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Chapter 1
Introduction
Allocation rules, information sharing requirements or precommitments of firms to
specific actions can strongly influence the outcome of a market. The understanding
of how these features affect incentives of players in a given context is hence essential
for market designers, antitrust authorities and legislators. In the following three
chapters of this dissertation these effects are analyzed. Methodologically, all chap-
ters have in common that they first develop and discuss a game theoretic model,
which is then used for the derivation of hypotheses that are tested in a laboratory
experiment. Each chapter thereby connects to and extends previous findings in
industrial organization, experimental economics or mechanism design.
A key difference between the chapters lies in the level of abstraction. Chapter 2
analyzes specific price commitments of firms in a well-defined market environment.
Chapter 3 looks more generally at the incentives of firms for sharing information in
environments which differ in the degree of information asymmetry and the type of
competition. Finally, the last chapter examines how institutions in general can be
designed to lead to a desired outcome, even if players have social preferences which
are unknown to the market designer.
Chapter 2 is motivated by a new low-price guarantee which was recently intro-
duced in the German gasoline market by Shell.1 The guarantee promises to regis-
tered customers of Shell that its effective gasoline price never exceeds the current
price of any regional competitor by more than 2 Cents. In addition, this guarantee
does not need to be explicitly claimed by participating customers, but is imple-
mented automatically since Shell checks every purchase with a complete and real-
time dataset from the German antitrust authority on whether the conditions of its
guarantee are met. This chapter investigates, how this new type of price guarantee
in general influences competition and, in particular, whether it can induce collusive
high prices.
To this end, we analyze the guarantee in a sequential Hotelling duopoly model
with two symmetric competitors which are located at the opposite ends of a road
and compete in prices for a homogeneous good. We find that whenever at least the
price-leader, i.e. the first moving firm, provides a guarantee with a sufficiently low
markup, the equilibrium price level in the market is on average at the monopoly price
1Chapter 2 is written without coauthors. Despite this, the terms we or us instead of I are used
throughout the chapter for consistency with the following chapters.
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level. The data from a laboratory experiment supports this theoretical prediction.
Here, we find that in the treatment where the first moving firm has a guarantee with
a low markup, prices of both firms are significantly higher in comparison with the
treatments where the markup is high, or no price guarantee is in place.
The findings contribute to the previous theoretical and experimental literature
on perfect price-matching guarantees and emphasize that this new type of price
guarantee should be carefully reviewed by regulators and antitrust authorities.
Chapter 3 is joint work with Jos Jansen. It is motivated by a conflict between
accounting rules and antitrust policies.2 In particular, antitrust authorities are typ-
ically skeptic about information sharing among competitors because this might lead
to price coordination, while accounting rules often force firms to publicly disclose
information in order to protect investors. This chapter studies strategic incentives
for the disclosure of private information by firms about common market character-
istics, like input costs or the demand level, and the corresponding consequences for
the market outcome.
For the analysis, we use a duopoly model with incomplete information on a
common demand intercept. This intercept can be either high or low and is drawn
according to some distribution. Each duopolist can learn the intercept with a pre-
defined probability. If they are successful in learning, they can voluntarily share this
information with their competitor before competing with each other in a product
market. Within this framework, we vary the demand distribution, the chances of
learning the intercept and whether the competition is in prices or quantities.
We find that, independently on the variation of the model, firms selectively
disclose information in order to gain a strategic advantage. By doing this, they
manage their competitor’s belief about the demand intercept as well as about their
own conduct. Hereby, they manipulate their competitor’s conduct in the product
market in a way favorable for them. However, what kind of information they disclose
and how strong the disclosure affects the market outcome depends on the information
asymmetries among firms and the type of competition. With Cournot competition,
firms typically disclose low demand and conceal high demand. However, we also
identify conditions under which one Cournot competitor follows this strategy and
2Both authors were equally involved in generating the general research ideas, the experimental
design as well as the hypotheses and in writing the draft. The theoretical model was developed
by Jos Jansen. Mathematical proofs were done by Jos Jansen. The experiment was programmed,
planned and conducted by Andreas Pollak. Statistical analyses were carried out by Andreas Pollak.
— The chapter is a modified version of Jansen and Pollak (2015). The data collection for the
homogenous goods Cournot treatments and parts of the empirical analysis regarding the first
hypothesis was done in Pollak (2012). The current version of the chapter was submitted to the
“International Journal of Industrial Organization” where it received a Revise & Resubmit.
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the other chooses the reverse strategy. Moreover, the reverse disclosure strategy is
always chosen in Bertrand competition, irrespective of the demand distribution and
the degree of information asymmetry.
The chapter connects to previous theoretical and experimental studies on infor-
mation disclosure. In particular, it is related to a paper by Ackert et al. (2000) who
find evidence for selective disclosure in a model where only one firm has the ability to
obtain and share information. We replicate and extend their findings by considering
bilateral disclosure decisions, Bertrand competition, and information asymmetries
between firms. We show that the previous finding of selective disclosure is robust
to various kinds of market environments. In addition, we provide a tool to examine
the resulting effect of disclosure on the market outcome.
In summary, our results help to evaluate the effects of economic policies regu-
lating information disclosure by firms, such as competition policies or accounting
rules.
Chapter 4 is joint work with Felix Bierbrauer, Axel Ockenfels and De´sire´e Ru¨ck-
ert.3 Standard mechanism design literature takes selfish preferences of players for
granted. Consequently, the mechanisms proposed by this literature might system-
ically fail when players are motivated by social preferences. In this chapter, we
compare standard mechanisms with social-preference-robust mechanisms by study-
ing two classical challenges of mechanism design, the bilateral trade problem and
the problem of optimal income taxation.
For the bilateral trade problem, we first characterize a standard optimal and seller
surplus maximizing mechanism, where the “buyer” and the “seller” are expected to
truthfully report their type. We test this mechanism in a laboratory experiment and
find that a non-negligible fraction of high valuation buyers understate their valua-
tion. This finding contradicts to the underlying assumption of selfish preferences in
classical mechanism design but is consistent with models of social preferences such
as Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Falk and Fischbacher (2006). We then characterize
a mechanism which is externality-free, i.e. where each player’s equilibrium payoff
does not depend on the other player’s type, and is thus social-preference-robust.
Testing this mechanism in the laboratory, we find that there are no longer devia-
tions from truth-telling. Hence, the social-preference-robust mechanism is able to
3The research question and the experimental design were developed by Felix Bierbrauer and
Axel Ockenfels, with comments from Andreas Pollak and Desiree Ru¨ckert. The theoretical analysis
was done by Felix Bierbrauer and Desiree Ru¨ckert. The experiment was planned, programmed and
conducted by Andreas Pollak. The statistical analyses were carried out by Andreas Pollak. All
authors contributed equally to writing the paper. The current version of the paper is forthcoming
in the “Journal of Public Economics”.
3
induce the desired outcome. However, in theory under the standard assumption
of selfish preferences, this social-preference-robust mechanism is inferior in terms
of performance relative to the standard mechanism, because the implementation of
externality-freeness comes with a cost. Due to this cost, the standard mechanism
outperformed the social-preference-robust mechanism in the experiment as the num-
ber of deviations in the former was too small to compensate for that cost. Based on
this observation, we engineered a hybrid mechanism by implementing externality-
freeness only for the cases where a deviation from truthful behavior was observed,
and tested it in the laboratory. In this experiment, the hybrid mechanism outper-
formed the standard mechanism in terms of both truth-telling and performance.
For the problem of optimal income taxation, we compare a mechanism proposed
by Piketty (1993), which is optimal in the classical sense, with a mechanism of Mir-
rlees (1971) which is externality-free. In an additional experiment, we find that the
(globally) externality-free Mirrleesian mechanism outperforms the standard optimal
(but not social-preference-robust) mechanism by Piketty in terms of both truthful
reporting and welfare.
Thus, Chapter 4 shows theoretically and experimentally that classic mechanisms
can fail in generating a desired outcome, whereas externality-free mechanisms can
preclude players from untruthful reporting. Whether a classic or a social-preference-
robust mechanism is superior in terms of performance depends on the extent of
deviations of players from truth-telling in the former. If the market designer knows
where deviations can be expected, externality-freeness can be implemented locally
and at a lower cost.
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Chapter 2
Do Price-Matching Guarantees with
Markups Facilitate Tacit Collusion?
Theory and Experiment∗
Andreas Pollak
University of Cologne
Abstract
This paper studies how competitive prices are affected by price-matching guarantees
allowing for markups on the lowest competing price. This new type of low-price
guarantee was recently introduced in the German retail gasoline market. Using a
sequential Hotelling model, we show that such guarantees, similar to perfect price-
matching guarantees, can induce collusive prices. In particular, this occurs if the
first mover provides a price guarantee with a markup which is below a threshold
value. In these cases, prices are on average set at the monopoly level. A laboratory
experiment supports the theoretical predictions.
Keywords: price-matching guarantee, tacit collusion, Hotelling, spatial competi-
tion, sequential pricing, laboratory experiment
JEL Codes: C92, D21, D22, D43, L11, L13, L41
∗The research project was funded by The Excellence Center for Social and Economic Behavior
at the University of Cologne via a Junior Start-up Grant of e 3,000, which is gratefully acknowl-
edged. I also acknowledge support from the German Research Foundation, who fund the Cologne
Laboratory for Economic Research where the experiment was conducted. I thank Axel Ockenfels,
Oliver Gu¨rtler, Felix Bierbrauer and my colleagues at the chair for helpful advice. I also thank
Alexander Rasch, Achim Wambach and all other participants of the Lenzerheide Seminar on Com-
petition Economics 2016 for valuable comments. Finally, special thanks go to Kiryl Khalmetski for
careful proof reading and Yero Ndiaye, who did a great job in assisting conducting the laboratory
experiment. Naturally, all errors are mine.
2.1 Introduction
Since summer 2015, Shell promotes a new kind of low-price guarantee for standard
gasoline: a price-matching guarantee with a markup on the lowest competing price
within the regional market. In order to benefit from this guarantee, Shell’s customers
have to register once, which is free of charge. Hereafter, Shell automatically checks
for any purchase whether the posted gasoline price exceeds the lowest competing
price by more than 2 Cents per liter, and, if this is the case, reduces its selling price
to the lowest price plus the markup of 2 Cents.1
The introduction of the guarantee followed a change in the design of the gasoline
retail market, implemented by the German antitrust authority in 2013. More pre-
cisely, the Bundeskartellamt established a real-time database for standard gasoline
and diesel, called the Markttransparenzstelle fu¨r Kraftstoffe or market transparency
unit, and forced almost all gasoline retailers to keep their prices in the database up to
date.2 The market transparency unit is accessible for anyone free of charge via var-
ious websites or smart-phone apps. The purpose of its introduction was to increase
competition in the German gasoline retail market, as this market was found to be
prone to (tacit) price coordination.3 However, it also enabled Shell to introduce this
kind of guarantee, by providing the data for its automatic price comparisons. This
made the guarantee especially attractive to customers, because they do not incur
any costs of invoking the guarantee.
The question arising from this motivating example is whether this new kind of
low-price guarantee might have an anti-competitive effect. Previous theoretical, em-
pirical and experimental literature suggests that perfect price-matching guarantees
are anti-competitive if the costs of invoking the guarantee are low. In contrary, other
forms of low-price guarantees, especially price-beating guarantees, can even be pro-
competitive. In a nutshell, the anti-competitive effect of the perfect price-matching
guarantees results from making it virtually impossible to effectively undercut a ri-
val’s price. However, this argument does not apply if the guarantee comes with a
markup, since effective undercutting within the markup is possible. To the authors
best knowledge, no previous theoretical or experimental paper studied the effect of
a price guarantee with a maximal markup on competing prices, except for a re-
cent empirical study by Dewenter and Schwalbe (2015), who find evidence for an
anti-competitive effect of Shell’s guarantee.
1For exact condition terms of the guarantee see Shell Deutschland Oil GmbH (2016).
2See Bundeskartellamt (2014, 2015) for details.
3See Bundeskartellamt (2011).
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This paper intends to close this gap. First, it analyzes the effects of price-
matching guarantees with non-negative markups on competition in a theoretical
framework inspired by the motivating example. Second, the obtained theoretical
predictions are tested in a laboratory experiment. Both, theoretical and experimen-
tal results show that the guarantee with a non-negative markup can indeed induce
price coordination and leads to (on average) monopoly prices in these cases.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The second section provides
a brief overview of previous theoretical, experimental and empirical literature on
low-price guarantees. The third section theoretically analyzes the price guarantee
with a markup in a sequential Hotelling framework with two symmetric firms com-
peting in prices and producing homogeneous goods. The fourth section presents an
experimental design which is used to test the main theoretical predictions. Finally,
the last section summarizes and discusses the results.
2.2 Previous literature
The effects of low-price guarantees have been discussed extensively in the economics
and law literature since the early 1980s.4
Salop (1986) was the first to intuitively point out that perfect price-matching
guarantees potentially lead to inefficient and anti-competitive market outcomes.
The basic idea is that, when a firm faces a competitor with a perfect price-matching
guarantee, its incentive to undercut the competitor’s price is dampened since his re-
bate mechanism effectively creates a penalty (Salop, 1986, p.16), as individual price
cuts become mutual. Accordingly, whenever all firms offer price-matching in mar-
kets with simultaneous price competition, new equilibria arise with prices above the
competitive level. This was later formalized by Doyle (1988). A further study by
Logan and Lutter (1989) shows that under certain conditions, it is sufficient for a
collusive market outcome if at least one firm offers a perfect price-matching guar-
antee. The authors endogenize the adoption of perfect price-matching guarantees
in a model with asymmetric costs, differentiated goods and simultaneous price com-
petition. They find that only the high-cost firm offering a guarantee can induce an
anti-competitive market outcome. In particular, if cost asymmetries are small, it
adopts the guarantee and hereby creates incentives for supra-competitive pricing,
whereas under large asymmetries it does not offer price-matching.
Additional literature focuses on further potentially negative effects of price match-
ing guarantees. Edlin and Emch (1999) study the role of market entry and find
4Hviid (2010) provides a detailed survey.
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that in markets with perfect price-matching, new entrants are attracted by collusive
profits and also adopt the given pricing strategy. Hence, these entries only create
inefficiencies, due to their entry and fixed costs, without making prices more com-
petitive. Furthermore, Corts (1996) and Chen et al. (2001) suggest that low-price
guarantees can be a tool to facilitate price discrimination between informed and
uninformed customers, as only the former can invoke the guarantee. Consequently,
in most cases uninformed customers loose whereas informed customers gain.5
In line with the previous argumentations Hay (1982), Sargent (1993) and Edlin
(1997) advocate in favor of legislative prohibition of low-price guarantees and advise
anti-trust authorities to at least carefully monitor markets in which they are used.
Further theoretical literature points out restrictions of the previous arguments
against low-price guarantees. Hviid and Schaffer (1999) introduce the term has-
sle costs, which subsumes all non-pecuniary costs of invoking the guarantee. They
show that whenever hassle costs exist, a perfect price-matching guarantee does not
prevent a competitor from undercutting within the hassle costs, since customers
would not enforce the guarantee in these cases. This reasoning implies that in the
presence of hassle costs, price-matching guarantees do not give rise to collusive equi-
libria in symmetric markets, while in asymmetric markets the potential for collusive
outcomes is limited.6 Moorthy and Winter (2006) show that in highly asymmetric
markets with costly information, low-costs firms adopt price guarantees not to foster
collusion, but rather as a signaling device. In these cases, under certain conditions
low-price guarantees can increase welfare.
A different strand of literature studies price-beating guarantees, i.e. promises
to strictly underbid the lowest competing price to a certain percentage or amount.
Hviid and Schaffer (1994) as well as Corts (1995) find that these guarantees do
not lead to collusive market outcomes and in turn can be used to offset perfect
price-matching guarantees. The reason is that price-beating guarantees reestablish
the firms’ ability to unilaterally undercut prices, even if the competitors offer price-
matching or beating. Intuitively, by posting a higher price, a firm offering a price-
beating guarantee forces itself to effectively undercut the competitors’ prices, while
at the same time the guarantees of the competitors are not activated. Kaplan
(2000) criticizes these findings by pointing out that these results are restricted to
price guarantees which pertain to posted prices, although admitting that these form
of guarantees are empirically more relevant.
5Corts (1996) finds, for a special case where informed customers have the less elastic demand
and firms can offer price-beating guarantees, that prices fall for both groups.
6Mao (2005) comes to a similar conclusion when focusing on the costs of returning of ex ante
uninformed customers to stores that provide price-matching.
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Empirical studies qualitatively confirm most of the theoretical results. For exam-
ple, Hess and Gerstner (1991) study the price development of five supermarket chains
in North Carolina in the mid 1980s. They find that after the first chain adopted
a perfect price-matching guarantee for specific goods, the others followed suit by
adopting similar guarantees. Consequently, prices of the goods included in the guar-
antees rose significantly in comparison to those excluded, while the differences in
the former prices almost vanished completely. Arbatskaya et al. (2004) study over
500 price guarantees by using data from newspaper advertisements. They find that
56 percent of the perfect price-matching guarantees and only about 10 percent of
the price-beating guarantees led to pricing above the competitive level. In addition,
they find that most of the latter referred to posted instead of effective prices. A
further study by Arbatskaya et al. (2006) comes to a similar conclusion when re-
viewing low-price guarantees in the retail tire market. Moorthy and Winter (2006)
as well as Moorthy and Zhang (2006) find support for the usage of price-matching
guarantees as signaling device by low-cost firms. A recent paper by Dewenter and
Schwalbe (2015) studies the effect of low-price guarantees in the German gasoline
market. With a difference-in-difference panel regression, controlling for exogenous
effects and using data from the market transparency unit, they examine changes in
pricing of two chains which recently started offering low-price guarantees. For the
chain HEM, which are offering a non-automatic prefect price-matching guarantee,
they do not find any significant price effect. The authors speculate, that this is a
result of the relative high hassle costs customer faces for invoking the guarantee. For
Shell’s hassle cost free price-matching guarantee with a markup, the authors find a
significant price increase by Shell of 2.4–2.8 Cent per liter standard gasoline after
the introduction of the guarantee.
Furthermore, experimental literature also supports most of the theoretical im-
plications. Dugar (2007) and Mago and Pate (2009) consider perfect price-matching
guarantees and focus on the resulting equilibrium selection in symmetric and asym-
metric markets with homogeneous goods and simultaneous pricing. They find evi-
dence for the selection of the most collusive equilibrium, as long as the asymmetries
in costs are sufficiently small. In addition, Fatas and Manez (2007) and Fatas et al.
(2013) results support the prediction that perfect price-matching guarantees lead to
a collusive outcome when symmetric firms compete simultaneously in a market with
differentiated goods. Finally, Fatas et al. (2005) find no evidence that price-beating
guarantees cause an anti-competitive market outcome.
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2.3 Theory
2.3.1 Framework
The model is based on the Hotelling duopoly framework with linear transportation
costs. There are two firms producing a homogeneous good, which are located at the
opposite ends of a road and compete in prices (Hotelling, 1929).
Customers are uniformly distributed along the road, normalized to a mass of 1,
and have a valuation of v > 0 for a unit of the good. They behave as price takers,
since they are infinitely many. Customers have full transparency about prices and
incur linear transportation costs of t > 0 times the distance to their dealer. The
transportation costs are assumed to be moderate, i.e. t < v
3
, which keeps the analysis
simple and assures that the firms serve the entire road in equilibrium. All customers
behave rationally and have a single unit demand. Thus, they buy at the best deal
they can get whenever their net benefit is positive, otherwise they do not buy at all.
Firms do not face capacity constraints and incur neither fixed nor variable costs.
They are allowed to set any non-negative price, i.e. dumping is prohibited. Firm A is
located at the left end of the road, at position xA = 0. The main new element of the
model is that it provides a price-matching guarantee with an (exogenous) markup
m ≥ 0.7 That is, it guarantees to customers that it never exceeds the competitor’s
price by more than m.8 Firm B is located at the right end of the road, i.e. at xB = 1,
and offers no price guarantee. Restricting to only Firm A offering a price guarantee
is sufficient to show the collusive effect of the price guarantee. In Appendix 2.B
we prove that any version of the model where Firm B additionally has an arbitrary
price guarantee with a non-negative markup leads to identical prices in equilibrium,
compared to the game with only Firm A offering such a guarantee.
The timing of the game is as follows. In the first stage, Firm A chooses its posted
price ppA (i.e. its initially announced price). After observing p
p
A, Firm B chooses its
price pB in the second stage. Based on these posted prices the effective price of
Firm A, denoted as pA, results by applying the guarantee, i.e.
pA := min{ppA, pB +m} with m ∈ [0, t[. (2.1)
7A markup smaller than zero would be an exotic form of a price-beating guarantee, which is
activated if the competitors price is not sufficiently higher than the price of the guarantee issuing
firm. For a discussion of price-beating guarantees see the previous literature section and the
references therein.
8For simplification, the analysis is restricted to cases where m < t, since otherwise the market
share would be zero for Firm A whenever the price guarantee is active.
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The effective price of Firm B always equals its posted price. Once the effective prices
are determined, customers make their purchasing decisions, and the game ends.
The game is solved by backward induction, i.e. the solution concept is a sub-game
perfect Nash equilibrium.
2.3.2 Market demand in equilibrium
Now, we derive the market demand function of Firm i. The location of the customer
who is indifferent between purchasing at Firm A or Firm B is denoted by x˜AB
(i.e. x˜AB ∈ [0, 1] is the share of customers located to the left of this customer on
the road). If this customer has a non-negative net benefit from consumption, his
position determines market shares, since all customers to the left of him will buy at
Firm A whereas all customers to the right of him will find it more profitable to buy
at Firm B.
In general, a customer located at position x gets a net benefit of uAx from buying at
Firm A, which equals his valuation minus the price and the incurred transportation
costs:
uAx = v − pA − x · t. (2.2)
The same customer receives a net benefit of uBx if he instead buys at Firm B:
uBx = v − pB − (1− x) · t. (2.3)
Consequently, the location of the customer who is indifferent between Firm A and
Firm B is
x˜AB =
1
2
+
pB − pA
2t
.
This position is interior (i.e., between 0 and 1) if and only if
pA − t < pB < pA + t. (2.4)
Naturally, being indifferent between buying at Firm A and Firm B does not neces-
sarily assure that the customer is willing to buy at all. This is only the case if his
net benefit of purchasing is non-negative, i.e. uAx˜AB = u
B
x˜AB ≥ 0. This is equivalent
to:
pB ≤ 2v − t− pA. (2.5)
Next, we consider four possible cases depending on the location and preferences of
the indifferent customer.
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Case 1: Condition (2.5) is not satisfied, while the indifferent customer does not exist
along the road. The non-existence of the indifferent customer implies that condition
(2.4) does not hold, i.e. the price difference between the firms exceeds the highest
possible transportation cost. Then, all customers on the road prefer the firm with
the lower price over the other firm (whose demand is then 0 anyway). The former
firm hence faces a monopolistic demand function:
DM(pi) =

1 if pi ≤ v − t,
v − pi
t
if v − t < pi < v,
0 else.
(2.6)
Case 2: Condition (2.5) is not satisfied, while the indifferent customer exists along
the road. In this case, there exists a range of customers along the road who do not
buy from any of the firms. Then, firms do not effectively compete with each other,
since the price of one firm does not affect the demand of the other, and hence again
face a monopolistic demand function given by (2.6), except that the first segment
with DM(pi) = 1 does not exist in this case.
Case 3: Condition (2.5) is satisfied, while the indifferent customer does not exist
along the road. Then, as in Case 1, the firm with a higher price has a demand of
zero, while the firm with a lower price faces monopolistic demand. However, one
can show that under considered conditions it always holds for the latter firm that
pi ≤ v − t, which by (2.6) implies that it demand is 1.
Case 4: Condition (2.5) is satisfied, while the indifferent customer exists along the
road. In this case, the indifferent customer prefers to buy the good over not buying.
Hence, Firm A (B) faces competitive demand given by the fraction of customers
positioned to the left (right) from the indifferent customer. That is, the market
demand for Firm i ∈ {A,B}, denoted as Di, is a function of the effective prices pi
and p−i:
Di(pi, p−i) =
1
2
+
p−i − pi
2t
. (2.7)
Finally, note that a firm gets a demand of 1 if and only if the following condition is
satisfied:
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Lemma 1. Firm i receives the whole demand if and only if pi ≤ v−t and pi < p−i−t.
Proof. A given firm receives the whole demand if and only if the following two
incentive constraints for the customers are satisfied: 1) all customers prefer buying
from this firm over not buying; 2) all customers prefer buying from this firm over
buying from the other firm. Given (2.2) and (2.3), these conditions are equivalent
to the conditions stated in the lemma. 
Thus, summing up all four cases and taking Lemma 1 into account, the market
demand for Firm i ∈ {A,B} is:
Di(pi, p−i) =

1 if pi ≤ v − t ∧ pi < p−i − t ,
1
2
+
p−i − pi
2t
if pi ≤ 2v − t− p−i ∧ pi ∈ [p−i − t, p−i + t] ,
v − pi
t
if pi > 2v − t− p−i ∧ pi ∈ ]v − t, v[ ,
0 else.
(2.8)
2.3.3 Equilibrium pricing without guarantees -
The competitive benchmark case
To begin, we relax the assumption that Firm A offers a price guarantee and look
what happens in the competitive benchmark case, i.e. ppA = pA.
9 In the next section,
we will then consider the model with Firm A having a price-matching guarantee with
a non-negative markup, as described above.
In stage 2, Firm B knows ppA and maximizes piB by choosing the optimal pB.
Since Firm A’s posted price is also its effective price and given (2.8), we get the
following piecewise defined profit function:
piNoPGB (pB, p
p
A)=

pB if pB ≤ v − t ∧ pB < ppA − t ,
pB ·
[
1
2
+
ppA − pB
2t
]
if pB < 2v − t− ppA ∧ pB ∈ [ppA − t, ppA + t] ,
pB ·
[
v − pB
t
]
if pB ≥ 2v − t− ppA ∧ pB ∈ ]v − t, v[ ,
0 else.
(2.9)
9This is technically equivalent to offering a guarantee with an infinitely high markup on the
competitor’s price, which therefore cannot be activated.
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This implies the following result:
Proposition 1. Firm B’s reaction function, when Firm A does not provide a price
guarantee, is given by:
RNoPGB (p
p
A) =

v − t if ppA > v,
ppA − t if 3t ≤ ppA ≤ v,
ppA+t
2
if ppA < 3t.
Proof. See Appendix 2.B.
Thus, Firm B’s best response depends on ppA being in one of three different cases.
Now, we discuss the intuition for B’s best response in each of these cases.
Case 1 – Firm A posts a prohibitively high price, i.e. ppA > v. In this case, Firm B
is de facto a monopolist. Since the transportation costs are moderate, a monopolist
wants to serve the entire road and sets a price of v − t.
Case 2 – Firm A posts a price between 3t and v. In this interval, ppA is not prohibitive,
but high enough to make it profitable for Firm B to serve the full market on its own.
Thus, Firm B undercuts Firm A’s price just to the extent of the transportation
costs.
Case 3 – Firm A posts a price between 0 and 3t. For this interval of ppA, it is not
optimal, even in some cases not possible, for Firm B to serve the entire road. Hence,
Firm B shares the market with Firm A. The price pB =
1
2
(ppA + t) solves Firm B’s
trade-off between gaining a higher market share and charging a higher price.
In the first stage, Firm A anticipates Firm B’s reaction function given by Propo-
sition 1 and hence faces the following maximization problem:
argmax
ppA
piNoPGA (p
p
A)|RNoPGB =

0 if ppA ≥ 3t,
ppA ·
[
1
2
+
t− ppA
4t
]
if ppA < 3t
(2.10)
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If ppA is at least 3t, Firm B, according to Proposition 1, undercuts Firm A’s price
at least by t. In these cases, the demand of Firm A will be zero, as even the closest
customer at x = 0 would prefer to buy from Firm B.
If ppA is smaller than 3t, Firm B undercuts, if at all, to a lesser extent than t by
setting pB =
ppA+t
2
. In these cases, all conditions of the second case of the demand
function in (2.8) are fulfilled: First,
ppA − pB =
ppA − t
2
< t,
pB − ppA =
t− ppA
2
> −t,
where the inequalities follow from ppA < 3t. Second,
pB =
ppA + t
2
≤ 2v − t− ppA
⇔ ppA ≤
4
3
v − t,
which holds for ppA < 3t because t ≤ v3 . Thus, by (2.8), whenever ppA is smaller than
3t the demand for Firm A is
1
2
+
pB − ppA
2t
=
1
2
+
1
2
ppA +
1
2
t− ppA
2t
=
1
2
+
t− ppA
4t
,
which implies the above profit maximization problem of Firm A. That is, if Firm
A posts a price higher than 3t, Firm B will serve the market on its own and conse-
quently A’s profits are zero, whereas for lower prices Firm A has to share the market
with Firm B and the profits are equal to its market share multiplied by its charged
price.
Solving the maximization problem of Firm A gives the optimal price of ppA =
3
2
t.
Using Firm B’s reaction function and the demand function in (2.8), we obtain the
equilibrium characterization of the competitive benchmark case in which Firm A
does not provide a price guarantee:
ppA =
3
2
t, pB =
5
4
t, DA =
3
8
, DB =
5
8
, piA =
18
32
t, piB =
25
32
t.
Note that Firm B is better off than Firm A in equilibrium, which results from the
sequential structure of the game. Since prices are strategic complements, Firm B
has a second mover advantage. It can profitably undercut Firm A’s price and hereby
gain a higher market share as well as higher profits in equilibrium.
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2.3.4 Equilibrium pricing with guarantees
In this subsection we assume that Firm A provides a guarantee with a non-negative
markup on the competitor’s price.10 This includes, if m is zero, also a perfect price-
matching guarantee.
In the second stage Firm B maximizes its profit function
piPGB (pB, pA(p
p
A, pB)) =

piNo PGB (pB, p
p
A) if pB ≥ ppA −m ,
piPG−ActiveB (pB, pB +m) else.
That is, only if it undercuts the price of Firm A by no more than m, Firm A’s
guarantee will not be activated and profits are defined by piNo PGB . For any lower pB,
the guarantee will be activated and the profits of Firm B are defined by (given the
demand function (2.8)):
piPG−ActiveB (pB, pB +m) =

pB ·
[
1
2
+
m
2t
]
if pB ≤ v − t+m
2
,
pB ·
[
v − pB
t
]
if v − t+m
2
< pB < v,
0 else.
(2.11)
Whenever Firm A’s price guarantee is active, the effective price difference between
pA and pB equals the markup, independently of pB. Consequently, the position
of the customer being indifferent between buying at Firm A or B exists along the
road, as the price difference m is by assumption smaller than t (see condition 2.4).
Hence, by the demand function in (2.8), whenever this customer finds it profitable
to purchase a good, i.e. if condition (2.5) holds (which is then equivalent to pB ≤
v − t+m
2
), the market demands are fixed to DA =
1
2
− m
2t
and DB =
1
2
+ m
2t
. This
is plausible, as customers balance the trade-off between better (effective) prices and
higher transportation costs. However, if pB exceeds v − t+m2 (i.e. the indifferent
customer prefers not to buy), the demand is calculated with the demand function of
a monopolist, stated in (2.6). Thus, for pB ≤ v− t+m2 profits are linearly increasing in
pB, whereas for higher prices profits are decreasing, so that the profits are maximized
at pB = v − t+m2 .
10As proven in Appendix 2.B, prices in equilibrium are identical if additionally Firm B provides
a price-matching guarantee with a non-negative markup.
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The following proposition derives the reaction function of Firm B maximizing piPGB :
Proposition 2. Firm B’s reaction function, when Firm A provides a price guarantee
with a markup m on the competitor’s price, is given by:
RPGB (p
p
A) =

v − t+m
2
if ppA > v − t−m2 ,
ppA −m if t+ 2m < ppA ≤ v − t−m2 ,
ppA + t
2
if ppA ≤ t+ 2m.
(2.12)
Proof. See Appendix 2.B.
Thus, Firm B’s reaction is dependent on ppA being in a specific interval. In the
following paragraphs the intuition for the optimal choice of pB is briefly discussed
with the help of a graphical illustration for each of the three intervals.
pB
piPGB
ν − t+m
2
ν
Figure 2.1: piPGB if p
p
A > v − t−m2
Figure 2.1 depicts the profit function of Firm B for ppA > v − t−m2 . Whenever
pB is below v − t+m2 Firm A’s price guarantee is active while the market is fully
covered. Hence, by (2.8), Firm B’s market demand is DB =
1
2
+ m
2t
, and thus
constant. Therefore, profits are linearly increasing in this interval. For any higher
pB, condition (2.5) is violated, and thus, independently of whether pB might activate
Firm A’s guarantee or not, Firm B faces monopolistic demand. Since the monopolist
prefers to serve the entire road, Firm B’s profits are monotonically decreasing in this
segment. Consequently, it is optimal to set pB = v− t+m2 for any ppA > v− t−m2 , since
any higher pB would lead to an unprofitable loss in market share and any lower price
would trigger a harmful automatic reduction of Firm A’s price. The latter precludes
Firm B from gaining any higher market demand.
Figure 2.2 illustrates Firm B’s profits for posted prices in the interval [t + 2m,
v− t−m
2
]. Analogously to the reasoning above, due to the price guarantee, it can not
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pB
piPGB
ppA −m ν
Figure 2.2: piPGB if t+ 2m < p
p
A ≤ v − t−m2
be optimal to set pB < p
p
A −m, since this would result in decreased profits for both
firms while leaving market shares unaffected. For any higher pB, Firm B’s trade-off
between charging at a higher price and gaining a higher demand is in favor of the
demand, independently of whether pB would violate condition (2.5) or not. As a
result piPGB is decreasing in this segment. In summary, p
p
A is still sufficiently high so
that Firm B has an incentive to undercut Firm A’s price just to the extent of the
markup.
Figure 2.3 finally refers to the states where Firm A posted a price lower or equal
2m + t. Here, the posted price of Firm A is so low, that Firm B would not want
to undercut it by more than m, even if it could effectively do so. Thus, the optimal
reaction for these posted prices is, similar to the competitive benchmark case, to set
pB =
ppA+t
2
.
pB
piPGB
ppA −m (ppA + t)/2 ppA + t
Figure 2.3: piPGB if p
p
A ≤ t+ 2m
In summary, Firm B ensures in all cases that the market is fully covered and
shared with Firm A, with a maximal market share of Firm B of 1
2
+ m
2t
.
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Given Firm B’s reaction, given by Proposition 2, and the demand function in
(2.8), Firm A faces the following maximization problem:
argmax
ppA
piA(p
p
A)|RPGB =

[
v − t−m
2
]
·
[
1
2
− m
2t
]
if ppA > v − t−m2 ,
ppA ·
[
1
2
− m
2t
]
if t+ 2m < ppA ≤ v − t−m2 ,
ppA ·
[
1
2
+
t− ppA
4t
]
if ppA ≤ t+ 2m.
(2.13)
That is, for any posted price higher than t + 2m, Firm A will serve a market
demand of 1
2
− m
2t
, since Firm B will either undercut just to the extent of the markup
or activate Firm A’s price guarantee (see Proposition 2). Moreover, its profits strictly
increase in the interval [t+2m, v− t−m
2
] because its effective price will be the posted
price as pB will be set to just p
p
A −m. All posted prices higher than v − t−m2 will
result in an effective price of Firm A of v − t−m
2
, due to the activation of the price
guarantee. Only for ppA ≤ t + 2m the maximization problem is identical to the
problem of the competitive benchmark case.
The following proposition shows the optimal price of Firm A:
Proposition 3. In equilibrium, Firm A will set
ppA =
p
p
A ≥ v −
t−m
2
if m < φ,
3
2
t if m ≥ φ.
(2.14)
with φ = 1
2
√
4v2 − 9t2 − v + t.
Proof. See Appendix 2.B.
According to Proposition 3 Firm A’s optimal price depends on the markup being
above or below the critical threshold value φ. Whenever m < φ, Firm A can
maximize its profits by setting any collusive arbitrary high price which is at least
v − t−m
2
, since Firm B will then take care, that the market is jointly covered with
the highest possible prices. For m ≥ φ Firm A’s optimal price coincides with the
equilibrium price in the competitive benchmark case.
Figure 2.4 shows an example of Firm A’s profit function if m is below the critical
threshold value. Here, the local profit maximum in the competitive section, reached
with the competitive price ppA =
3
2
t in the example, is clearly below the maximum
which can be achieved by setting a collusive price. This argument also holds if the
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ppA
piPGA
3
2
t ν − t−m
2
Figure 2.4: piPGA if m < φ
local maximum of the parabola is to the right of the competitive section, i.e. if
3
2
t < 2m+ t.
Figure 2.5 portrays Firm A’s profit function when m exceeds the critical thresh-
old. Here, the profits from collusion are lower than the profits which can be achieved
in the competitive segment. This results from the fact that the market division with
collusion is increasingly disadvantageous for Firm A when m gets larger.
ppA
piPGA
3
2
t ν − t−m
2
Figure 2.5: piPGA if m ≥ φ
Finally, Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 together imply the following result, fully
characterizing the effective prices in equilibrium.
Proposition 4. If Firm A offers a price guarantee with a non-negative markup of
(a) m < φ, the effective price of Firm A is v − t−m
2
and the effective price of
Firm B is v − t+m
2
, and hence prices equal on average the monopoly price of v − t
2
.
(b) m ≥ φ, the effective price of Firm A is 3
2
t, and the effective price of Firm B
is 5
4
t, and hence prices are the same as in the competitive benchmark case where no
firm provides a guarantee.
Proof. See Appendix 2.B.
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The intuition for Proposition 4 is simply that Firm A’s market share is decreasing
in the size of the markup. Hence, if m exceeds φ, Firm A’s profit from setting a
collusive price would be too small, so that it prefers to post the competitive price.
In contrast, if m is below φ, the guarantee induces a collusive outcome.
2.3.5 Summary of results
Table 2.1 summarizes the results and compares equilibrium market outcomes across
different kinds of competition.
It shows that whenever Firm A offers perfect price-matching, the market outcome
is identical to a case where both firms are owned by a monopolist. This type of price
guarantee is most attractive for Firm A, because it neutralizes the second mover
advantage of Firm B, i.e. both firms share the monopoly profit of v − t
2
equally.
Table 2.1: Equilibrium Prices and Consumer Rent
pA pB Consumer rent
Monopoly,
v − t
2
v − t
2
1
4
t
Perfect price-matching (m = 0)
Price-matching with m ∈ (0, φ] v − t−m
2
v − t+m
2
1
4
t+ m
2
4t
Price-matching with m ≥ φ, 3
2
t 5
4
t v − 81
64
t
No price-matching
According to Proposition 4, whenever Firm A is offering a price guarantee with
a positive small markup, the average price level of both firms is still the monopoly
price. However, due to the unequal market division, the profit of Firm A decreases
when the markup gets bigger, whereas the profits of Firm B increase. The consumer
rent in this case is slightly higher in comparison with perfect price-matching, as cus-
tomers close to Firm B benefit from its lower prices and their gains overcompensate
the losses of customers close to Firm A.
If Firm A offers a price guarantee with a high markup, the guarantee will be
virtually ignored. Both firms set prices as in the competitive benchmark case, and
accordingly rents and profits are unaffected by the guarantee.
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2.4 Experiment
We conducted a laboratory experiment using the model-framework discussed in the
previous section. We aim to investigate the collusive effects of guarantees with
different maximum markups on the competitor’s price.
Background information. All treatments were programmed with the software
z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and all sessions were conducted in the Cologne Laboratory
for Economic Research at the University of Cologne in August 2016. Participants
were randomly recruited from a sample of 1,500 students, enrolled in business ad-
ministration or economics, via email with the Online Recruitment System ORSEE
(Greiner, 2015). We conducted in total six sessions with 30 participants each. Each
subject was only allowed to participate in one session. The share of males and fe-
males, 53.3% and 46.7% respectively, was almost equal. The average age was 24.7
years. Payments to subjects consisted of a 4 Euro lump-sum payment for showing
up, another 4 Euro for completing a short questionnaire and additional money which
could be earned in every period, based on achieved profits. The currency used was
Experimental Currency Units (ECU), which was converted to Euro at the end of
the experiment at an exchange rate of 1 EUR per 14,000 ECU. Average individual
payments including the lump-sum payments were 13.56 Euro. Each session took
about one hour.
2.4.1 Design and hypotheses
The lab experiment was designed to test the extend of tacit collusion in the presence
of guarantees. Three treatments were conducted: A baseline treatment without a
price guarantee, a treatment with a markup below and a treatment with a markup
above the threshold value φ, which determines whether a guarantee is expected to
lead to collusive prices or not. In each treatment subjects were in role of either
Firm A or Firm B and faced a computerized equilibrium demand function.
Besides the markup, all parameters were kept constant across treatments. The
valuation of customers for a good was set to v = 200 and the transportation costs
were set to t = 35. Given these parameters, the threshold value φ predicts that
a price guarantee with a markup below 27.99 results in collusive prices, whereas
guarantees with higher markups are expected to result in competitive prices. Addi-
tionally, potential customers along the road were set to a mass of 100 instead of 1 in
the previous section. This does not qualitatively change theoretical predictions, but
scales up demand and profits and thus makes the experiment less artificial and easier
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to explain in the instructions. In order to gain sufficient statistical power for the
analysis, all treatments consisted of two sessions with 30 participants each. Since
we used a matching group size of six, this resulted in 10 independent observations
for each role in every treatment.
Table 2.2 summarizes the treatment design and states theoretical point predic-
tions for posted as well as effective prices, and the corresponding equilibrium profits.
Table 2.2: Treatment Design and Point Predictions
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3
(No guarantee) (Small markup) (High markup)
m — 2 33
ppA 52.50 ≥ 183.50 52.50
pA 52.50 183.50 52.50
pB 43.75 181.50 43.75
piA 1, 968.75 8, 650.71 1, 968.75
piB 2, 734.38 9, 593.57 2, 734.38
All values are stated in ECU.
In Treatment 1 (T1) Firm A has no price guarantee. This treatment serves as the
competitive benchmark. In equilibrium Firm A sets a price of 52.50. Firm B, due to
its second mover advantage undercuts this by setting a price of 43.75. Consequently,
Firm A’s price exceeds Firm B’s price by 20%, leading to a market coverage of 37.5%
for Firm A compared to 62.5% for Firm B. Due to the higher market share, Firm B
gets a profit of 2,734.38, which exceeds Firm A’s profit of 1,968.25 .
In Treatment 2 (T2) Firm A has a price guarantee with a markup of m = 2.
Since this markup is below the threshold value φ, it induces a collusive market
outcome in theory. In any equilibrium of T2, Firm A posts the collusive price of
183.50 or higher. Firm B undercuts the posted price but only to the extent of m
plus the amount by which Firm A’s price exceeds 183.50. Put differently, Firm B
sets 181.50 in any equilibrium and thus assures that the effective price of Firm A is
183.50. Consequently, effective prices are close to another and equilibrium market
shares and profits are only in slight favor of Firm B, which serves 52.86% of the
market and earns 9,593.57 compared to 47.14% and 8,650.71 for Firm A.
In Treatment 3 (T3) Firm A has a price guarantee with a markup of m = 33.
Since the markup is higher than φ, theory predicts that the guarantee does not
affect effective prices, market shares and profit levels compared to a setting where
no guarantee is in place. Thus, chosen price levels in this treatment are expected to
coincide with the price levels of T1.
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Hypotheses. In summary, we get two hypotheses from the treatment compar-
isons. First, we expect the price guarantee with the small markup in T2 to lead to
a collusive market outcome. That is, we expect Firm A and Firm B to set higher
prices in T2 compared to T1. Second, we do not expect the price guarantee with the
high markup to have any effect on competition. Consequently, the prices of Firm A
and Firm B in T3 are expected not to differ compared to T1 but to be lower than
in T2.
Procedures within the experiment. All treatments consisted of an individual
trial stage, followed by an interaction stage consisting of 15 periods of the sequential
pricing game.
Prior to the start of the experiment, subjects were randomly allotted to computer
terminals. Then they received identical written instructions, explaining general lab
rules, all treatment specific information, including the equilibrium demand function
as well as the matching procedure in the interaction stage.11 Whenever subjects had
questions, these were answered privately by referring to the relevant section in the
instructions.
The trial stage, which lasted approximately five minutes, started roughly ten
minutes after the instructions were distributed. This stage was not payoff rele-
vant, did not involve any interaction between subjects and consisted of a simple
scenario-calculator which used continuous posted prices as inputs and showed re-
sulting effective prices, market shares and profit levels as outputs. This calculator
was identical for all subjects within a treatment, independently of the role a subject
was assigned to in the subsequent interaction stage, where it was also accessible.
The purpose for providing the calculator was to allow subjects to deal with complex
demand and profit calculations. By using a calculator with empty default values,
it could be avoided to set anchoring points in contrast to providing payoff tables or
examples, which inevitably put focus on certain price combinations. The scenario
calculator could be used for any continuous price combination between 0 and 200.12
Finally, subjects proceeded to the interaction stage, consisting of 15 identical
periods of the sequential pricing game. Each subject was assigned to a specific role,
either Firm A or Firm B, and a matching group consisting of 6 subjects. These
11The instruction in English language can be found in Appendix 2.C. The original German
instructions are available upon request.
12Imposing an upper bound for posted prices was necessary, due to a technical reason: Subjects
entered prices via a slider bar, which requires a lower and an upper bound. Thus, we have chosen
to set the upper bound to the prohibitive price level of 200, since all posted prices higher than
200 are at least weakly dominated. Thus, this restriction does not affect the equilibrium point
predictions stated in Table 2.2.
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assignments remained constant for the course of the experiment. In order to avoid
reciprocal behavior, a stranger matching was used to determine pairs of Firm A and
Firm B. That is, in every period each subject was randomly rematched within its
matching group, while we ensured that the same pair was never matched in two
consecutive periods. This matching procedure was clearly stated in the instructions.
Only the size of the matching group was not mentioned. At the beginning of each
period Firm A chooses its posted price. Thereafter Firm B, being aware of the posted
price, chooses its effective price. Afterwards subjects received complete feedback on
posted and effective prices, market shares and profit levels and proceeded to the
next period.
Once the experiment was over, a short questionnaire appeared on the screen
asking subjects for their age, field of study and gender. In addition to the collec-
tion of demographic data, the questionnaire justified the higher than usual total
lump-sum payment of 8 Euro. The latter was needed for easing equilibrium payoff
differences across treatments, as the exchange rate of ECU to EUR was identical
across treatments.
2.4.2 Results
Table 2.3 summarizes the descriptive results of the experiment.
Table 2.3: Average Price and Profit Levels
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3
(no guarantee) (small markup) (high markup)
Prediction Experiment Prediction Experiment Prediction Experiment
ppA 52.50 79.82 ≥ 183.50 180.52 52.50 73.86
(21.88) (3.42) (27.63)
pA 52.50 79.82 183.50 178.96 52.50 73.81
(21.88) (3.93) (27.59)
pB 43.75 68.99 181.50 177.17 43.75 62.63
(18.38) (3.90) (23.21)
piA 1, 968.75 1, 875.39 8, 650.71 8, 540, 33 1, 968.75 1, 597.21
(506, 87) (172.19) (340.23)
piB 2, 734.38 5, 096.05 9, 593.57 9, 330.95 2, 734.95 4, 779.08
(1, 682.57) (207.42) (2, 331.18)
All values are stated in ECU. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses and calculated
at the matching group level.
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In Treatment 1 the average price level for Firm A (Firm B) was 79.82 (68.99),
which is higher than the predicted equilibrium price of 52.50 (43.75). In a sense,
this could be interpreted as a form of collusion, although these price levels are far
from perfect collusion.13 A closer look at the data reveals that Firm A sometimes
attempted to establish (almost) perfect collusion, by posting prices higher than 180,
in 76 out of 450 observations, often in early periods. However, in 39 of these cases
the posted price was undercut such that Firm A was not able to sell any good. Only
in 24 cases the collusive attempt was profitable in the sense that the resulting profit
exceeded the equilibrium profit. As a consequence, only Firm B benefited from the
higher than predicted price levels and received on average higher profits than in
equilibrium.
In Treatment 2 Firm A posted on average a price of 180.52, slightly below the
equilibrium price of ppA ≥ 183.5. More precisely, in 100 out of 450 observations an
equilibrium strategy was played, either by posting a price of 183.5 (23 obs.) or higher
(77 obs.), in 312 cases the posted prices were between 180 and 183.5 and in 38 cases
a price lower than 180 was posted. Firm B set on average prices of 177.17. That
is, in the 100 observations where an equilibrium price was posted, Firm B reacted
on average by setting a price of 181.08 which is close to the predicted value of the
reaction function of 181.5 for those cases. Firm B’s average undercutting of 1.89
in the 371 observations where Firm A’s posted price was between 70 and 183.5 is
also close to the prediction of 2 for this interval of ppA. Hence, the descriptive data
suggests that Firm A’s price guarantee prevented Firm B from harsh undercutting.
Consequently, the resulting effective prices of 178.96 (177.17) for Firm A (Firm B)
and the hereby resulting profit levels were close to the point predictions of Table 2.2 .
In Treatment 3 the posted price of Firm A was on average 73.86, which is, similar
like to T1, a bit higher than the predicted 52.50. An attempt for (almost) perfect
collusion was observed in 61 of 450 cases, but only in 6 observations this attempt
was profitable. The average undercutting of Firm B for posted prices in the interval
[70,199] was 27.63 compared to the prediction of 33 for these cases (132 obs.). The
average price of Firm B was 62.63 and, since the Firm A’s price guarantee was
almost never activated, the average effective price of Firm A rarely differed from the
posted price.14 In terms of profit Firm B was better off than in equilibrium because
it could benefit from Firm A’s attempts for collusion whereas Firm A was worse off.
13Perfect collusion is reached when both firms have an effective price of 182.50. This is the only
price combination which extracts the full rent of the indifferent consumer and minimizes overall
transportation costs at the same time.
14The price guarantee in T3 was activated in 17 observations. In none of these cases Firm B
undercut by more than 36.
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Test of hypotheses. In order to test the hypotheses, price levels across treat-
ments are compared on the matching group level by using the non-parametric Mann-
Whitney-Wilcoxon test (MWW test, all hereafter stated p-values refer to the two-
sided version of the test).
The first hypothesis states that the price guarantee with the small markup of 2
has a collusive effect. This hypothesis can be confirmed, as we find that the posted
price of Firm A as well as the price of Firm B are significantly higher in T2 compared
to T1 (p < 0.001 in both comparisons).
In addition, the experiment data is also consistent with the second hypothesis,
which states that the price guarantee with a high markup of 33 does not lead to
collusion. The comparison of T3 with T1 cannot detect any significant differences
neither for the price of Firm A (p = 0.4057) nor the price of Firm B (p = 0.4983),
whereas both prices are lower compared to T2 (p < 0.001 for both comparisons).
Dynamic effects. For robustness, we control for dynamic effects. To this end,
Table 2.4 provides the results of a random-effects GLS regression with the posted
price of Firm A as the dependent variable and Treatment 2, where collusion is
predicted, as baseline.
Table 2.4: Determinants of Firm A’s posted price
(1) (2)
Constant 180.5∗∗∗ 174.2∗∗∗
(1.044) (3.600)
Treatment 1 -100.7∗∗∗ -82.68∗∗∗
(6.761) (8.780)
Treatment 3 -106.7∗∗∗ -86.42∗∗∗
(8.502) (9.160)
Period 0.794∗
(0.358)
Treatment 1 × Period -2.251∗∗
(0.855)
Treatment 3 × Period -2.530∗
(0.995)
Observations 1,350 1,350
The table shows the results of Random-Effects GLS model. Robust standard errors
clustered on the level of experimental cohorts are listed in parentheses. ***, ** and *
indicate significance on the 1h, 1% and 5%-level, respectively.
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Figure 2.6: Price development across treatments
The regression results show that the coefficients for Treatment 1 and Treat-
ment 3 are negative compared to Treatment 2, i.e. posted prices are lower in these
treatments. The effects are highly statistically significant, independent of whether
it is controlled for period effects or not, which reconfirms the results of the non-
parametric analysis of a collusive price level in T2. Only the size of the (initial)
treatment effect varies slightly, once period is taken into account. That is in T1
(T3) the size changes from -100.7 (-106.7) to -82.68 (-86.42). The coefficients on
period and corresponding interaction terms show that subjects refrain over time
from making collusive offers in T1 and T3 whereas the period effect in T2 goes in
the opposite direction. More precisely posted prices decrease per period on average
by 1.457 in T1 and 1.736 in T3 whereas posted prices increase slightly by 0.794 in
T2.15 This indicates that subjects behave in line with the theoretical predictions
more frequently over time. Finally, Figure 2.6 illustrates the development for posted
prices of Firm A and Firm B for T1 and T2.
15The numbers stated refer to the overall treatment specific period effect. For T1 and T3 the
effect is the sum of the treatment unspecific period effect and the interaction effect.
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2.5 Conclusion
This paper studies whether a price-matching guarantee with a markup on the lowest
competing price has the potential to induce tacit collusion. It shows both theoreti-
cally and experimentally that in a Hotelling duopoly framework with fixed locations
and sequential pricing this can be indeed the case. Thus, these kind of price guaran-
tees should be reviewed by antitrust authorities with the same skepticism as perfect
price-matching guarantees.
In particular, whenever the guaranteed maximum markup on the lowest com-
peting price does not exceed a threshold value, the guarantee leads to on average
monopoly pricing. If instead the markup exceeds this threshold, the market out-
come is unaffected. For the former results it suffices that the price leader, i.e. the
first moving firm, offers a guarantee. However, if the level of the markup would be
endogenously chosen by the first moving firm, it would offer the smallest possible
markup, in other words, a perfect price-matching guarantee. The reason is that the
latter neutralizes the second mover advantage of its competitor completely.
Apart from studying the role of the markup, the paper connects to the existing
literature on perfect price-matching guarantees. It shows that even in a setting where
competitors are symmetric with regard to their cost structure, a collusive market
outcome can result. The reason is, that with sequential price competition the first
mover has a disadvantageous position, similar to a firm which is disadvantaged by
its cost structure in a simultaneous move game. Thus, it extends the findings of
Logan and Lutter (1989).
With regard to the motivating example of Shell, which, to the best of the author’s
knowledge, is the first to use the considered type of guarantee, the paper does not
claim to provide a final answer on whether their conduct intends to establish tacit
collusion. One reason is that the model setup used does not cover all characteristics
of the German gasoline retail market, e.g. it does not take repeated interaction
or the heterogeneity of customers into account. Yet, it is an open question why
Shell, which possesses price leadership according to Bundeskartellamt (2011, 2014),
adopted a guarantee with a theoretically suboptimal markup of 2 Cents. A ratio-
nale for this could be to avoid suspicion about anti-competitive conduct, as perfect
price-matching guarantees have been criticized extensively in the economics and law
literature. At the same time, a recent empirical paper of Dewenter and Schwalbe
(2015) found that Shell’s prices increased after the introduction of its guarantee.
This finding, in combination with the paper’s result that such a guarantee in gen-
eral has the potential to induce tacit collusion, suggest that Shell’s conduct should
be carefully monitored.
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2.B Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Let us consider all possible cases of pA, and derive separately the best responses of
Firm B. Since Firm B’s profit function is piecewise defined, it is important to check
which interval of pB, for a given p
p
A, refers to which segment of the profit function
piNoPGB . The four segments are therefore labeled with capital roman numbers, i.e.
piNoPGB =

I : pB if pB ≤ v − t ∧ pB < ppA − t ,
II : pB ·
[
1
2
+
ppA − pB
2t
]
if pB < 2v − t− ppA ∧ pB ∈ [ppA − t, ppA + t] ,
III : pB ·
[
v − pB
t
]
if pB ≥ 2v − t− ppA ∧ pB ∈ ]v − t, v[ ,
IV : 0 else.
In the following cases we never check for IV, since the zero profit is always strictly
dominated by other segments (with at least one of these segments being nonempty
for any ppA, as shown below).
Case 1 – Firm A sets ppA > v.
Segment I is equivalent to pB ∈ [0, v − t]. This follows from ppA − t > v − t > 0,
where the first inequality is by assumption on ppA, and the second follows from our
parametric assumption t < v
3
. Consequently, the highest reachable profit level in
segment I is v − t, independently of ppA, which is reached by setting pB = v − t.
Segment II is empty in the considered case. Assume by contradiction that it is
non empty. Then there exists a pB such that
pB < 2v − t− ppA ∧ pB ≥ ppA − t
⇒ ppA − t < 2v − t− ppA
⇔ ppA < v,
which is a contradiction to the considered interval of ppA.
Segment III is equivalent to pB ∈ ]v − t, v[. This follows from
pB ≥ 2v − t− ppA ∧ pB ∈]v − t, v[
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⇔ pB ∈]v − t, v[,
since v − t > 2v − t− ppA by ppA > v. The highest reachable profit in this segment is
in the limit v − t, because
∂(pB · v−pBt )
∂pB
=
v − 2pB
t
< 0 since pB ≥ v − t ∧ t < v
3
.
Best response – Case 1: Thus, the best response to ppA > v is to set pB = v − t.
Case 2 – Firm A sets ppA in the interval ]v − t, v].
Segment I is, given that ppA < v − t, defined in the interval equivalent to pB <
ppA − t. Since t < v3 , the interval [0, ppA − t[ is non-empty for the given interval of ppA.
Then, the highest reachable profit level in I is in the limit ppA − t.
Segment II is defined for
pB < 2v − t− ppA ∧ pB ∈ [ppA − t, ppA + t]
⇔ pB ∈ [ppA − t, 2v − t− ppA[,
because 2v − t − ppA < ppA + t due to assumed ppA > v − t. This interval of pB is
non-empty, since ppA − t < 2v − t − ppA is equivalent to ppA < v which is satisfied in
the considered interval of ppA.
The highest reachable profit level in II is dependent on ppA. For p
p
A > 3t it is
ppA − t, and is reached with pB = ppA − t. For ppA ≤ 3t it is (p
p
A+t)
2
8t
, and is reached
with pB =
ppA+t
2
. The reason is, that the profit function in segment II has a parabolic
shape, but the maximum at pB =
1
2
(ppA + t) can be to the left of the interval of pB
allowed by II, which is the case if:
1
2
(ppA + t) < p
p
A − t
⇔ ppA > 3t.
At the same time, the right boundary of the interval of pB equal to 2v − t − ppA is
always above
ppA+t
2
within the considered interval of ppA. Thus, when p
p
A > 3t, the
lower bound of the interval of pB, i.e. p
p
A− t, is the best response, whereas if ppA ≤ 3t
the best response is
ppA+t
2
.
Segment III is defined if the following conditions are met
pB ≥ 2v − t− ppA ∧ pB ∈]v − t, v[
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⇔ v > pB ≥ 2v − t− ppA
because 2v− t−ppA ≥ v− t due to ppA ≤ v. This interval of pB is non-empty, because
v > 2v−t−ppA is equivalent to ppA > v−t which is satisfied in the considered interval
of ppA.
The highest reachable profit level in III is
(ppA+t−v)(2v−t−ppA)
t
reached with the
lowest pB within the interval, i.e. 2v− t−ppA. The reason is, that the profit function
in III has a parabolic shape, but the price maximizing the parabola pB =
v
2
is always
to the left of the interval [2v − t− ppA, v[ :
v
2
< 2v − t− ppA
⇔ ppA <
3
2
v − t
which holds for the considered interval of ppA since t ≤ v3 .
Best response – Case 2: In summary, the best response to ppA ∈ ]v − t, v] is to
set pB = p
p
A − t if ppA > 3t and pB = p
p
A+t
2
if ppA ≤ 3t.
The reason is, that the highest profit in II is always at least as high as the highest
profit in I and III. The former comparison directly follows from the analysis of seg-
ments I and II above, given that the profit level ppA − t is always achievable in II.
The latter comparison results from the following:
(a) ppA > 3t:
(ppA + t− v)(2v − t− ppA)
t
≤ ppA − t
⇔ (ppA + t− v)(2v − t− ppA)− t2 − ppA · t ≤ 0.
The left hand side is a parabola in t, with a global maximum. Thus, for the claim to
be true the inequality needs to hold for the maximum at t∗ = 3
4
(ppA − v). Plugging
t∗ into the inequality gives:
1
8
((ppA)
2 + 6ppA · v − 7v2) ≤ 0
which is fulfilled as long as ppA ≤ v, which holds in the considered case.
(b) ppA ≤ 3t:
(ppA + t− v)(2v − t− ppA)
t
≤ (p
p
A + t)
2
8t
⇔ (3p
p
A + 3t− 4v)2
t
≥ 0
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which is fulfilled since t > 0.
Case 3 – Firm A sets ppA in the interval ]t, v − t].
Segment I is defined when the following conditions are met
pB ≤ v − t ∧ pB < ppA − t
⇔ pB < ppA − t
because ppA is smaller than v in the considered interval of p
p
A. This interval of pB is
non-empty since ppA > t. The highest reachable profit level in I is in the limit p
p
A− t.
Segment II is defined under the conditions
pB < 2v − t− ppA ∧ pB ∈ [ppA − t, ppA + t]
⇔ pB ∈ [ppA − t, ppA + t]
because ppA + t ≤ 2v − t − ppA, which equals ⇔ ppA ≤ v − t and is fulfilled for
the given interval of ppA. The interval of pB stated above is non-empty because
ppA > t and t ≥ 0. The highest reachable profit level in II is dependent on ppA. For
ppA > 3t it is p
p
A − t, and is reached with pB = ppA − t. For ppA ≤ 3t it is (p
p
A+t)
2
8t
, and
is reached with pB =
ppA+t
2
. The reasoning is identical to Case 2.
Segment III is not defined for the given interval of ppA. This is shown by contra-
diction. For III to be defined the following conditions have to be satisfied:
pB > 2v − t− ppA ∧ pB ∈]v − t, v[
⇒ v > 2v − t− ppA
⇔ ppA > v − t,
which is a contradiction.
Best response – Case 3: In summary, the best response to ppA ∈]t, v − t] is
pB = p
p
A − t if ppA ≥ 3t and pB = p
p
A+t
2
if ppA < 3t. This is true because in the
considered case the highest profit of II always exceeds the highest profit in I. Indeed,
for ppA > 3t the profit maximum of I is only in the limit as high as the profit maximum
of II. For ppA ≤ 3t the profit of II is at least as high as in I, because:
(ppA + t)
2
8t
≥ ppA − t
⇔ (ppA)2 − 6ppA · t+ 9t2 ≥ 0.
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The left hand side is a parabola with a global minimum of 0 at ppA = 3t. Thus the
condition is always met.
Case 4 – Firm A sets ppA in the interval [0, t].
Segment I does not exist. Assume by contradiction there exists pB < p
p
A − t.
This however cannot be true since ppA ≤ t is assumed in the considered case.
Segment II has the following conditions
pB < 2v − t− ppA ∧ pB ∈ [ppA − t, ppA + t]
⇔ pB ∈ [ppA − t, ppA + t],
since 2v − t − ppA > ppA + t, which is in turn equivalent to ppA < v − t and hence
fulfilled in the given interval of ppA due to the parametric assumption t <
v
3
. But
since pB has to be non-negative by assumption, II is eventually equivalent to
0 ≤ pB ≤ ppA + t,
which is clearly a non-empty interval, because ppA ≥ 0 and t > 0.
The highest reachable profit level in II is
(ppA+t)
2
8t
, which is achieved by setting pB =
ppA+t
2
, which in turn is always within the allowed boundaries of pB, i.e. in [0, p
p
A + t].
Segment III is not defined for the given interval of ppA. The argumentation is
analogous to Case 3.
Best response – Case 4: In summary, the best response to ppA ∈ [0, t] is p
p
A+t
2
.
Best response function – Summary of the four cases:
Let us now sum up the best responses for the considered intervals of ppA together.
This yields
RNoPGB (p
p
A) =

v − t if ppA > v,
ppA − t if 3t ≤ ppA ≤ v,
ppA+t
2
if ppA < 3t.

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Proof of Continuity of piPGB
Lemma 2. piPGB is continuous in pB.
Proof. The proof consists of three parts: First we prove that piNo PGB is continu-
ous, second we show that piPG−ActiveB is continuous and finally the continuity of pi
PG
B ,
which is a combination of piNo PGB and pi
PG−Active
B , is proven.
1.) Continuity of piNo PGB .
Here it is sufficient to show, that DB is continuous with respect to pB for any
given pA = p
p
A. The reason is that pi
No PG
B = pB ·DB(pA = ppA, pB) and pA is not a
function of pB since the price guarantee is inactive.
We first reformulate the demand function in the following way. From the argumen-
tation of Cases 1 and 2 on page 12 it follows that whenever condition (2.5) is not
satisfied, the firm with a lower price faces a monopolistic demand function given by
(2.6). At the same time, since for the firm with the higher price it should hold that
pi ≥ v (which follows from pB ≥ 2v − t − pA and pi > p−i + t), the monopolistic
demand function is formally applicable to this firm as well in the considered case.
Hence,
DB(pA, pB) = min
{
max
{
v − pB
t
, 0
}
, 1
}
if pB > 2v − t− pA . (2.15)
Next, note that 1
2
+ pA−pB
2t
> 1 iff pA > pB+t, and that
1
2
+ pA−pB
2t
< 0 iff pA < pB−t.
This implies that whenever condition (2.5) is satisfied (given the argumentation in
Case 3 and Case 4 on page 12), the demand function can be represented as
DB(pA, pB) = min
{
max
{
1
2
+
pA − pB
2t
, 0
}
, 1
}
if pB ≤ 2v − t− pA . (2.16)
Summing up (2.15) and (2.16) together, we obtain
DB(pA, pB) =

min
{
max
{
1
2
+
pA − pB
2t
, 0
}
, 1
}
if pB ≤ 2v − t− pA ,
min
{
max
{
v − pB
t
, 0
}
, 1
}
else.
(2.17)
Because both sections of the demand function are continuous in pB for any pB > 0,
it remains to show that at pB = 2v − t − pA both sections of the demand function
38
yield the same level of demand. Indeed, at this value of pB:
1
2
+
pA − pB
2t
=
t+ 2v − t− pB − pB
2t
=
v − pB
t
.
2.) Continuity of piPG−ActiveB .
Since under an active price guarantee pA = pB +m, we have
piPG−ActiveB = pB ·DB(pB +m, pB).
Given (2.17), the former demand function can be rewritten as
DB(pB +m, pB) =

min
{
max
{
1
2
+
m
2t
, 0
}
, 1
}
if pB ≤ v − t+m2 ,
min
{
max
{
v − pB
t
, 0
}
, 1
}
else.
(2.18)
Because both sections of the demand function are continuous in pB for any pB > 0,
it remains to show that at pB = v − t+m2 both sections yield the same demand.
Indeed at this value of pB
v − pB
t
=
v − v + t+m
2
t
=
1
2
+
m
2t
.
3.) Continuity of piPGB .
The combined profit function piPGB is defined as
piPGB (p
p
A, pB) =

piNo PGB (p
p
A, pB) if pB ≥ ppA −m ,
piPG−ActiveB (pB) else.
Since piPG−ActiveB and pi
No PG
B are both continuous in pB for any pB > 0, as proven
above, it only needs to be shown that at pB = p
p
A−m both functions give the same
profit. Indeed, for this posted price
piNo PGB = pB ·DB(pA = pB +m, pB)
and hence coincides with piPG−ActiveB . Consequently, pi
PG
B is continuous in pB. 
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Proof that piPGB is hump-shaped
Lemma 3. There exists a p∗B such that pi
PG
B (pB) is increasing for pB < p
∗
B and
decreasing for pB ≥ p∗B.
Proof. The proof has three parts. First, we prove that piPG−ActiveB is hump-shaped.
Second, we show that piNo PGB is hump-shaped. Finally, it is proven that the combined
profit function piPGB is hump-shaped.
1.) piPG−ActiveB (pB) is hump-shaped.
It is easy to see, that piPG−ActiveB is linearly increasing in pB for values of pB
smaller than v − t+m
2
(see (2.11)). For higher values, it has a parabolic shape up
to pB = v and then stays flat at 0. However, the maximum of the parabola is
located at pB =
1
2
v which is lower than the left border of the parabolic interval
v − t+m
2
since t + m < v, because m < t ≤ v
3
. Hence, piPG−ActiveB (pB) is decreasing
in pB for pB > v − t+m2 . Consequently, given that piPG−ActiveB (pB) is continuous (see
proof of Lemma 2), it is hump-shaped with respect to pB with a global maximum
at pB = v − t+m2 .
2.) piNo PGB (pB) is hump-shaped.
Since the composition of piNo PGB (pB) is dependent on p
p
A, the proof is given sepa-
rately for each of the four cases of intervals of ppA described in the proof of Proposition
1. In what follows, we refer to the results of the analysis in the proof of Proposition
1 in each of these four cases. We also rely on the fact that piNo PGB (pB) is continuous
(see proof of Lemma 2).
Case 1 – Firm A sets ppA > v.
For pB ≤ v − t the profit function is defined by Segment I of piNo PGB , and thus
linearly increasing in pB.
For v−t < pB < v, the profit function is defined by Segment III of piNo PGB , which
is a parabola with the maximum at v
2
. Since this maximum is reached with a lower
price than v − t, because t < v
3
, the profit function is decreasing for pB ∈]v − t, v[.
For any higher pB the profit is zero. Hence, for p
p
A > v the function pi
No PG
B (pB) is
hump-shaped with respect to pB with a global maximum at pB = v − t.
Case 2 – Firm A sets ppA in the interval ]v − t, v].
For pB < p
p
A − t the profit function is defined by Segment I of piNo PGB (pB), and
thus linearly increasing in pB.
For ppA − t ≤ pB < 2v − t − ppA the profit function is defined by Segment II of
piNo PGB , which is a parabola with the maximum at
ppA+t
2
. If additionally ppA > 3t this
maximum is located at a price lower than the left interval border ppA − t and the
profit function is hence decreasing for pB ∈ [ppA − t, 2v − t − ppA[. Otherwise, i.e. if
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ppA ≤ 3t, the profit function is increasing in pB ∈ [ppA − t, p
p
A+t
2
[ and decreasing in
pB ∈ [p
p
A+t
2
, 2v − t− ppA[.
For 2v− t− ppA ≤ pB < v the profit function is defined by Segment III of piNo PGB ,
which is a parabola with the maximum at pB =
v
2
. Since this maximum is reached
with a lower price than the left border of the interval 2v− t− ppA, because t < v3 and
ppA ≤ v, the profit function is decreasing for pB ∈ [2v − t− ppA, v[.
For any higher pB the profit is zero.
Hence, for v− t < ppA ≤ v the function piNo PGB (pB) is hump-shaped with a global
maximum at pB = p
p
A − t if ppA > 3t and at pB = p
p
A+t
2
if ppA ≤ 3t.
Case 3 – Firm A sets ppA in the interval ]t, v − t].
For pB < p
p
A − t the profit function is defined by Segment I of piNo PGB , and thus
linearly increasing in pB.
For ppA − t ≤ pB ≤ ppA + t the profit function is defined by Segment II of piNo PGB ,
which is a parabola with the maximum at
ppA+t
2
. Whether this maximum is in
the given interval for pB depends on p
p
A. If p
p
A is larger than 3t the maximum
is located at pB lower than the left border of the interval p
p
A − t, and hence the
profit function is decreasing for pB ∈ [ppA − t, ppA + t]. If ppA ≤ 3t the maximum is
reachable, and the profit function is increasing for pB ∈ [ppA− t, p
p
A+t
2
[ and decreasing
for pB ∈]p
p
A+t
2
, ppA + t].
For any higher pB the profit is zero.
Hence, for ppA ∈]t, v− t] function piNo PGB (pB) is hump-shaped with a global max-
imum at pB =
ppA+t
2
if t < ppA ≤ 3t and at pB = ppA − t if 3t < ppA ≤ v − t.
Case 4 – Firm A sets ppA in the interval [0, t].
For pB < p
p
A + t the profit function is defined by Segment II of pi
No PG
B , which is
a parabola with the maximum at
ppA+t
2
, which is within the given interval of pB.
For any higher pB the profit is zero.
Hence, for ppA ≤ t the function piNo PGB (pB) is hump-shaped with a global maxi-
mum at pB =
ppA+t
2
.
Summing up all four cases.
In summary, piNo PGB (pB) is hump-shaped with respect to pB for any value of p
p
A.
3.) piPGB (pB) is hump-shaped.
The function piPGB (pB) consists of pi
PG−Active
B (pB) for pB < p
p
A−m and of piNo PGB (pB)
for any higher pB. Since it is already proven that pi
PG−Active
B (pB) and pi
No PG
B (pB)
are both hump-shaped, while piPGB (pB) is continuous by Lemma 2, it is sufficient to
show that whenever piPG−ActiveB (pB) is hump-shaped on the interval pB ∈ [0, ppA−m[,
the slope of piNo PGB (pB) is negative at p
p
A −m. Indeed, if piPG−ActiveB (pB) is hump-
shaped on the interval pB ∈ [0, ppA −m[, then, given that it has a global maximum
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at pB = v − t+m2 as shown above, we must have
ppA −m > v −
t+m
2
. (2.19)
This yields ppA > v − t. Consequently, given the arguments in Case 1 and Case 2
in the proof above, piNo PGB (pB) is hump-shaped with a global maximum at pB =
min{v − t, ppA − t} if ppA > 3t and at pB = p
p
A+t
2
if ppA ≤ 3t. Let us show that both of
these maximum points are below pA −m once (2.19) holds, in which case the slope
of piNo PGB (pB) must be negative at pB = p
p
A − m. For the first possible point, we
have that min{v− t, ppA− t} ≤ ppA− t is always below pA−m since m < t. Consider
the second possible maximum point and assume by contradiction
ppA + t
2
> ppA −m⇔ ppA < t+ 2m.
Given (2.19), we then have
t+ 2m > m+ v − t+m
2
⇔ 3t+ 3m > 2v,
which is a contradiction given that m < t and t < v
3
.
Thus, whenever piPG−ActiveB (pB) is hump-shaped on the interval pB ∈ [0, ppA−m[,
the slope of piNo PGB (pB) is negative at pB = p
p
A −m.
Consequently, piPGB (pB) is hump-shaped with respect to pB for any value of p
p
A. 
Proof of Proposition 2
Firm B’s profit function piPGB is given by pi
PG−Active
B for pB < p
p
A − m, whereas
for higher pB it is defined by pi
NoPG
B . The proof is split in three different cases
and uses the fact that piPGB is continuous by Lemma 2, and is hump-shaped by
Lemma 3. Hence, whenever either piNoPGB or pi
PG−Active
B are hump-shaped on the
corresponding interval, their peaks are the global maximum of piPGB . If none of them
are hump-shaped on the corresponding interval, the maximum of piPGB is located at
the intersection of both functions, i.e. at pB = p
p
A −m.
Case 1 – Firm A sets ppA ≥ v − t−m2 .
Then, function piPG−ActiveB (pB) is hump-shaped on the corresponding interval, i.e.,
its peak, which is located at pB = v− t+m2 (see proof of Lemma 3) is reachable within
pB ∈ [0, ppA −m[. Indeed, v − t+m2 < ppA −m is equivalent to ppA > v − t−m2 which is
fulfilled in the given interval of ppA.
Hence, the best response to ppA ≥ v − t−m2 is pB = v − t+m2 .
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Case 2 – Firm A sets ppA in the interval ]t+ 2m, v − t−m2 ].
The maximum of piPG−ActiveB (pB) is not reachable on the corresponding interval
pB ∈ [0, ppA −m[. Indeed, v − t+m2 ≥ ppA −m is equivalent to ppA ≤ v − t−m2 which is
fulfilled in the given interval of ppA. Hence, pi
PG−Active
B (pB) monotonically increases
in pB for pB ∈ [0, ppA −m] (given that it is hump-shaped over the whole interval of
pB, see proof of Lemma 3).
The maximum of piNo PGB is also not reachable on the corresponding interval
pB ∈ [ppA−m,∞[ . Indeed, given that ppA ∈]t, v[ in the considered case, the maximum
is located either at pB =
ppA+t
2
or pB = p
p
A − t (see Cases 2 and 3 in the proof of
Lemma 3). Both values are smaller than ppA −m, since p
p
A+t
2
< ppA −m is equivalent
to ppA > t+2m and p
p
A−t < ppA−m is equivalent to m < t. The former is true for the
given interval of ppA and the latter is true due to the parametric assumption m < t.
Since the maximum of piNo PGB is to the left of p
p
A −m and piNo PGB is hump-shaped
(see proof of Lemma 3), piPGB has a decreasing slope to the right of p
p
A −m, where
it is defined by piNo PGB . Since to the left of p
p
A −m the function piPGB is defined by
piPG−ActiveB , which monotonically increases in pB for pB ∈ [0, ppA−m] in the considered
case as shown above, the maximum of piPGB is located at pB = p
p
A −m.
Hence, the best response to ppA ∈ ]t+ 2m, v − t−m2 ] is pB = ppA −m.
Case 3 – Firm A sets ppA in the interval [0, t+ 2m].
Since ppA < 3t (due to m < t), the maximum of pi
No PG
B is reachable in the relevant
interval of pB with pB =
ppA+t
2
(see Cases 2-4 in the proof of Lemma 3).
Hence, the best response to ppA ∈ [0, t+ 2m] is pB = p
p
A+t
2
.
Best response function – Summary of the three cases.
In summary of all three cases the reaction function is given by
RPGB (p
p
A) =

v − t+m
2
if ppA > v − t−m2 ,
ppA −m if t+ 2m < ppA ≤ v − t−m2 ,
ppA + t
2
if ppA ≤ t+ 2m.

43
Proof of Proposition 3
From (2.13) one can see that Firm A, in order to maximize its profits, chooses ei-
ther ppA from the “collusive” interval ]v − t−m2 ,∞] or from the “competitive” interval
[0, t + 2m]. The reason is, that the profit of Firm A, if ppA is set in the interval
]t + 2m, v − t−m
2
], is strictly dominated by the constant profit level which results
when ppA is in the collusive interval.
In the competitive interval Firm A’s profit function is defined by a parabola which
reaches a maximum of 9
16
t at ppA =
3
2
t. Now, we consider two cases depending
on whether this maximum is reachable within the corresponding interval ppA ∈
[0, t+ 2m].
Case 1: 3
2
t ≤ t+ 2m.
In this case, the maximum of the parabola is reached in the competitive interval.
In this case, Firm A finds it only optimal to set a collusive ppA if the constant collusive
profit level is at least 9
16
t:
9
16
t ≤
[
v − t−m
2
]
·
[
1
2
− m
2t
]
⇔ 9t
2
16t
−
[
8mt− 8mv + 8tv − 4m2 − 4t2
16t
]
≤ 0,
⇔ m2 − 2m(t− v)− 2tv + 13
4
t2 ≤ 0.
The left-hand side is a parabola with respect to m. It has a global minimum, and
only one positive root equal to 1
2
√
4v2 − 9t2 − v + t. Hence, the condition above is
met whenever
m ≤ 1
2
√
4v2 − 9t2 − v + t.
In this case, Firm A’s profit is maximized at any collusive price, i.e. at any
ppA ≥ v− t−m2 . Otherwise, the profit is maximized at the competitive price ppA = 32t.
Case 2: 3
2
t > t+ 2m.
Here, the maximum of Firm A’s profit is to the right of the competitive interval.
Consequently, the slope of the profit function is positive at ppA = t + 2m. Since the
profit function is monotonically increasing for ppA > t+ 2m, while being continuous
over the whole domain (see (2.13)), a collusive ppA (i.e., any p
p
A above v− t−m2 ) yields
the highest profit.
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Summary of both cases.
Firm A’s profit is maximized at any ppA ≥ v − t−m2 whenever
m ≤ 1
2
√
4v2 − 9t2 − v + t ∨ (3
2
t > t+ 2m⇔ m < t
4
).
Since t
4
< 1
2
√
4v2 − 9t2 − v + t for t ≤ v
3
, the condition is equivalent to:
m ≤ 1
2
√
4v2 − 9t2 − v + t.
Otherwise, Firm A’s profit is maximized under competitive price ppA =
3
2
t. 
Proof of Proposition 4
(a) In this case, by Propositions 2 and 3 it follows that ppA ≥ v − t−m2 while pB =
v − t+m
2
. Hence, ppA − pB ≥ v − t−m2 − (v − t+m2 ) = m. Consequently, the guarantee
is activated and the effective price of Firm A is pB +m = v − t−m2 .
(b) From Proposition 3 it follows that ppA =
3
2
t in the considered case. Consider the
best response of Firm B described in Proposition 2. Let us show that the condition
for a competitive reaction from Firm B, i.e. ppA ≤ t + 2m, is fulfilled. Given that
m ≥ φ, the sufficient condition for this is ppA ≤ t+ 2φ, which is equivalent to φ ≥ 14t.
One can show that this always holds for t ≤ v
3
. Consequently, by Proposition 2,
pB =
ppA+t
2
= 5
4
t. Then we have, ppA − pB = 32t − 54t = 14t ≤ φ ≤ m. Consequently,
the effective price of Firm A is equal to its posted price: pA = p
p
A =
3
2
t. 
Proof that Firm B’s guarantee does not affect equilibrium
prices
It is to show, that in comparison to a game where only Firm A offers a price guarantee
with an arbitrary non-negative markup on the competitors’ price (1PG-game), a
game in which both firms offer such a price guarantee does not change equilibrium
prices (2PG-game). In order to show this, it is important to recall that in any
equilibrium of the 1PG-game Firm B undercuts Firm A.
In the 2PG-game Firm B is restricted in overbidding the price of Firm A by
more than m. This restriction is binding for the best response function of Firm
B in the 1PG-game only off the equilibrium path. Hence, it is sufficient to show
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that Firm A’s optimal strategy does not change between the 1PG-game and the
2PG-game.
Since Firm A’s profit is weakly increasing in the price of Firm B, all posted
prices of Firm A which lead to a less drastic overbidding of Firm B in the 2PG-
game compared to the 1PG-game are becoming less attractive. However, all other
profits, including the profit of the equilibrium action of the 1PG-game, are identical
to the 2PG-game. Consequently, Firm A posts the same prices in equilibrium in
both games, and Firm B reacts by undercutting to the same extent.16 
16Note that this reasoning holds only for the sequential game with otherwise symmetric firms
considered in the theory section, as it relies on Firm B setting the lower price in the equilibrium of
the 1PG Game. This reasoning may not hold if firms are asymmetric, for example if Firm B has
a disadvantageous cost structure.
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2.C English Instructions (translated)
The following pages contain a translated version of the instructions. Curley brackets
indicate the treatment variation of the instructions. Naturally subjects only saw
their treatment variation.
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Instructions — Experiment Rules
Welcome to the experiment!
In this experiment you can earn money. How much you will earn, depends on your
decisions and on the decisions of other participants. Irrespectively of the decisions
during the experiment, you will additionally receive an amount of 4.00 Euro for your
appearance as well as another 4.00 Euro for the completion of a questionnaire at the
end of the experiment.
During the experiment the currency “Experimental Currency Units” (ECU) is used.
At the end of the experiment all ECU amounts, which you earned during the exper-
iment, are converted into Euro and are paid to you in cash. The exchange rate for
14,000 ECU is 1 Euro.
All decisions during the experiment are anonymous. The payments at the end of
the experiment are treated confidentially.
From now on, please do not communicate with other participants. If you have any
questions, now or during the experiment, please raise your hand. We will come
to you and answer your question. Moreover, during the experiment we ask you to
switch off your mobile phone. Documents (books, lecture script, etc.), which are not
related to the experiment, may not be used during the experiment. In case of offense
against these rules we may exclude you from the experiment and all payments.
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Instructions — General Part
At the beginning of the experiment each participant is assigned to a role, either
Competitor A or Competitor B. This assignment remains constant during the whole
experiment and each participant is informed individually about his role on the screen.
Competitor A and Competitor B sell arbitrarily divisible goods in a market. Each
competitor can produce up to 100 units. The production will create no costs.
{T2+T3: Competitor A is bound to a price guarantee, which guarantees, that his
final price will not exceed the price of Competitor B by more than {T2:2; T3:33}
ECU.}
The sales prices are determined in the following order:
1. Competitor A sets his {T2+T3: posted} price first.
2. Competitor B sees the {T2+T3: posted} price of Competitor A and sets his
price. {T2+T3: This price is his final price.
3. The final price of Competitor A is determined:
• If Competitor B sets a price which is at least {T2: 2; T3: 33} ECU lower
than the posted price of Competitor A, the price guarantee of Competi-
tor A is activated. The final price of Competitor A equals the price of
Competitor B plus a markup of {T2: 2; T3: 33} ECU.
• If Competitor B sets a higher price than Competitor A, or undercuts
his price by less than {T2: 2; T3: 33} ECU, the price guarantee of
Competitor A is not activated. The final price of Competitor A equals
his posted price.}
The sales volume of each competitor depend on the {T2 + T3: final} price of
Competitor A (pA) and the {T2 + T3: final} price of Competitor B (pB). In the
experiment they are calculated by the computer as follows:
Sales Volume Competitor A =

pB − pA + 35
70
· 100 if pA + pB < 365
200− pA
35
· 100 else.
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Sales Volume Competitor B =

pA − pB + 35
70
· 100 if pA + pB < 365
200− pB
35
· 100 else.
A sales volume cannot be less than 0 units or greater than 100 units. If the formulas above
generate a sales volume smaller than 0, the sales volume is set to 0. If the formulas above
generate a sales volume higher than 100, the sales volume is set to 100.
The sales volumes and {T2 + T3: final} prices lead to the competitors’ profits:
Profit of a Competitor (in ECU) = His {T2+T3:Final} Price ·His Sales Vol-
ume
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Instructions — Scenario Calculator
At the beginning of the experiment a scenario calculator will be provided. With the help
of this calculator you can calculate the sales volumes and profits of both competitors for
any price combination. The scenario calculator is available during the whole experiment.
The scenario calculator uses the {T2 + T3: posted} price of Competitor A
and the {T2 + T3: final} price of Competitor B as inputs:
• You can enter any value between 0 and 200 for each competitor.
• The input is either entered in an input field or by using a slider-bar.
• Inputs via the input field can have any number of decimal places and must be
confirmed with the button next to it.
Note: Consider in your simulations that Competitor B makes his decision after Competi-
tor A and therefore knows Competitor A’s {T2 + T3: posted} price.
After both prices are entered, the scenario calculator displays:
• {T2+T3: whether the price guarantee is activated:
– This is the case when the final price of Competitor B is at least {T2: 2; T3:
33} ECU lower than the posted price of Competitor A.
– If the price guarantee is activated, the following applies:
Final Price Competitor A = Final Price Competitor B + {T2:2; T3:33} ECU}
• the sales amounts of every competitor:
– {T2+T3: The calculation is based on the final prices.}
– Sales volumes can vary between 0 and 100 units.
• {T2+T3: the final prices of both competitors:
– The final price of Competitor A equals his posted price, if the price guarantee
is not activated, or equals the price of Competitor B plus {T2: 2; T3: 33}
ECU if the price guarantee is activated.
– The final price of Competitor B is always his entered price because Competitor
B is not restricted by a price guarantee.}
• the profits of both competitors:
– The profits of both competitors are the respective {T2+T3: final} price mul-
tiplied by the respective sales volume:
Profit = {T2+T3: Final} Price · Sales Volume [in ECU]
51
Familiarize yourself with the calculations and use the scenario calculator as
often as you like. Your entries in the scenario calculator will not affect your
payoff at the end of the experiment.
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Instructions — Decision Stage
In this stage of the experiment you interact with other competitors which will be matched
to you. The interaction takes place in the setting you already know from the scenario
calculator.
The decision stage consists of 15 independent periods. The course in each period is identi-
cal. However, the competitor matched to you differs from period to period. The matching
procedure is as follows:
• Your competitor will be randomly determined each period. However, it is assured
that you are never matched with the same competitor in two consecutive periods.
• Your competitor will differ from you in the assigned role, in other words a Competitor
A always competes with a Competitor B.
Timing within a period:
1. At the beginning of every period, Competitor A sets his {T2+T3: posted} price.
Meanwhile, Competitor B sees a waiting screen.
2. After Competitor A has set his {T2+T3: posted} price, Competitor B sees it and
sets his {T2+T3: final} price.
Meanwhile, Competitor A sees a waiting screen.
3. Finally, the computer calculates {T2+T3: the final price of Competitor A and} the
sales volumes. These are displayed, in addition to the profits of both competitors,
in the period summary.
After completing 15 periods, your profits of all periods will be displayed and summed up
in a final summary. The total sum is then converted into Euro to the exact cent and
paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. The payment additionally includes a
premium of 4.00 Euro for showing up and another premium of 4.00 Euro for completing
the questionnaire. The exchange rate is e 1 per ECU 14,000.
Once the experiment ended, a short questionnaire appears on your screen. Please fill out
this questionnaire, while the experimenters prepare your payoff. Afterwards, you will be
called by your cabin number for your payment.
Thank you for your participation!
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2.D German Instructions (original)
Instruktionen — Allgemeine Experimentregeln
Herzlich Willkommen zum Experiment!
In diesem Experiment ko¨nnen Sie Geld verdienen. Wie viel Sie verdienen werden, ha¨ngt
von Ihren Entscheidungen beziehungsweise den Entscheidungen anderer Experimentteil-
nehmer ab. Unabha¨ngig von den Entscheidungen wa¨hrend des Experimentes erhalten Sie
zusa¨tzlich 4,00 Euro fu¨r Ihr Erscheinen sowie weitere 4,00 Euro fu¨r das Ausfu¨llen eines
Fragebogens am Ende des Experimentes.
Wa¨hrend des Experimentes wird die Wa¨hrung ECU (Experimental Currency Units) ver-
wendet. Am Ende des Experimentes werden alle ECU-Betra¨ge, welche Sie im Laufe des Ex-
perimentes verdienen, in Euro umgerechnet und Ihnen ausgezahlt. Der Umrechnungskurs
betra¨gt 1 Euro fu¨r 14 000 ECU.
Alle Entscheidungen, die Sie wa¨hrend des Experimentes treffen, sind anonym. Ihre Aus-
zahlung am Ende des Experimentes wird vertraulich behandelt.
Bitte kommunizieren Sie ab sofort nicht mehr mit den anderen Teilnehmern. Falls Sie jetzt
oder wa¨hrend des Experimentes eine Frage haben, heben Sie bitte die Hand. Wir werden
dann zu Ihnen kommen und Ihre Frage beantworten. Wa¨hrend des Experimentes bitten
wir Sie außerdem, Ihr Mobiltelefon auszuschalten. Unterlagen (Bu¨cher, Vorlesungsskripte,
etc.), die nichts mit dem Experiment zu tun haben, du¨rfen wa¨hrend des Experimentes nicht
verwendet werden. Bei Versto¨ßen gegen diese Regeln ko¨nnen wir Sie vom Experiment und
allen Auszahlungen ausschließen.
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Instruktionen — Allgemeiner Teil
Zu Beginn des Experimentes wird jedem Experimentteilnehmer eine Rolle zugeteilt, ent-
weder Wettbewerber A oder Wettbewerber B. Diese Zuteilung bleibt das gesamte Experi-
ment u¨ber bestehen und wird jedem Experimentteilnehmer individuell auf dem Bildschirm
mitgeteilt.
Wettbewerber A und Wettbewerber B verkaufen am Markt beliebig teilbare Gu¨ter. Sie
ko¨nnen jeweils bis zu 100 Einheiten produzieren. Bei der Produktion fallen keine Kosten
an. {T2+T3: Beim Verkauf ist Wettbewerber A an eine Preisgarantie gebunden, welche
garantiert, dass sein endgu¨ltiger Preis den Preis von Wettbewerber B um nicht mehr als
{T2: 2; T3: 33} ECU u¨berschreitet.}
Die Festlegung der Verkaufspreise geschieht in folgender Reihenfolge:
1. Wettbewerber A legt zuerst seinen {T2+T3: vorla¨ufigen} Preis fest.
2. Wettbewerber B sieht den {T2+T3: vorla¨ufigen} Preis von Wettbewerber A und
legt seinen Preis fest. {T2+T3: Dieser Preis ist zugleich sein endgu¨ltiger Preis.
3. Der endgu¨ltige Preis von Wettbewerber A wird bestimmt:
• Sollte Wettbewerber B den vorla¨ufigen Preis von Wettbewerber A um min-
destens {T2: 2; T3: 33} ECU unterbieten, so wird dessen Preisgarantie ak-
tiviert. Der endgu¨ltige Preis von Wettbewerber A entspricht dann dem Preis
von Wettbewerber B zuzu¨glich {T2: 2; T3: 33} ECU.
• Sollte Wettbewerber B einen ho¨heren Preis festlegen als Wettbewerber A oder
dessen vorla¨ufigen Preis um weniger als {T2: 2; T3: 33} ECU unterbieten,
so wird die Preisgarantie von Wettbewerber A nicht aktiviert. Der endgu¨ltige
Preis von Wettbewerber A entspricht dann seinem vorla¨ufigen Preis.}
Die Absatzmengen der Wettbewerber ha¨ngen von dem {T2 + T3: endgu¨ltigen} Preis von
Wettbewerber A (pA) und dem {T2 + T3: endgu¨ltigen} Preis von Wettbewerber B (pB)
ab. Sie werden im Experiment durch den Computer wie folgt berechnet:
Absatzmenge Wettbewerber A =

pB − pA + 35
70
· 100 falls pA + pB < 365
200− pA
35
· 100 sonst.
Absatzmenge Wettbewerber B =

pA − pB + 35
70
· 100 falls pA + pB < 365
200− pB
35
· 100 sonst.
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Eine Absatzmenge kann niemals kleiner als 0 Einheiten oder gro¨ßer als 100 Einheiten
sein. Falls sich aus den obigen Formeln eine kleinere Absatzmenge als 0 Einheiten ergibt,
so wird die Absatzmenge auf 0 Einheiten gesetzt. Falls sich aus den obigen Formeln eine
Absatzmenge von mehr als 100 Einheiten ergibt, so wird die Absatzmenge auf 100 Ein-
heiten gesetzt.
Aus den Absatzmengen und den {T2+T3: endgu¨ltigen} Preisen ergeben sich die Gewinne
der Wettbewerber:
Gewinn eines Wettbewerbers (in ECU) = Sein {T2+T3: endgu¨ltiger} Preis ·
seine Absatzmenge
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Instruktionen — Szenario–Rechner
Zu Beginn des Experimentes wird Ihnen ein Szenario-Rechner bereitgestellt. Mit Hilfe
dieses Rechners ko¨nnen Sie fu¨r beliebige Preiskombinationen die Absatzmengen und Ge-
winne beider Wettbewerber berechnen. Der Szenario-Rechner steht Ihnen wa¨hrend des
gesamten Experimentes zur Verfu¨gung.
Als Eingabe beno¨tigt der Szenario-Rechner den {T2 + T3: vorla¨ufigen} Preis
von Wettbewerber A und den {T2 + T3: endgu¨ltigen} Preis von Wettbewer-
ber B:
• Sie ko¨nnen fu¨r jeden Wettbewerber beliebige Werte zwischen 0 und 200 eingeben.
• Die Eingabe erfolgt entweder u¨ber eine Schiebeleiste oder ein Eingabefeld.
• Eingaben u¨ber das Eingabefeld ko¨nnen beliebig viele Nachkommastellen haben und
mu¨ssen mit dem nebenstehenden Knopf besta¨tigt werden.
Hinweis: Beru¨cksichtigen Sie bei Ihren Simulationen, dass Wettbewerber B nach Wettbe-
werber A entscheidet und zum Zeitpunkt seiner Entscheidung dessen {T2 + T3: vorla¨ufi-
gen} Preis kennt.
Nachdem beide Preise eingegeben sind, wird angezeigt,
• {T2+T3: ob die Preisgarantie aktiviert wird:
– Dies ist immer der Fall, wenn der endgu¨ltige Preis von Wettbewerber B den
vorla¨ufigen Preis von Wettbewerber A um mehr als {T2: 2; T3: 33} ECU
unterschreitet.
– Sofern die Preisgarantie aktiviert wird, gilt:
Endgu¨ltiger Preis Wettbewerber A = Endgu¨ltiger Preis Wettbewerber B
+ {T2: 2; T3: 33} ECU }
• welche Absatzmenge jeder Wettbewerber hat:
– {T2+T3: Die Berechnung erfolgt auf Basis der endgu¨ltigen Preise.}
– Die Absatzmengen ko¨nnen zwischen 0 und 100 Einheiten betragen.
• {T2+T3: wie die endgu¨ltigen Preise beider Wettbewerber lauten:
– Der endgu¨ltige Preis von Wettbewerber A ist sein vorla¨ufiger Preis, falls die
Preisgarantie nicht aktiviert wird, beziehungsweise der Preis von Wettbewerber
B zuzu¨glich {T2: 2; T3: 33} ECU, falls die Preisgarantie aktiviert wird.
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– Der endgu¨ltige Preis von Wettbewerber B ist immer sein eingegebener Preis,
da Wettbewerber B an keine Preisgarantie gebunden ist.}
• wie hoch die Gewinne beider Wettbewerber sind:
– Die Gewinne beider Wettbewerber ergeben sich aus der Multiplikation des
jeweiligen {T2 + T3: endgu¨ltigen} Preises und der jeweiligen Absatzmenge:
Gewinn ={T2 + T3: Endgu¨ltiger} Preis · Absatzmenge [in ECU]
Machen Sie sich mit den Berechnungen vertraut und nutzen Sie den Szenario-
Rechner. Sie ko¨nnen ihn beliebig oft verwenden. Ihre Eingaben im Szenario-
Rechner haben keinen Einfluss auf Ihre Auszahlungen am Ende des Experi-
mentes.
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Instruktionen — Entscheidungsstufe
Nachdem Sie sich nun mit dem Szenario-Rechner vertraut gemacht haben, interagieren
Sie in diesem Teil des Experimentes mit Ihnen zugeteilten anderen Wettbewerbern in dem
Ihnen aus dem Szenario-Rechner bekannten Setting.
Die Entscheidungsstufe besteht aus insgesamt 15 Runden, wobei jede Runde vom Ablauf
identisch ist. Von Runde zu Runde unterschiedlich ist, mit welchem Wettbewerber sie
konkurrieren. Hierbei gilt:
• Ihr Wettbewerber wird jede Runde zufa¨llig neu bestimmt. Es wird sichergestellt,
dass Sie in zwei aufeinanderfolgenden Runden niemals demselben Wettbewerber
zugeordnet sind.
• Ihr Wettbewerber hat immer eine von Ihnen unterschiedliche Rolle, sodass immer
ein Wettbewerber A mit einem Wettbewerber B konkurriert.
Ablauf einer Runde:
1. Zu Beginn jeder Runde setzt Wettbewerber A zuerst seinen {T2+T3: vorla¨ufigen}
Preis.
Wettbewerber B sieht wa¨hrenddessen einen Wartebildschirm.
2. Nachdem Wettbewerber A seinen {T2+T3: vorla¨ufigen} Preis gesetzt hat, wird
dieser Wettbewerber B angezeigt, welcher nun seinen {T2+T3: endgu¨ltigen} Preis
setzt.
Wettbewerber A sieht wa¨hrenddessen einen Wartebildschirm.
3. Anschließend werden vom Computer {T2+T3: der endgu¨ltige Preis von Wettbewer-
ber A und} die Absatzmengen bestimmt. Diese werden zusammen mit den Gewin-
nen beider Wettbewerber in der abschließenden Rundenzusammenfassung angezeigt.
Nach Abschluss der 15 Runden wird eine Auflistung Ihrer sa¨mtlichen Rundengewinne
angezeigt und aufsummiert. Die Gesamtsumme wird am Ende des Experimentes zum Um-
rechnungskurs von 1 e pro 14 000 ECU auf den Cent genau umgerechnet und zuzu¨glich
zu der Pra¨mie von 4 e fu¨r das Erscheinen und der 4 e - Pra¨mie fu¨r das Ausfu¨llen des
Fragebogens Ihnen in bar ausbezahlt.
Nach der Rundenu¨bersicht erscheint der kurze Fragebogen auf dem Bildschirm. Bitte
fu¨llen Sie diesen aus, wa¨hrend die Experimentatoren Ihre Auszahlungen vorbereiten. Im
Anschluss werden Sie anhand Ihrer Kabinennummer zur Auszahlung aufgerufen und das
Experiment ist beendet.
Vielen Dank fu¨r Ihre Teilnahme!
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We study the strategic disclosure of demand information and product-market strate-
gies of duopolists. In a setting where both firms receive information with some prob-
ability, we show that firms selectively disclose information in equilibrium in order to
influence their competitor’s product-market strategy. Subsequently, we analyze the
firms’ behavior in a laboratory experiment. We find that subjects often use selective
disclosure strategies, and this finding appears to be robust to changes in the informa-
tion structure, the mode of competition, and the degree of product differentiation.
Moreover, in our experiment, subjects’ product-market conduct is largely consistent
with theoretical predictions.
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3.1 Introduction
This paper studies strategies of firms that may not have complete information about
the demand for their goods. The market demand may be affected by exogenous
shocks, such as the business cycle or the weather. For example, a firm may not
know whether its market demand remains depressed (booming) or a recovery (re-
cession) is imminent. In addition, the firm may not be fully informed about how
well product characteristics match with consumers’ tastes if those tastes are subject
to change. Alternatively, a firm may not have complete information on a common
cost of production. For example, prices of common inputs may fluctuate in an un-
predictable way. In all those cases, a firm can obtain information to learn about
the market, and if it does, it can use this information to gain a strategic advantage.
First, the firm can manage the beliefs of a competitor by disclosing or concealing
its information. Second, the firm can use the information to make better-informed
choices in the product market. In this paper, we study these strategic uses of a
firm’s demand information both theoretically as well as experimentally.
The analysis of the firms’ disclosure incentives is relevant as starting point for
developing antitrust policy and accounting rules. An antitrust authority is better
equipped to determine how much information firms should be allowed to share,
by understanding the non-cooperative disclosure strategies of competing duopolists
(e.g., Ku¨hn and Vives, 1995, and Ku¨hn, 2001). Likewise, it is helpful to know
how much information firms share voluntarily when one designs accounting rules
that stipulate how much information firms are required to disclose (e.g., Verrecchia,
2001, and Dye, 2001). In other words, the effects of disclosure regulation can only
be properly assessed if the unregulated disclosure strategies and their effects on
product-market competition are well understood.
If there are no verification and disclosure costs, and if it is known that firms have
information, then often firms will disclose all information. Firms do so, since they
cannot credibly conceal unfavorable news. This phenomenon is called the unraveling
result (Milgrom, 1981, Milgrom and Roberts, 1986, Okuno-Fujiwara et al., 1990, and
Milgrom, 2008).1 In the experimental literature, King and Wallin (1991a), and Jin
et al. (2015) find support for the unraveling result if receivers get enough feedback.
By contrast, if a firm can fail to become informed, it is no longer known whether
this firm is informed. Although information is verifiable, it is not verifiable whether
or not a firm is informed. In such an environment the unraveling result may fail to
hold since firms can credibly conceal unfavorable news by claiming to be uninformed,
1The assumption that information is verifiable, which we adopt in this paper, is consistent with
some empirical findings (e.g., see Jansen, 2008).
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e.g., see Dye (1985), Farrell (1986), Jung and Kwon (1988), and Sankar (1995). In
these models of unilateral disclosure, a Cournot oligopolist has an incentive to dis-
close bad news (low demand), and conceal good news (high demand) to discourage
its rivals. A Bertrand oligopolist only discloses good news (high demand) to in-
duce the competitors to choose high prices. Ackert et al. (2000) give experimental
support for unilateral, selective information disclosure of a common cost parameter
in Cournot duopoly. They confirm that a firm discloses bad news more often than
good news.2
Theoretical studies of multilateral information disclosure typically focus on sym-
metric models.3 Darrough (1993) analyzes a symmetric model, and Jansen (2008)
focuses on symmetric equilibria. These papers show that the optimal unilateral dis-
closure strategy is also an equilibrium strategy in symmetric settings of multilateral
disclosure. That is, symmetric Cournot duopolists disclose low demand intercepts
and conceal high intercepts, whereas Bertrand duopolists disclose only high inter-
cepts. As far as we know, there are no experiments on multilateral disclosure in
duopoly models.
Although the literature focuses on unilateral disclosure and multilateral informa-
tion exchange between symmetric firms, there exist important differences between
firms in practice (e.g., established firms differ from new firms, and firms have differ-
ent sizes and capabilities). Our paper intends to address this issue.
We contribute to the literature in two ways. First, we contribute to the theoret-
ical literature on multilateral information disclosure by analyzing the disclosure and
product-market strategies of firms in asymmetric duopolies. Second, we contribute
to experimental work on strategic information disclosure by studying multilateral
disclosure, by analyzing the behavior of Bertrand duopolists, and by studying dis-
closure behavior of duopolists with differentiated goods in a laboratory.
A firm’s disclosure of common demand information in a Cournot duopoly has
two conflicting effects. First, the disclosure informs the firm’s competitor about his
payoff from the product market. In particular, if the firm discloses that demand
is low (high), then its competitor learns that a relatively low (high) output level
is profitable. Therefore, this effect gives the firm an incentive to disclose a low
demand intercept and conceal a high intercept in order to discourage supply by its
competitor.
2King and Wallin (1991b) obtain results consistent with selective disclosure in an asset market.
In a labor market, costly disclosure to an automated receiver is selective too (Benndorf et al.,
2015).
3With multilateral disclosure, both firms in a duopoly make (simultaneous) disclosure choices.
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However, there is an additional effect of demand disclosure. A firm that discloses
information also informs its competitor about its conduct in the product market.
In particular, if the firm discloses that it learned that demand is low (high), then it
signals to the competitor that it will have a less (more) “aggressive” output strategy
than an uninformed firm. This effect gives the firm an incentive to disclose a high
demand intercept and conceal a low demand intercept. Such a disclosure strategy
makes the firm’s competitor pessimistic about the competitive pressure, and thereby
discourages him to supply to the market (strategic substitutes).
Our paper derives precise conditions under which the former effect outweighs
the latter. In particular, if the demand distribution is not too skewed towards low
demand, or if firms do not differ too much from each other, then there exists an
equilibrium in which both firms disclose low demand and conceal high demand.
Hence, we extend the aforementioned literature by allowing for asymmetry and
multilateral disclosure.
In addition, we characterize situations where the latter effect of disclosure domi-
nates the former, and a firm reverses its disclosure strategy. This happens if demand
is sufficiently skewed towards low demand (e.g., in periods of economic recession),
and if one firm is likely to be informed while the other firm is unlikely to be informed.
In this case, the former firm discloses only a low intercept whereas the latter firm
discloses only a high demand intercept. If it is unlikely that a firm is informed and
it is likely that the demand is low, then this firm is expected to be a soft com-
petitor, since it is likely that the firm is uninformed and pessimistic. Disclosure of
good news by this firm makes the competitor less “aggressive,” since the news makes
the competitor realize that the firm will be less soft than expected.4 Hence, if the
firms’ probabilities of receiving information are sufficiently different, then the firms’
information disclosure choices may differ from the choices by identical firms.5
In a Bertrand duopoly, the effects from disclosing information about a common
demand intercept are aligned. As before, the disclosure of high (low) demand infor-
mation makes the competitor of a firm optimistic (pessimistic) about his product-
market opportunities. In addition, the firm’s disclosure of a high (low) demand
intercept signals to the firm’s competitor that it will have a less (more) “aggressive”
4This happens for the following reasons. First, the competitor drastically updates his belief
about the firm’s conduct in the product market, and thereby expects fiercer competition. Moreover,
the average competitor becomes only slightly more optimistic about his own opportunities in the
product market, since it is very likely that the competitor was already informed about the size of
the market.
5This observation is consistent with the observations in Hwang (1993, 1994). Hwang analyzes
the information sharing incentives of precommitting firms (Ku¨hn and Vives, 1995, Raith, 1996,
and Vives, 1999), whereas we study the incentives for strategic disclosure.
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pricing strategy than if it were uninformed. Both belief updates give the competitor
the incentive to set a relatively high (low) price. Therefore, the firm discloses a
high demand intercept and conceals a low intercept to encourage a high price by its
competitor.
Our laboratory experiment analyzes the strategic information disclosure and
product market choices of firms in several duopolistic settings. In particular, we
vary the mode of competition, the information structure (i.e., from unilateral to
bilateral disclosure, and from symmetric to asymmetric models), and the degree of
product differentiation across seven treatments.
We find that subjects often use selective disclosure strategies. The subjects in
our treatments with Cournot (Bertrand) competition disclose information on low
(high) demand intercepts significantly more often than information on high (low)
demand intercepts. These observed tendencies suggest that subjects understand
that disclosed information informs their competitor about demand, and they use
their information strategically. The observed selective disclosure strategies give the
subjects’ competitor pessimistic (optimistic) beliefs about the market with Cournot
(Bertrand) competition, and thereby make the competitor less “aggressive” in the
product market if this were the only effect of information disclosure. Our finding
appears to be robust to changes in the information structure, and the degree of
product differentiation.
Finally, the subjects in our experiment display product-market conduct that is
largely consistent with our theoretical predictions. Their product-market choices
tend to be responsive to information, and (weakly) to the precision of information.
3.2 The model
Consider an industry where two risk-neutral firms interact in a three-stage game.
Firms have symmetric demand functions, with intercept θ. This demand intercept
is unknown to the firms.6 The intercept is either low or high, i.e., θ ∈ {θ, θ}
with 0 < θ < θ, and θ is drawn with probability q(θ) where 0 < q(θ) < 1 and
q(θ) + q(θ) = 1.
In stage 1, the firms can learn the demand realization from imperfect signals,
(Θ1,Θ2). With probability ai, firm i learns the true demand intercept, Θi = θ, but
with probability 1 − ai the firm receives the uninformative signal Θi = ∅, where
0 < ai < 1 and i = 1, 2. These signals are independent, conditional on θ.
6This model is conceptually identical to a model with incomplete information about a common
shock to a constant marginal production costs. Hence, all results hold for such a model as well.
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In stage 2, each firm chooses whether to disclose or conceal its signal. If a firm
receives information about the demand intercept, then this information is verifiable.
However, the fact whether or not a firm is informed is not verifiable. If firm i receives
information Θi = θ, it chooses the probability with which it discloses this informa-
tion, si(θ) ∈ [0, 1] for i = 1, 2. In particular, firm i discloses θ with probability si(θ),
while it sends uninformative message ∅ with probability 1 − si(θ) for i = 1, 2. An
uninformed firm can only send message ∅. In other words,
[
si(θ), si(θ)
]
denotes
firm i’s disclosure strategy for i = 1, 2. Firms choose their disclosure strategies
simultaneously.
In the final stage, firms simultaneously choose their output levels of substitutable
goods, xi ≥ 0 for firm i (i.e., Cournot competition).7 Firm i’s inverse demand
function is Pdi (xi, xj) ≡ θ − xi − δxj, for i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i 6= j, and 0 < δ ≤ 1.
Parameter δ stands for the degree of product substitutability.8 Firm i has the
constant unit cost of production ci ≥ 0. We assume that the firms’ costs do not
differ too much, and thereby we focus on accommodating output strategies. Firm
i’s profit for output levels (xi, xj) and demand intercept θ is (for i, j ∈ {1, 2} with
i 6= j):
pii(xi, xj; θ) = (θ − ci − xi − δxj)xi. (3.1)
We solve the model backwards and use the perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept.
3.3 Theoretical analysis
This section analyzes the equilibrium quantities for given disclosure choices, and
characterizes the equilibrium disclosure strategies. In addition, we characterize the
equilibrium strategies of Bertrand competitors. These analyses yield testable hy-
potheses.
3.3.1 Equilibrium outputs
First, we study the equilibrium outputs under complete information. Whenever one
of the firms discloses the information θ, both firms know that the demand intercept
is θ. Firm i’s first-order condition of profit maximization with respect to xi, given
7In Section 3.3, we extend the model by considering price competition (i.e., Bertrand competi-
tion).
8For example, if δ = 1 then the firms’ goods are perfect substitutes, and if δ → 0 then in the
limit the firms supply to independent markets.
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θ ∈ {θ, θ}, is as follows (for i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j):
2xi(θ) = θ − ci − δxj(θ) (3.2)
The first-order conditions give the following equilibrium output and profit for firm i:
xfi (θ) =
θ − ci
2 + δ
+
δ(cj − ci)
4− δ2 and (3.3)
pifi (θ) = x
f
i (θ)
2, (3.4)
respectively, with θ ∈ {θ, θ} and i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i 6= j. This is a standard result.
Second, we consider the equilibrium after no firm disclosed any information. In
that case, an informed firm i with Θi = θ assigns probability Aj(θ; sj) to compet-
ing with an informed rival j (Θj = θ), and probability 1 − Aj(θ; sj) to facing an
uninformed rival (Θj = ∅), where:
Aj(θ; sj) ≡ aj [1− sj(θ)]
1− ajsj(θ) . (3.5)
After an uninformative signal (Θi = ∅), firm i expects the demand intercept:
Ej{θ|∅; sj} ≡ Qj(θ; sj)θ +Qj(θ; sj)θ, (3.6)
with posterior belief
Qj(θ; sj) ≡ q(θ) [1− ajsj(θ)]
q(θ) [1− ajsj(θ)] + q(θ)
[
1− ajsj(θ)
] . (3.7)
The uninformed firm i assigns probability Qj(θ; sj)Aj(θ; sj) to competing with an
informed firm j with Θj = θ for θ ∈ {θ, θ}. With the remaining probability, 1 −
Ej{Aj(θ; sj)|∅; sj}, firm j is believed to be uninformed. Hence, if the beliefs of firm
i are consistent with disclosure strategy sj, then firm i’s first-order conditions are
as follows (for i, j = 1, 2 with i 6= j, and Θi ∈ {θ, θ,∅} where Ej{θ|θ; sj} = θ):
2x∗i (Θi) = Ej{θ|Θi; sj} − ci − δEj
{
Aj(θ; sj)x
∗
j(θ) + [1− Aj(θ; sj)]x∗j(∅)
∣∣Θi; sj} .
(3.8)
Equation (3.8) implies that the equilibrium output of an uninformed firm equals
the conditionally expected output of an informed firm:
x∗i (∅; si, sj) = Ej {x∗i (θ; si, sj)|∅; sj} . (3.9)
66
After we define the function D as follows
D(si, sj) ≡ 4− δ2
[
Aj(θ; sj)Qi(θ; si) + Aj(θ; sj)Qi(θ; si)
]
· [Ai(θ; si)Qj(θ; sj) + Ai(θ; si)Qj(θ; sj)] , (3.10)
we derive the equilibrium output from (3.8) and (3.9), by using (3.5)–(3.7).
Proposition 1. If no firm disclosed information, and firms i and j have beliefs
consistent with sj and si, respectively, then the following holds for i, j = 1, 2 with
i 6= j. The equilibrium output of firm i with information Θi = θ equals
x∗i (θ; si, sj) ≡ xfi (θ) +
δ
4−δ2 q(θ̂)
(
θ − θ̂
)
ψi(si, sj)
D(si, sj)
∏2
h=1 [1− ahsh(θ)]E{1− ahsh(θ)}
, (3.11)
where
ψi(si, sj) ≡ δ(1− ai)(1− aj)E {[1− aisi(θ)] [1− ajsj(θ)]}
+2(1− aj) [1− aisi(θ)]
[
1− aisi(θ)
]
E{1− ajsj(θ)}
−δ(1− ai) [1− ajsj(θ)]
[
1− ajsj(θ)
]
E{1− aisi(θ)}, (3.12)
and D(si, sj) > 0 for θ, θ̂ ∈ {θ, θ} with θ 6= θ̂. In equilibrium, firm i with signal
Θi ∈ {θ, θ,∅} expects to earn the profit pi∗i (Θi; si, sj) ≡ x∗i (Θi; si, sj)2.
The sign of
(
θ̂ − θ
)
· ψi(si, sj) determines the sign of xfi (θ) − x∗i (θ; si, sj), since
all other terms are positive for i = 1, 2. This observation is important for the firm’s
incentive to disclose information, which we analyze in the next subsection.
3.3.2 Equilibrium disclosure strategies
Now we analyze the firms’ incentives to strategically disclose information. That is,
we look for strategies (s∗i , s
∗
j) that are optimal given beliefs consistent with (s
∗
i , s
∗
j).
Suppose that firm i’s beliefs are consistent with strategy s∗j , and firm j has beliefs
that are consistent with s∗i . Given these beliefs, the expected profit of firm i with
Θi = θ from disclosure probability si(θ) equals:
Πi(θ, si; s
∗
i , s
∗
j) = pi
f
i (θ) + [1− si(θ)]
[
1− ajs∗j(θ)
] (
pi∗i (θ; s
∗
i , s
∗
j)− pifi (θ)
)
. (3.13)
Hence, the sign of firm i’s marginal expected profit from changing si(θ) depends
on the sign of the profit difference pifi (θ) − pi∗i (θ; s∗i , s∗j). In turn, the sign of the
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output difference xfi (θ) − x∗i (θ; si, sj) determines the sign of this profit difference,
and thereby the incentive of firm i to disclose information θ.
We illustrate the firms’ disclosure incentives in two extreme information disclo-
sure constellations. First, we consider full disclosure (i.e., si(θ) = si(θ) = 1 for
i = 1, 2). Firm i has the incentive to unilaterally deviate from full disclosure by
concealing high-demand information. Such concealment reduces the competitor’s
output from xfj (θ) to E{xfj (θ)} if the competitor is uninformed, whereas it does not
affect an informed competitor. The competitor’s output reduction is profitable for
firm i.
Second, we consider full concealment (i.e., si(θ) = si(θ) = 0 for i = 1, 2). With
prior beliefs and ex ante symmetric firms (i.e., ai = aj), a firm has the incentive
to unilaterally deviate from full concealment by disclosing a low demand intercept.9
This relaxes competitive pressure from the competitor, and increases the disclosing
firm’s profit. By contrast, if the firms are asymmetric, i.e., ai is low and aj is high,
firm i may want to deviate by disclosing a high demand intercept.10 Yet, firm j
has the incentive to unilaterally deviate from full concealment by disclosing a low
intercept.11
These examples suggest that there is always a firm with an incentive to disclose
only low demand information. This disclosure incentive is also present in equilib-
rium.
Proposition 2. For any equilibrium, there exists a firm, i, such that this firm
chooses the disclosure strategy
[
si(θ), si(θ)
]
= (1, 0).
Hence, it is without loss of generality to restrict attention to equilibria in which
one of the firms discloses only a low demand intercept. This simplifies the equilibrium
analysis, and it yields the following characterization.
Proposition 3. (a) There exists an equilibrium with symmetric disclosure choices
(i.e.,
[
s∗i (θ), s
∗
i (θ)
]
= (1, 0) for i = 1, 2) if and only if q(θ)aj [2 + δ (1− ai)] ≤ 2 for
i, j = 1, 2 with i 6= j;
(b) For some i, j = 1, 2 with i 6= j, there exists an equilibrium with [s∗i (θ), s∗i (θ)] =
(0, 1) if and only if q(θ)aj(2 + δ) ≥ 2;
9It follows from (3.12) that ψi([0, 0], [0, 0]) = 2(1− aj)− δ(1− ai)aj which is positive if ai = aj .
10For example, if θ = θ, aj is close to 1, and ai is close to 0 (and both firms conceal all
information), then firm j expects an output close to E{xfi (θ)} from firm i. In turn, firm i expects
that firm j is informed and will set its output approximately according to the best reply xj(θ) =
[θ− ci − δE{xfi (θ)}]/2. This output is higher than the output which firm j sets after disclosure of
high demand information by firm i (i.e., xfj (θ)). In other words, the unilateral disclosure of Θi = θ
allows firm i to set a higher output, and thereby to reach a higher profit level.
11Subsequently, firm i supplies the output xfi (θ) instead of the higher output E{xfi (θ)}.
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(c) For some i, j = 1, 2 with i 6= j, there exists an equilibrium with 0 ≤ s∗i (θ) ≤ 1
and
s∗i (θ) =
1
ai
(
1− δ(1− ai)q(θ)aj
2 [1− q(θ)aj]
)
(3.14)
if and only if 2/(2 + δ) ≤ q(θ)aj ≤ 2/ [2 + δ(1− ai)];
(d) No other equilibrium exists.
Proposition 2 implies that the equilibrium of Proposition 3(a) is the only sym-
metric disclosure equilibrium that can exist. In this equilibrium, the incentive to
make a competitor pessimistic about the size of the market dominates. Proposition
3(a) gives two conditions for the existence of this equilibrium. In particular, the
conditions hold if the distribution is not too skewed towards a low demand intercept
(e.g., q(θ) ≤ 2
3
).12 Alternatively, if firms are symmetric (i.e., ai = aj), then Proposi-
tion 3(a) applies too.13 Finally, product differentiation is favorable for the existence
of the symmetric disclosure equilibrium. In particular, there exists a critical degree
of substitutability, δ∗ > 0, such that the conditions of Proposition 3(a) are satisfied
for all δ ≤ δ∗.14
Conversely, the proposition shows that the equilibrium with symmetric disclosure
choices need not always exist. In particular, if (i) the distribution of θ is skewed
towards low intercepts (i.e., q(θ) is high), (ii) goods are close substitutes (i.e., δ is
high), and (iii) it is very likely that one of the firms receives information while it
is unlikely that the other firm receives information (e.g., aj is high while ai is low),
then the symmetric disclosure equilibrium does not exist. Under those conditions,
firm i has an incentive to unilaterally disclose good (conceal bad) news to make its
rival realize (believe) that firm i will compete “aggressively” in the product market.
For intuition of these observations, suppose that the firms have beliefs consistent
with the strategies
[
s∗i (θ), s
∗
i (θ)
]
=
[
s∗j(θ), s
∗
j(θ)
]
= (1, 0), and firm j chooses the
strategy
[
s∗j(θ), s
∗
j(θ)
]
= (1, 0). It is convenient to consider the extreme situation
where q(θ) = 1 − ε, and ai = ε, aj = 1 − ε, with ε > 0 small. In this situation, an
uninformed firm i would expect a demand intercept of approximately 1
2
(
θ + θ
)
, and
the firm would consider it approximately equally likely to compete with an informed
12In the rewritten condition q(θ) ≤ 2/ (aj [2 + δ (1− ai)]), the right-hand side is decreasing in aj
and δ, and increasing in ai. This implies that 2/ (aj [2 + δ (1− ai)]) > 2/3.
13For ai = aj = a, the conditions reduce to q(θ)a [2 + δ (1− a)] ≤ 2. This condition holds, since
its left-hand side is increasing in a for 0 < a < 1 and therefore q(θ)a [2 + δ (1− a)] < 2q(θ) < 2.
14The condition’s left-hand side is increasing in δ, and it is smaller than 2 for δ = 0.
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rival (Θj = θ) as with an uninformed rival (Θj = ∅).15 Consequently, an uninformed
firm i would supply approximately the amount xfi
(
1
2
(
θ + θ
))
.16
First, we consider the incentive for firm i with Θi = θ to unilaterally deviate by
disclosing a high demand intercept. If firm i were to conceal its information, then
firm j would expect to compete almost surely with an uninformed rival (since ai
is small), who supplies xfi
(
1
2
(
θ + θ
))
units. By contrast, the disclosure of the high
demand intercept makes firm j realize that it faces a strong competitor, who sets the
output xfi (θ). Clearly, firm i’s expected output from disclosure is greater than the
expected output from concealment, i.e., xfi (θ) > x
f
i
(
1
2
(
θ + θ
))
. Now, irrespective
of whether firm i discloses or conceals, the competitor’s best reply is approximately
2xj ≈ θ−cj−δxi, since it is extremely likely that firm j is informed in the latter case
(i.e., aj is big). Whereas disclosure does not greatly affect firm j’s beliefs about the
demand, it has a substantial effect on firm j’s beliefs about firm i’s product market
conduct. This gives firm j an incentive to contract its output. Hence, the unilateral
disclosure of Θi = θ is profitable for firm i, given the proposed equilibrium beliefs.
Under the same conditions, firm i with bad signal Θi = θ has the incentive
to conceal bad news. Here, firm i’s strategy can only have an effect on the firms’
product-market conduct, if firm j is uninformed. In this case, a similar intuition
applies as before. Although firm i’s strategy has a negligible effect on firm j’s beliefs
about demand, it has a substantial effect on the firm’s beliefs about the competitive
pressure from firm i.17 Concealment makes uninformed firm j expect fierce quantity
competition, and firm j reduces its output as a consequence. Firm j’s lower output
enables firm i to expand its output, and thereby increase its expected profit.
Proposition 3(b) shows that the deviation strategies from above can be equi-
librium strategies. An asymmetric equilibrium can only exist if the intercept dis-
15This is due to the fact that both aj and q(θ) are high. In particular, the posterior probability
Qj(θ; 1, 0) in (3.7) equals 1/(2−ε), and Aj(θ; 1, 0) in (3.5) gives Aj(θ; 1, 0) = 0 and Aj(θ; 1, 0) = 1−
ε. Clearly, for ε→ 0, these probabilities converge to Qj(θ; 1, 0)→ 1/2 and Qj(θ; 1, 0)Aj(θ; 1, 0)→
1/2.
16An informed rival would know that the intercept is θ, whereas an uninformed rival would
expect approximately the low intercept θ, since q(θ) is high and the concealment by firm i generates
almost no additional information (ai is low). Approximately, this gives the best reply functions:
2xj(θ) ≈ θ − cj − δxi(∅) and 2xj(∅) ≈ θ − cj − δxi(∅) for firm j, and 2xi(∅) ≈ (θ + θ)/2− ci −
δ
[
xj(θ) + xj(∅)
]
/2 for firm i. Solving this system of equations gives x∗i (∅; s∗i , s∗j ) ≈ xfi ( 12
(
θ + θ
)
)
for firm i.
17With or without disclosure by firm i, the competitor’s best reply is approximately 2xj ≈
θ − cj − δxi. This is due to the fact that ai is low and q(θ) is high. In particular, the posterior
probability Qi(θ; 1, 0) in (3.7) equals ε/
[
(1− ε)2 + ε], and Ai(θ; 1, 0) in (3.5) gives Ai(θ; 1, 0) =
0 and Ai(θ; 1, 0) = ε. Clearly, for ε → 0, these probabilities converge to Qi(θ; 1, 0) → 0 and
Qi(θ; 1, 0)Ai(θ; 1, 0)→ 0. Whereas firm j anticipates the competitor’s output xfi (θ) after disclosure,
it expects approximately the output xfi
(
1
2
(
θ + θ
))
after concealment.
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tribution is skewed towards the low demand (i.e., q(θ) > 2/(2 + δ) is a necessary
condition).
Finally, Proposition 3(c) shows that there can exist equilibria in mixed strategies.
As in part (b), an equilibrium in mixed strategies can only exist if the distribution of
θ is skewed towards low intercepts (i.e., q(θ) > 2/(2+δ)). Moreover, Proposition 3(c)
implies that an equilibrium with full disclosure or full concealment by firm i only ex-
ists in special cases (respectively, if q(θ)aj = 2/(2+δ) or q(θ)aj = 2/ [2 + δ (1− ai)]).
Proposition 3 has the following implication for the uniqueness of an equilibrium.
Corollary 1. (a) For q(θ) max{a1, a2} < 2/(2 + δ), the firms choose symmetric
disclosure strategies (i.e.,
[
s∗i (θ), s
∗
i (θ)
]
= (1, 0) for i = 1, 2) in the unique equilib-
rium.
(b) For q(θ)ai < 2/(2 + δ) and q(θ)aj > 2/ [2 + δ (1− ai)] where i, j = 1, 2 with
i 6= j, the firms choose the strategies [s∗i (θ), s∗i (θ)] = (0, 1) and [s∗j(θ), s∗j(θ)] = (1, 0)
in the unique equilibrium.
Corollary 1(a) confirms the result of Darrough (1993). For the symmetric distri-
bution (i.e., q(θ) = 1
2
) and symmetric probabilities of receiving an informative signal
(ai = aj), the symmetric equilibrium is unique. In our setting with a binary type
space, symmetry of the distribution is already sufficient for uniqueness.
In the setting where only one firm can become informed, we confirm Sankar
(1995).
Corollary 2 (Sankar, 1995). If aj = 0, then firm i chooses strategy
[
si(θ), si(θ)
]
=
(1, 0) in the unique equilibrium for i, j = 1, 2 with i 6= j.18
In the context of a model with a symmetric distribution, Sankar (1995) argues
that this result extends to settings with aj > 0. Our contribution is to show that
this argument depends on the symmetry of the distribution. In particular, if the
distribution is sufficiently skewed towards a low intercept, then the equilibrium with
symmetric disclosure choices may not be unique or may not exist (Corollary 1(b)).
3.3.3 Bertrand competition
This subsection analyzes the incentives of firms that compete in prices. Inverting
the system of inverse demand functions gives the following direct demand function:
Di(pi, pj; θ) ≡ 1
1− δ2
(
(1− δ)θ + δpj − pi
)
(3.15)
18Corollary 2 follows from the fact that (3.12) reduces to ψi(si) = 2 [1− aisi(θ)]
[
1− aisi(θ)
]
> 0
for aj = 0. Consequently, there only exists an equilibrium with
[
si(θ), si(θ)
]
= (1, 0).
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for i, j = 1, 2 with i 6= j. Maximizing the expected profit pii = (pi − ci)Di(pi, pj; θ)
and solving for the equilibrium gives the following result by focusing on accommo-
dating pricing strategies (i.e., the substitutability parameter δ is sufficiently low).
Proposition 4. If a firm disclosed θ, then firm i sets the equilibrium price:
pfi (θ) ≡
(1− δ)θ + ci
2− δ +
δ(cj − ci)
4− δ2 . (3.16)
If no firm disclosed information, and firms i and j have beliefs consistent with sj
and si, respectively, then the equilibrium price of firm i with information Θi = θ
equals:
p∗i (θ; si, sj) ≡ pfi (θ)−
δ 1−δ
2−δp(θ̂)
(
θ − θ̂
)
ψbi (si, sj)
D(si, sj)
∏2
h=1 [1− ahsh(θ)]E{1− ahsh(θ)}
(3.17)
where ψbi (•) > 0 and D(•) > 0 for θ, θ̂ ∈ {θ, θ} with θ 6= θ̂, and i, j = 1, 2
with i 6= j. The equilibrium price of an uninformed firm equals p∗i (∅; si, sj) =
Ej {p∗i (θ; si, sj)|∅; sj} for i, j = 1, 2 with i 6= j. Firm i chooses the strategy[
si(θ), si(θ)
]
= (0, 1) in the unique equilibrium for i = 1, 2.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. The effects of information disclo-
sure by Bertrand competitors reinforce each other, whereas demand disclosure by
a Cournot competitor yields two conflicting effects. Disclosure of good news about
the market size increases the competitor’s price for two reasons. First, the com-
petitor becomes more optimistic about the market opportunities (i.e., the demand),
and raises its price. In addition, the competitor learns that the disclosing firm is
informed about the fact that demand is high, and is therefore less “aggressive” than
expected. Also this makes the competitor a softer price setter in the product market
(strategic complements). The intuition for concealing bad news is analogous.
3.3.4 Hypotheses
Our theoretical results yield some hypotheses which we test afterwards. First, we
derive the following testable hypothesis from Corollary 1 and Proposition 4.
Hypothesis 1. (a) If demand is uniformly distributed (q(θ) = 1
2
) and firms com-
pete in quantities (prices), then firms disclose information on low (high) demand
intercepts more often than high (low) intercepts.
(b) If firms compete in quantities and the conditions of Corollary 1(b) are satisfied,
then firm i (firm j) discloses information on high (low) demand intercepts more
often than low (high) intercepts.
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Hypothesis 1(a) gives testable predictions for settings in which firms choose sym-
metric disclosure strategies in the unique equilibrium. Hypothesis 1(b) covers the
settings in which the disclosure strategies differ in the unique equilibrium.
Second, we develop two testable hypotheses about the effects of information
on the firms’ product-market strategies.19 If firms compete in quantities and the
demand distribution is uniform (i.e., q(θ) = 1
2
), then firms choose the disclosure
strategy s1 = s2 = [1, 0] in the unique equilibrium (Proposition 3), and Proposition
1 gives:
x∗i (θ; [1, 0], [1, 0]) < x
f
i (θ) < x
∗
i (∅; [1, 0], [1, 0]) < x
f
i (θ) < x
∗
i (θ; [1, 0], [1, 0]) (3.18)
for i = 1, 2. A firm’s incentive to conceal θ follows from the last inequality of (3.18).
By contrast, under the conditions of Corollary 1(b), firm i discloses only high demand
intercepts in the unique equilibrium, and its equilibrium outputs compare as follows:
xfi (θ) < x
∗
i (θ; [0, 1], [1, 0]) < x
∗
i (∅; [0, 1], [1, 0]) < x∗i (θ; [0, 1], [1, 0]) < x
f
i (θ). (3.19)
Firm i’s incentive to conceal θ follows from the first inequality in (3.19). Similarly,
if firms compete in prices, then Proposition 4 shows that both firms disclose only
high demand intercepts in the unique equilibrium (i.e., s1 = s2 = [0, 1]), and prices
can be ranked as follows (for i = 1, 2):
pfi (θ) < p
∗
i (θ; [0, 1], [0, 1]) < p
∗
i (∅; [0, 1], [0, 1]) < p∗i (θ; [0, 1], [0, 1]) < p
f
i (θ). (3.20)
Firm i’s incentive to conceal a low demand intercept follows from the first inequality
in (3.20). We summarize these observations in the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. Consider firm i with an informative signal (Θi = θ).
(a) If demand is high (θ = θ) and it is drawn from the uniform distribution
(q(θ) = 1
2
), and firms compete in quantities, then the firm’s output without in-
formation disclosure is greater than the output with information disclosure.
If demand is low (θ = θ), and (b) firms compete in quantities and the conditions
of Corollary 1(b) are satisfied, or (c) firms compete in prices, then firm i’s product
market choice without information disclosure is greater than the choice with disclo-
sure.
The inequalities (3.18)-(3.20) relate the equilibrium product-market strategy of
an uninformed firm to the strategies under complete information in the following
way.
19See the Mathematical Appendix for details on formal derivations.
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Hypothesis 3. The product-market choice of uninformed firm i is greater (smaller)
than the choice of a firm with complete information about a low (high) demand, if:
(a) firms compete in quantities and demand is uniformly distributed (q(θ) = 1
2
), or
(b) firms compete in quantities and the conditions of Corollary 1(b) are satisfied,
or
(c) firms compete in prices.
The product-market choice of an uninformed firm is greater than the choice of
a firm with complete information about a low demand intercept for the following
reason. On the one hand, an uninformed firm is more optimistic about the demand
than a firm that knows that demand is low. This gives an uninformed firm an incen-
tive to choose a higher product-market variable. On the other hand, an uninformed
firm expects tougher quantity (softer price) competition than a firm that faces a pes-
simistic competitor who knows that demand is low. This gives the uninformed firm
an incentive to set a lower output (higher price). Under the conditions of Hypoth-
esis 3(a)-(b), the former effect outweighs the latter, which yields xfi (θ) < x
∗
i (∅; ·).
Under Bertrand competition (Hypothesis 3(c)), the two effects reinforce each other,
and give pfi (θ) < p
∗
i (∅; ·). The comparison of the product-market choice of an unin-
formed firm with the choice of a firm with complete information about high demand
is analogous.
Finally, we generate a testable hypothesis which relates to the effect of the like-
lihood of receiving information on a firm’s equilibrium product-market choice.
Hypothesis 4. For i = 1, 2, the product-market choice of firm i under incom-
plete information is decreasing in the firm’s likelihood of receiving information, ai,
in the following instances. (a) Firms compete in quantities, demand is uniformly
distributed (q(θ) = 1
2
), and the firm is uninformed (Θi = ∅) or the firm received
high-demand information (Θi = θ) and ai ≥ 0.3. (b) Firms compete in prices.
The likelihood ai affects the beliefs of firm i’s competitor. In particular, for
beliefs consistent with the equilibrium strategy and information concealment, an
increase of ai has two effects. On the one hand, an uninformed Cournot (Bertrand)
competitor becomes more optimistic (pessimistic) about the size of demand in the
market, since it is more likely that firm i is informed and conceals good (bad)
news. This gives the Cournot (Bertrand) competitor an incentive to expand his
output (reduce his price). On the other hand, in a Cournot (Bertrand) duopoly,
firm i’s competitor expects that firm i is relatively more “aggressive,” since it is
more likely that firm i is informed about a high (low) demand intercept. This
gives the competitor an incentive to reduce his output or price. If firms compete
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in quantities, and demand is uniformly distributed, the former effect dominates the
latter effect, and firm i reduces its output in response to the competitor’s output
expansion. Under Bertrand competition, the two effects on the competitor’s beliefs
reinforce each other. Firm i’s best reply to its competitor’s lower price is to decrease
its price as well.
3.4 Experimental analysis
We conduct a lab experiment in which participants play variants of the duopoly
games from Sections 3.2 and 3.3.3. All sessions of our experiment were conducted in
the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research at the University of Cologne. The ex-
periment has been programmed with the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007).
Participants were recruited via e-mail from a preselected subsample of 1,900
students with a considerable background in business administration or economics.20
We used the Online Recruitment System ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) to randomly invite
participants for the experiment. We held seven sessions with 30 participants each.
The share of male (110) and female (100) participants was almost equal and the
average age was 24.7 years. Each subject was allowed to participate in one session
only.
We paid each subject e 2.50 for showing up. During the course of the experi-
ment, subjects could earn additional money, dependent on their decisions. In the
experiment, we used an experimental currency (ECU), which was converted to Eu-
ros (e) and paid in cash at the end of the experimental sessions. Average individual
payments were approximately e 21 (including participation fee). Each session took
about two hours.
We describe and motivate the experimental design before discussing the results.
3.4.1 Design
In the experiment, we simplify the model by imposing zero production costs (c1 =
c2 = 0), we set θ = 240 and θ = 300, and we truncate the inverse demand function
20We invited students who were at least in their third semester and had been enrolled in one
of the following courses of studies towards a Bachelor’s, Master’s or other comparable degree:
business administration, business arithmetics, business informatics, economics, social sciences. The
preselection from the pool of about 5,000 registered subjects has the following motivation. First,
students with these backgrounds may be more representative of the business community than the
general student population. Second, students with this background may have a greater ability to
deal with the complexity of this game.
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to avoid negative profits.21 In contrast to the models of Sections 3.2 and 3.3.3, we
restrict disclosure decisions to pure strategies (i.e., si(θ) ∈ {0, 1} for any θ and i).22
Treatments. Each treatment has 30 participants, i.e., 15 subjects with the role of
firm 1 and 15 subjects as firm 2. Subjects in each treatment of the experiment are
randomly assigned to matching groups of six individuals. In each period, a subject
is randomly assigned to another subject within his matching group, but the same
pair is never matched in two consecutive periods. Subjects are made aware of the
random matching, but they do not know the matching group size. This is done to
avoid reciprocal behavior.23
We vary the strategic product-market variables, the degree of substitutability
(δ), firm 1’s likelihood of receiving information (a1), the prior demand probability
q(θ), and the exchange rate of ECU/e across treatments, to test our hypotheses.
The exchange rates vary such that the subjects’ expected earnings remain constant
across treatments. We keep a2 = 0.9 across treatments. Table 3.1 lists the different
variables and parameter values in our seven treatments. By using these parameter
values, we focus on settings with unique equilibria.
Table 3.1: Treatment overview – parameter values
Strategic
variable
δ a1 a2 q(θ) Exchange Rate Date
Treatment 1 (T1) output 1 0 0.9 0.5 28,000 ECU/e 12/04/2012
Treatment 2 (T2) output 1 0.9 0.9 0.5 28,000 ECU/e 12/04/2012
Treatment 3 (T3) output 1 0.3 0.9 0.5 28,000 ECU/e 12/05/2012
Treatment 4 (T4) output 1 0.3 0.9 0.9 23,000 ECU/e 12/05/2012
Treatment 5 (T5) output 1
2
0 0.9 0.5 40,000 ECU/e 22/07/2013
Treatment 6 (T6) price 1
2
0 0.9 0.5 56,000 ECU/e 22/07/2013
Treatment 7 (T7) price 1
2
0.9 0.9 0.5 56,000 ECU/e 22/07/2013
Treatments 1-4 adopt Cournot competition with homogeneous goods (δ = 1).
In Treatment 1, we use the uniform demand distribution (i.e., q(θ) = 0.5) and set
21That is, Pdi (xi, xj) = max{θ − xi − δxj , 0}. Since θ and θ are sufficiently close to each other,
this restriction has no effect on the equilibrium, and it was only rarely binding in the experiment
(<1%).
22This does not restrict the equilibrium strategies, since we aim to test the emergence of unique
equilibria in pure strategies for all treatments. For the parameter choices of our treatments, mixed
strategies affect the firm’s choices neither along the equilibrium path, nor off the equilibrium path.
23With this matching procedure we especially aim to prevent collusion, since collusion is most
likely in small groups with repeated interaction, e.g., see Huck et al. (2004).
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a1 = 0. This gives a model of unilateral disclosure, which is similar to one of the
settings in Ackert et al. (2000).24 With T1, we aim to replicate the findings of Ackert
et al., and thereby test Hypotheses 1(a for quantity competition), 2(a) and 3(a).
In Treatment 2, we modify T1 such that both firms have the same likelihood
of learning the demand intercept, i.e., a1 = 0.9 and q(θ) = 0.5. In this ex ante
symmetric setting, we aim to test whether multilateral selective disclosure occurs as
predicted by Hypothesis 1(a). In addition, it allows us to compare quantities between
different treatments, and study the effects of changing a1 (Hypothesis 4(a)).
In Treatment 3, we set a1 = 0.3 while everything else remains as in T1 and T2.
With this treatment we can test whether multilateral selective disclosure of low de-
mand occurs in asymmetric settings with uniformly distributed demand (Hypothesis
1(a)). Moreover, the comparisons with T1 and T2 give further insights in the effects
of varying a1 (Hypothesis 4(a)). T1-T3 allow us to test Hypotheses 2(a) and 3(a)
too.
In Treatment 4, we modify T3 by setting q(θ) = 0.9, i.e., we introduce skewness
of the demand distribution. This changes the unique equilibrium disclosure strategy
of firm 1. Hypothesis 1(b) predicts that firm 1 discloses only a high demand intercept
in T4, which we aim to verify. Further, we can test Hypotheses 2(b) and 3(b) by
T4.
Treatments 5-7 adopt product differentiation (δ = 1
2
). In Treatment 5, we modify
T1 by introducing product differentiation (i.e., a1 = 0, q(θ) = 0.5, and δ =
1
2
). This
allows us to verify whether the results from T1 are robust to a change in the degree
of product substitutability (Hypotheses 1(a), 2(a) and 3(a)). In addition, T5 serves
as a link between T1-T4 and T6-T7.
Treatments 6 and 7 adopt competition in prices (Bertrand competition) with
differentiated goods. Here, we use the direct demand function Di(pi, pj; θ) ≡ θ +
pj − 2pi for i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j (i.e., δ = 12). As in T5, Treatment 6 assumes
unilateral disclosure. By comparing behavior in T6 with behavior in T5, we are
able to study the effects of changing the strategic variable in the product market
(Hypothesis 1(a)).
Finally, Treatment 7 extends T6 by adopting multilateral disclosure, i.e., a1 =
0.9, and q(θ) = 0.5. In other words, a1 increases from 0 to 0.9 by moving from
T6 to T7, and thereby T7 is the Bertrand counterpart of T2 (Hypothesis 4(b)). In
addition, T6-T7 yield data for testing Hypotheses 1(a for price competition), 2(c)
and 3(c).
24Incentives in T1 and Ackert et al. (2000) are identical. Though, framing and procedures differ,
e.g., Ackert et al. hold a Pen&Paper experiment and subjects learn about an industry-wide cost
with three possible realizations.
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Parts within each treatment. Each treatment consists of three different parts
which are all slight modifications of the models from Sections 2 and 3.3. The three
parts have different levels of complexity, as they introduce random variables and
strategy choices step by step.
In Part I, subjects compete in a duopolistic market with full information (i.e.,
a1 = a2 = 1), and subjects make no disclosure choices (i.e., s1 = s2 = 1). This part
consists of 20 independently repeated periods and is identical across treatments
with the same intensity of competition.25 At the beginning of each period, both
subjects are informed about the realization of the random demand intercept θ. Sub-
sequently, they simultaneously choose output levels (T1-T5) or prices (T6-T7) from
the interval [0, 300]. At the end of each period, we give feedback concerning chosen
outputs (prices), the subject’s price (demand), and the subject’s profit. To start
each treatment with this simple part has several advantages. First, participants
familiarize themselves with the duopoly game. This is important, since subjects
are not equipped with calculators, payoff tables or other auxiliary means in our
experiment.26 Therefore, we expect more noisy and suboptimal behavior in initial
periods. Second, we can use observations from Part I for investigations of general
interest, e.g., it allows us to examine the intensity of competition and learning in a
complete-information setting.
In Part II, we introduce incomplete information about the demand intercept,
and we allow subjects to make disclosure choices. At the beginning of each period
in this part, subjects 1 and 2 independently learn the intercept with probability a1
and a2, respectively, which varies across treatments. Subsequently, both subjects
simultaneously make their disclosure decisions. Finally, subjects simultaneously
set their output levels or prices and receive feedback as in Part I. We repeat this
procedure for 50 independent periods, in order to increase the likelihood for all
subjects to experience all possible states of information at least once.27 Part II
constitutes the core of our experiment, as it allows us to observe disclosure decisions
and product-market choices for various realizations of random variables.
Part III consists of a single period. Here, subjects have to make a conditional
disclosure decision prior to receiving their signal. That is, they formulate a full
25In T1-T3, Part I is ex ante identical. Part I of T4 is only strategically identical to Part I of
T1-T3, since it has a different demand distribution. Part I of T6 is ex ante identical to Part I of
T7.
26Requate and Waichman (2011), and Gu¨rerk and Selten (2012) explore the effects of the provi-
sion of payoff tables in experimental oligopolies. They find that provision has a considerable effect
on initial behavior and it makes collusion more likely to occur.
27The likelihood for specific informational settings is quite low in some treatments, due to a low
a1 or q(θ), since the demand intercept and signals are randomly drawn within all treatments.
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disclosure strategy,
[
si(θ), si(θ)
] ∈ {0, 1} × {0, 1}, indicating whether or not any
particular demand intercept will be disclosed.28 After posting the strategies, the
intercept is drawn and messages are transferred. Finally, subjects simultaneously
make their product-market choices, and receive feedback as in Parts I and II. The
observed strategies of this part allow a deeper inquiry into the subjects’ disclosure
behavior.
3.4.2 Results
In this section, we make a descriptive analysis of the data generated by our experi-
ment, and we test the hypotheses from the previous section.
Each treatment and subject role give 5 independent observations, since the 30
subjects are randomly matched in groups of 6 subjects. That is, an observation is
the average of choices by subjects with a specific role over time in their matching
group.29
As we only have a small number of observations we do not make normality
assumptions. Instead, we analyze our data by using non-parametric tests. For
comparisons within treatments, we use the Wilcoxon-Matched-Pairs-Signed-Rank
test (Wilcoxon test), while we use the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test (MWW test)
for between-treatment comparisons.30 Typically, we test directional hypotheses, and
thus we use the one-sided version of the previous tests in those cases.
Observations from Part I – Complete information. In Part I of our exper-
iment, the firms have complete information. Table 3.2 summarizes the equilibrium
product-market choices under complete information for all treatments. Similarly,
Table 3.3 lists the average product-market choices in Part I across treatments.
Table 3.2: Equilibrium product-market choices under complete information
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7
low demand (θ = θ) 80 80 80 80 96 80 80
high demand (θ = θ) 100 100 100 100 120 100 100
Note: The choices in T1-T5 (T6-T7) are output levels (prices).
First, we test whether there are exogenous variations across treatments which
are strategically identical in Part I (i.e., T1-T4 for Cournot competition with ho-
mogeneous goods, and T6-T7 for Bertrand competition with differentiated goods).
28The strategy method was initially used by Selten (1967).
29Hence, all product-market choices reported below refer to average levels of matching groups.
30For descriptions of the Wilcoxon and MWW tests, see, e.g., Siegel and Castellan (1988).
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Table 3.3: Average product-market choices in Part I
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7
low demand (θ = θ) 85.8
(15.9)
86.2
(22.2)
86.9
(22.7)
87.9
(21.3)
94.6
(4.2)
76.1
(2.7)
83.8
(11.4)
high demand (θ = θ) 108.4
(16.8)
107.6
(24.3)
111.5
(22.8)
114.2
(40.0)
127.9
(10.6)
102.6
(13.9)
112.0
(15.0)
Note: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
The choices in T1-T5 (T6-T7) are output levels (prices).
The choices in Table 3.3 are relatively close to the predictions of Table 3.2, and they
do not differ much across strategically identical treatments. By using one-on-one
treatment comparisons with the two-sided MWW test, we find no statistically sig-
nificant differences between choices in any two strategically equivalent treatments.
Hence, we attribute differences between treatments in Parts II and III solely to the
parameter variations.
Next, we investigate the choices in Part I, by using pooled data from the ex
ante identical Cournot treatments T1-T3, and the Bertrand treatments T6-T7. For
the Cournot treatments, we can reject the hypothesis that chosen output levels are
lower (i.e., less competitive) than the respective equilibrium outputs in Table 3.2.31
In fact, the chosen outputs tend to be a bit more competitive than predicted.32
For Bertrand competition with low demand, we do not find significant differences
between chosen and predicted prices.33 For high demand draws, we can reject the
hypothesis that price choices are lower (i.e., more competitive) than predicted with
weak statistical significance.34 The latter result is mainly driven by initial periods,
as we see next.
Finally, we examine the extent to which learning takes place. One reason for
having Part I is to familiarize subjects with the product-market game. Therefore, we
expect deviations from the Nash equilibria to diminish over time. To our surprise,
the initial product-market choices of subjects are on average already close to the
predictions of Table 3.2. For T1-T3, subjects choose an average output level of 86.7
(SD:10.9) in the first five instances with low demand, which significantly decreases
to 84.11 (SD:7.9) in the later periods of Part I.35 For high demand in T1-T3, subjects
31Wilcoxon tests, one-sided: p=0.0234 for low demand, p=0.0013 for high demand.
32Holt (1985) finds slighty more competitive behavior than predicted in his Cournot duopoly
experiment too. Some subjects gave a “rivalistic” explanation, i.e., they are willing to take a
small loss in order to harm the competitor. Huck et al. (1999) observe the same, especially
when providing feedback about the competitors’ quantities. Rivalistic behavior may explain our
observations too.
33Wilcoxon test, two-sided (non-directional null-hypothesis), p=0.5751.
34Wilcoxon test, one-sided, p=0.0697.
35Wilcoxon test, one-sided, p=0.0219.
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start with 109.4 units (SD:9.5) on average, and continue with 108.6 units (SD:9.1)
in the subsequent periods. Those two output levels do not differ significantly. In
T6-T7 with low demand, subjects start with average price 84.0 (SD:11.7) which
is significantly higher than 75.8 (SD:7.9) in the subsequent periods.36 With high
demand, the average initial price 112.8 (SD:16.5) is significantly higher than the
average price 101.7 (SD:13.2) in later instances.37 Thus, the price (output) choices
of Bertrand (Cournot) competitors become slightly more (less) “aggressive” in the
course of Part I. The choices tend to converge to the predicted levels for both modes
of competition.
Observations on Disclosure Choices (H1). Table 3.4 summarizes the unique
equilibrium disclosure choices for T1-T7. Below we test whether the disclosure
choices in our experiment are in line with these predictions.
Table 3.4: Disclosure frequencies in the unique equilibrium (in %)
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7
Firm 1:
low demand (Θ1 = θ) — 100 100 0 — — 0
high demand (Θ1 = θ) — 0 0 100 — — 100
Firm 2:
low demand (Θ2 = θ) 100 100 100 100 100 0 0
high demand (Θ2 = θ) 0 0 0 0 0 100 100
Disclosure choices in Part II. Table 3.5 gives the average disclosure frequencies
of the subjects who received an informative signal from nature in Part II of the
experiment.38 A pairwise comparison of the frequencies from the first and second
rows, and from the third and fourth rows, suggests that firms in T1-T5 disclose a
low demand intercept more frequently than a high demand intercept. By contrast,
firms in T6-T7 appear to disclose a high demand intercept more frequently than a
low intercept, as the theory predicts (Table 3.4). The following statistical results
are in line with these qualitative observations.
36Wilcoxon test, one-sided, p=0.0184.
37Wilcoxon test, one-sided, p=0.0026.
38We also analyze whether subjects change their disclosure behavior over time. We compare
the subjects’ average disclosure frequency in the first five instances where the subjects received a
particular informative signal with the frequency in the last five instances where they observed this
signal. Although the disclosure frequencies appear to increase, the changes are not statistically
significant in most cases. For details, see Tables 3.12-3.14 in Appendix 3.C.
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Table 3.5: Disclosure frequencies in Part II (in %)
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7
Firm 1:
low demand (Θ1 = θ) — 85.5
(17.5)
87.7
(9.9)
93.5
(13.3)
— — 41.9
(13.9)
high demand (Θ1 = θ) — 56.1
(25.4)
56.5
(19.5)
36.6
(30.9)
— — 84.5
(21.2)
Firm 2:
low demand (Θ2 = θ) 97.8
(1.6)
85.5
(17.5)
87.9
(9.3)
84.7
(16.5)
81.8
(11.1)
38.9
(22.3)
41.9
(13.9)
high demand (Θ2 = θ) 46.4
(9.9)
56.1
(25.4)
34.4
(27.8)
32.6
(22.1)
13.6
(14.1)
94.7
(4.0)
84.5
(21.2)
Note: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
In T2 and T7 we do not distinguish between firms as they are ex ante identical.
Result 1. (a) In Cournot (Bertrand) markets with uniformly distributed demand,
there is evidence that subjects disclose low (high) demand intercepts significantly
more often than high (low) intercepts.
(b) In Cournot markets with skewed demand distribution and asymmetric signal
distributions (T4), subjects with a high-demand signal show a lower than predicted
frequency of disclosure.
Hypothesis 1(a) predicts that Cournot (Bertrand) competitors with a uniform
demand distribution disclose low (high) demand intercepts more frequently than high
(low) intercepts. In line with this hypothesis, we find in the Cournot treatments T1-
T3 and T5 significantly higher disclosure frequencies for subjects with low-demand
information.39 This result is consistent with a finding by Ackert et al. (2000) who
examine a unilateral disclosure setting. In addition, we extend their finding to a
setting with differentiated goods (T5), and to multilateral settings for symmetric
(T2) as well as asymmetric signaling technologies (T3). Further, we find in T6-T7
that the frequencies of disclosing a high demand intercept are significantly higher
than the frequencies of disclosing low demand.40 This is in line with Hypothesis 1(a)
too.
Hypothesis 1(b) predicts that firm 1 (firm 2) in T4 discloses high (low) demand
intercepts more frequently than low (high) intercepts. We find that firm 1 discloses
a low demand intercept significantly more often than a high intercept, and we obtain
39We used one-sided Wilcoxon tests. The p-value in each treatment comparison is 0.0215, which
is the best possible value attainable given the number of independent observations.
40Wilcoxon tests, one-sided, p-values=0.0215.
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a similar result for firm 2.41 The latter result is consistent with Hypothesis 1(b),
whereas the former result is not.
Result 1(a) suggests that the subjects understand that their disclosure reveals
information to their competitor about the size of the market. That is, the subjects
seem to understand the strategic value of managing the competitor’s belief about
the market. In addition, it gives experimental support for the theoretical finding
that the disclosure behavior of Cournot competitors differs from that of Bertrand
competitors (e.g., Darrough, 1993). However, there is no evidence that subjects
understand that their disclosure reveals information about their own conduct, as
Result 1(b) implies. These observations are consistent with the observations by
Ackert et al. (2000). Also they find that subjects adjust their disclosure choices if
they inform the competitor about the market (industry-wide information), whereas
they do not adjust if disclosure informs the competitor about the discloser’s con-
duct (firm-specific information). Ackert et al. make this observation in a model
with unilateral disclosure of independently distributed costs, whereas we make our
observation in a model with bilateral disclosure of a common demand intercept.
Disclosure choices in Part III. For a deeper inquiry of the disclosure behavior,
we asked the participants in Part III of each treatment for a complete disclosure
strategy. Table 3.6 gives the frequencies of the individual disclosure-strategy choices
for each treatment and role in Part III. Out of the 90 participants who had to
make a disclosure decision in the Cournot treatments T1-T3 and T5, 42 subjects
choose to disclose only if demand is low, which is the equilibrium disclosure strategy.
Another 39 (7) subjects choose to disclose all (no) demand intercepts. The high
frequency of full-disclosure choices is in line with Cai and Wang (2006), who find
that senders in a cheap-talk game tend to overcommunicate.42 Just 2 subjects choose
to disclose only a high demand intercept. In short, 90% of the subjects in Part III
of T1-T3 and T5 disclose a low demand intercept, whereas less than 46% disclose
a high intercept. This is in line with Hypothesis 1(a). Also the frequencies from
the Bertrand treatments T6-T7 are in line with the aggregate disclosure predictions
from Hypothesis 1(a), and they are consistent with our findings from Part II.43
41Wilcoxon tests, one-sided: p=0.0339 for firm 1, p=0.0215 for firm 2.
42Subjects may disclose all information if they lack sophistication to recognize the strategic role of
information (Cai and Wang, 2006). Alternatively, subjects may have an aversion to deception (e.g.,
Gneezy, 2005), and they may interpret concealment as lying about the fact that they are informed.
Finally, risk-averse subjects may disclose all information to eliminate strategic uncertainty.
43Out of the 45 subjects in T6-T7 who choose a disclosure strategy, 28 subjects choose to
disclose only a high demand intercept, whereas no subject chooses to do the reverse. Further, 14
(3) subjects choose to disclose all (no) demand information. In other words, more than 93% of the
subject choose to disclose a high demand intercept, whereas about 31% disclose a low intercept.
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Table 3.6: Frequencies of disclosure choices in Part III (in %)
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7
Firm 1’s strategy
“disclose nothing” — 6.7 6.7 6.7 — — 10
“disclose only low” — 40 26.7 66.7 — — 0
“disclose only high” — 3.3 0 13.3 — — 63.3
“disclose all” — 50 66.7 13.3 — — 26.7
Firm 1’s disclosure frequency
low demand — 90 93.3 80 — — 26.7
high demand — 53.3 66.7 26.7 — — 90
Firm 2’s strategy
“disclose nothing” 0 6.7 26.7 6.7 0 0 10
“disclose only low” 46.7 40 60 66.7 66.7 0 0
“disclose only high” 0 3.3 0 0 6.7 60 63.3
“disclose all” 53.3 50 13.3 26.7 26.7 40 26.7
Firm 2’s disclosure frequency
low demand 100 90 73.3 93.3 93.3 60 26.7
high demand 53.3 53.3 13.3 26.7 33.3 100 90
Note: In T2 and T7 we do not distinguish between firms as they are ex ante identical.
For T4, Hypothesis 1(b) predicts that firm 1 discloses a high demand intercept
more frequently than a low intercept, whereas firm 2 does the reverse. However,
Table 3.6 indicates that firm 1 chooses to disclose low-demand information more
often (i.e., in 80% of the cases) than high-demand information (by less than 27% of
the subjects).44 Hence, the behavior of subjects in the role of firm 1 is inconsistent
with the predicted behavior, whereas the behavior of firm 2 in T4 is consistent with
our prediction.45
Observations on product-market choices.
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 summarize the average product-market choices in Part II of firm
1 and firm 2, respectively. These choices are output levels in T1-T5, whereas they
are prices in T6-T7. We distinguish settings in which no messages were sent from
settings of complete information. In the former situation, firms did neither send nor
44From the 15 subjects with the role of firm 1, there are 2 subjects who choose to disclose only
high demand, whereas 10 subjects choose to do the reverse. There are 2 (1) subjects with the role
of firm 1 who commit to disclosing all (no) information.
45Out of the 15 subjects with the role of firm 2, 10 subjects commit to disclosing only low demand
intercepts, whereas no-one commits to the opposite strategy. Further, 4 (1) subjects in the role of
firm 2 commit to disclose all (no) information. Hence, low demand intercepts are disclosed by 93%
of the subjects, whereas high intercepts are disclosed by less than 27% of the subjects.
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Table 3.7: Average product-market choices of Firm 1 in Part II
Incomplete Information Complete Information
Θ1 = θ Θ1 = ∅ Θ1 = θ θ = θ θ = θ
T1 — 105.3
(7.7)
— 85.2
(7.8)
108.5
(10.8)
T2 too few obs. 95.0
(11.4)
108.0
(6.1)
81.6
(2.6)
101.8
(4.1)
T3 too few obs. 99.9
(3.9)
112.7
(1.6)
80.9
(3.4)
104.3
(5.3)
T4 too few obs. 90.9
(11.0)
107.3
(10.3)
79.6
(11.1)
99.9
(11.7)
T5 — 120.5
(12.5)
— 95.9
(6.6)
125.1
(7.6)
T6 — 79.2
(3.9)
— 74.3
(7.2)
105.7
(6.9)
T7 75.8
(7.4)
82.5
(9.2)
too few obs. 78.3
(6.7)
106.5
(6.0)
Note: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
In T2 and T7 we do not distinguish between firms as they are ex ante identical.
The choices in T1-T5 (T6-T7) are output levels (prices).
receive any informative message but they received a particular signal by nature. We
list the average product-market choices for this setting in the first three columns of
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 . 46 We list the average product-market choices under complete
information in the last two columns of Tables 3.7 and 3.8. Here, we pool data from
instances in which firm 1, firm 2, and both firms sent an informative message.
Product-market choice of privately informed firms (H2). First, we analyze
the effect of incomplete information on the product-market choices of informed firms.
Our statistical analysis gives the following result.
Result 2. In Cournot markets, there is evidence that subjects who are privately
informed about high demand supply significantly more than subjects with complete
information about high demand. In Bertrand markets, there is no significant dif-
ference between prices of subjects with private and complete information about low
demand.
The pairwise comparison between the third and fifth columns of Tables 3.7 and
3.8 for T1-T3 and T5 suggests that a firm with a high-demand signal chooses a higher
output level under incomplete information than under complete information. This
is consistent with Hypothesis 2(a), and it suggests that a firm with high-demand
46We do not have enough observations to give a meaningful average for subjects who have learned
that demand is low (high) and have incomplete information in T1-T5 (respectively, T6-T7).
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Table 3.8: Average product-market choices of Firm 2 in Part II
Incomplete Information Complete Information
Θ2 = θ Θ2 = ∅ Θ2 = θ θ = θ θ = θ
T1 too few obs. 93.8
(6.3)
111.1
(9.4)
83.5
(4.5)
101.2
(11.2)
T2 too few obs. 95.0
(11.4)
108.0
(6.1)
81.6
(2.6)
101.8
(4.1)
T3 too few obs. 98.9
(10.1)
119.0
(24.4)
82.3
(4.6)
107.1
(11.7)
T4 too few obs. 92.8
(6.0)
109.4
(7.7)
77.9
(4.5)
110.1
(9.0)
T5 too few obs. 104.6
(4.3)
129.6
(11.3)
91.6
(7.2)
122.4
(17.9)
T6 76.3
(5.8)
87.5
(6.8)
too few obs. 80.8
(3.0)
104.3
(5.1)
T7 75.8
(7.4)
82.5
(9.2)
too few obs. 78.3
(6.7)
106.5
(6.0)
Note: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
In T2 and T7 we do not distinguish between firms as they are ex ante identical.
The choices in T1-T5 (T6-T7) are output levels (prices).
information may have indeed an incentive to conceal its information. We also test
whether there is a statistically significant difference between the product-market
choices under incomplete and complete information. The tests confirm that outputs
differ significantly for both firms in T2 and T3.47
Hypothesis 2(b) predicts that a firm 1 with a low-demand signal in T4 chooses a
lower output level under complete information than under incomplete information.
This requires that firm 1 did not receive an informative message by its competitor
and successfully learned the market demand by nature. This situation is unlikely
to occur for three reasons. First, firm 2 learns the market demand with 90% prob-
ability, and it discloses low signals in equilibrium. Second, firm 1 has only a 30%
probability of learning the market demand by nature. Finally, firm 1 often disclosed
a low demand in the experiment. As a result, we lack sufficient observations to test
Hypothesis 2(b).
With Bertrand competition, Hypothesis 2(c) predicts that the price of a firm with
low-demand information is higher with incomplete information than with complete
information. The pairwise comparison between the first and fourth columns of Tables
3.7 and 3.8 for T6 and T7 suggests that the reverse holds. However, from a statistical
point of view, the prices do not differ significantly in either treatment.
47All p-values for the one-sided Wilcoxon tests in T2 and T3 are smaller than or equal to 0.0398.
By contrast, the differences between x∗2(θ; ·) and xf2 (θ) are not significant in T1 (p-value=0.1124),
and T4 (p-value=0.3429). Table 3.9 in Appendix 3.C gives all the p-values for these tests.
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Product-market choices of uninformed firms (H3). Next, we characterize
the output choices of uninformed firms. Hypothesis 3 predicts that the product-
market choice of an uninformed firm should lie between the choices under complete
information for T1-T3, T4 for firm 1, and T5-T7. That is, the entries in the second
column are predicted to be greater (smaller) than the corresponding entries in the
fourth (fifth) column of Tables 3.7 and 3.8. The qualitative pairwise comparisons of
our data are consistent with the predicted rankings in all instances. Our statistical
tests on the variable differences are largely in line with these observations, as we
state below.
Result 3. There is evidence that the product-market choices of uninformed subject
i are significantly higher (lower) than the choices of subject i with complete infor-
mation about a low (high) demand under the conditions of Hypothesis 3.
We test whether and how the average product-market choice of an uninformed
firm differs from the average product-market choices of a firm with complete infor-
mation. The first and third (second and last) columns of Table 3.10 in Appendix 3.C
give the p-values for these comparisons when demand is low (high). The statistical
inference yields significant results in most cases.48 Hence, our observations are in
line with Hypothesis 3 in almost all cases.
The effect of a firm’s own signal precision (H4). For the uniform demand
distribution, Hypothesis 4 predicts that a firm’s product-market choice under in-
complete information tends to be decreasing in the firm’s likelihood of receiving
information. This is the case for an uninformed firm. In addition, it happens if a
Cournot competitor is privately informed about high demand and it receives this in-
formation with a high likelihood, or a Bertrand competitor has private low-demand
information.
In T1-T3, we vary firm 1’s likelihood of receiving information (a1) for a Cournot
competitor with a uniform demand distribution (see Table 3.1). There is a ceteris
paribus increase in firm 1’s likelihood by moving from T1 (a1 = 0%) via T3 (a1 =
30%) to T2 (a1 = 90%). As Hypothesis 4(a) predicts, the qualitative comparison of
the incomplete-information entries in rows T1, T3 and T2 of Table 3.7 suggests a
decreasing pattern. Likewise, a1 increases from 0 to 0.9 for a Bertrand competitor
by switching from T6 to T7. In contrast to the prediction of Hypothesis 4(b), the
48Except for two tests, our results are significant with p-values smaller than or equal to 0.0398 for
the one-sided Wilcoxon tests. The two exceptions emerge for the comparisons of output choices by
uninformed subjects with output choices under complete information about high demand. There,
our results are not significant in T2 (p-value=0.1124), and weakly significant for firm 1 in T3
(p-value=0.0690). Table 3.10 in Appendix 3.C gives all p-values for the one-sided Wilcoxon tests.
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comparison of price choices under incomplete information (i.e., the second entry) in
T6 and T7 of Table 3.7 suggests that firm 1’s price increases in a1. In addition to
these qualitative comparisons, we perform statistical tests. This gives the following
results.
Result 4. In Cournot markets, there is weak evidence that the output of subject
i is decreasing in the subject’s likelihood of receiving information, ai, if the subject
remained uninformed or concealed high demand. In Bertrand markets, there is no
significant difference between the prices set by subjects with different likelihoods of
receiving information.
First, the decrease of outputs chosen by an uninformed firm 1 is weakly significant
if the firm’s signal precision a1 increases from 0% to 90%.
49 For smaller increases
of a1, the decrease in output is statistically insignificant (see the first column of
Table 3.11 in Appendix 3.C for details). Second, also the decrease in output of
privately informed firm 1 with Θ1 = θ is weakly significant.
50 Hence, the qualitative
and statistical comparisons are in line with the prediction from Hypothesis 4(a),
although the statistical result is weak.
Hypothesis 4(b) predicts that firm 1’s prices are decreasing in signal precision a1,
whereas the qualitative comparison of average price choices in T6 and T7 of Table
3.7 suggests the reverse. Although the MWW test indicate that these prices do
not significantly differ from one another, our finding is not in line with Hypothesis
4(b).51
3.5 Conclusion
This paper analyzes a theoretical model and an experiment to examine voluntary
disclosure of demand information and product-market strategies in duopoly.
The model extends some existing theoretical models dealing with simultaneous
disclosure choices by duopolists by allowing firms to be asymmetric. We identify
conditions for a Cournot duopoly under which firms choose the usual selective dis-
closure strategy, with disclosure of low demand and concealment of high demand.
In addition, we give conditions under which one firm in an asymmetric Cournot
duopoly chooses the reverse information-disclosure strategy in equilibrium. Further,
we show that Bertrand competitors disclose high-demand information and conceal
low demand.
49One-sided MWW test: p-value=0.0586.
50One-sided MWW test: p-value=0.0872.
51Two-sided MWW test: p-value=0.9168.
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Our experiment considers information-disclosure and product-market choices,
and the interaction between these choices too. The experiment’s treatments con-
sider unilateral disclosure, and bilateral disclosure in symmetric settings as well as
asymmetric settings. Thereby, we replicate a result of Ackert et al. (2000), and
we extend it by considering bilateral disclosure in addition to unilateral disclosure,
Bertrand competition besides Cournot competition, and product differentiation.
A key finding is that subjects in the laboratory experiment often selectively
disclose their information. This finding is robust to changes in the information
structure, mode of competition, and the degree of product differentiation. On the
one hand, the subjects’ disclosure behavior suggests that the subjects understand
that disclosed information informs their competitor about the competitor’s demand.
Their behavior suggests that they often try to manage expectations of their com-
petitor about the size of the market demand to obtain a favorable product market
choice of their competitor. On the other hand, the subjects in our experiment did
not seem to grasp that their disclosed information also gives a signal to their com-
petitor about their product-market conduct. In a different context, also Ackert et
al. (2000) observe that subjects in the laboratory tend to ignore the signaling role of
their information. They make this observation in a model with unilateral disclosure
of independently distributed costs, whereas our model considers bilateral disclosure
of a common demand intercept.
Moreover, our theoretical analysis tends to provide good qualitative predictions
for behavior in a duopolistic product market with demand uncertainty. The product-
market choices for subjects in our experiment tend to adjust to the subject’s infor-
mation, and they weakly adjust to the precision of information.
Our findings can be used as a starting point for understanding the impact of
disclosure regulation on information transmission and product market competition.
These theoretical and experimental findings can help to evaluate the effects of eco-
nomic policy towards information exchange, such as competition policy or account-
ing rules.
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3.B Mathematical appendix
Proofs of propositions
Proof of Proposition 1
The equilibrium output levels follow from solving the system of equations (3.9) and
(3.8) for Θi ∈ {θ, θ} and i, j = 1, 2 with i 6= j.
Take θ, θ̂ ∈ {θ, θ} with θ 6= θ̂, and i, j = 1, 2 with i 6= j. Using (3.9) for firm j
and the identity Qi(θ; si) = 1 − Qi(θ̂; si), enables us to rewrite condition (3.8) for
Θi = θ as follows:
2x∗i (θ; si, sj) = θ − ci − δx∗j(θ; sj, si) + δ [1− Aj(θ; sj)]Qi(θ̂; si)∆j(θ; sj, si) (3.B.1)
where ∆j(θ; sj, si) ≡ x∗j(θ; sj, si) − x∗j(θ̂; sj, si). After substituting an analogous
condition of firm j for x∗j(θ), we obtain the following:
x∗i (θ; si, sj)=x
f
i (θ) +
δ
4− δ2
(
2 [1− Aj(θ; sj)]Qi(θ̂; si)∆j(θ; sj, si)
−δ [1− Ai(θ; si)]Qj(θ̂; sj)∆i(θ; si, sj)
)
(3.B.2)
From (3.B.1) we derive the following expression for firm i’s equilibrium output dif-
ference:
2∆i(θ; si, sj) =
(
θ − θ̂
)
− δ
[
Aj(θ; sj)Qi(θ̂; si) + Aj(θ̂; sj)Qi(θ; si)
]
∆j(θ; sj, si)
Solving for firm i’s equilibrium output difference, ∆i, gives the following:
∆i(θ; si, sj) = (3.B.3)(
2− δ
[
Aj(θ; sj)Qi(θ̂; si) + Aj(θ̂; sj)Qi(θ; si)
])(
θ − θ̂
)
4− δ2
[
Aj(θ; sj)Qi(θ̂; si) + Aj(θ̂; sj)Qi(θ; si)
] [
Ai(θ; si)Qj(θ̂; sj) + Ai(θ̂; si)Qj(θ; sj)
]
Equations (3.9), (3.B.2) and (3.B.3) define the equilibrium outputs of firm i if both
firms do not disclose information. Now define D as in (3.10). By (3.B.2), (3.B.3),
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and (3.10), it is straightforward to show the following:
4− δ2
δ
(
θ̂ − θ
)D(si, sj) [xfi (θ)− x∗i (θ; si, sj)] =
2 [1− Aj(θ; sj)]Qi(θ̂; si)
[
2− δAi(θ; si)Qj(θ; sj)− δAi(θ; si)Qj(θ; sj)
]
− δ [1− Ai(θ; si)]Qj(θ̂; sj)
[
2− δAj(θ; sj)Qi(θ; si)− δAj(θ; sj)Qi(θ; si)
]
By definitions (3.5) and (3.7), the components of the first term simplify as follows:
[1− Aj(θ; sj)]Qi(θ̂; si) = 1− aj
1− ajsj(θ) ·
q(θ̂)
[
1− aisi(θ̂)
]
E{1− aisi(θ)}
=
q(θ̂) · (1− aj)E{1− ajsj(θ)} [1− aisi(θ)]
[
1− aisi(θ)
]
[1− aisi(θ)] [1− ajsj(θ)]E{1− aisi(θ)}E{1− ajsj(θ)}
=
q(θ̂) · (1− aj)E{1− ajsj(θ)} [1− aisi(θ)]
[
1− aisi(θ)
]∏2
h=1 [1− ahsh(θ)]E{1− ahsh(θ)}
and (by using Qj(θ; sj) +Qj(θ; sj) = 1)
Ai(θ; si)Qj(θ; sj) + Ai(θ; si)Qj(θ; sj)
= 1− [1− Ai(θ; si)]Qj(θ; sj)−
[
1− Ai(θ; si)
]
Qj(θ; sj)
= 1− 1− ai
1− aisi(θ) ·
q(θ)
[
1− ajsj(θ)
]
E{1− ajsj(θ)} −
1− ai
1− aisi(θ)
· q(θ) [1− ajsj(θ)]
E{1− ajsj(θ)}
= 1− 1− ai
E{1− ajsj(θ)}
(
q(θ)
[
1− ajsj(θ)
]
1− aisi(θ) +
q(θ) [1− ajsj(θ)]
1− aisi(θ)
)
= 1− (1− ai)E {[1− aisi(θ)] [1− ajsj(θ)]}
E{1− ajsj(θ)} [1− aisi(θ)]
[
1− aisi(θ)
]
The second term simplifies in a similar way. Hence, the equilibrium output x∗i (θ; si, sj)
reduces to (3.11) where (3.12) defines ψi. This completes the proof.
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Proof of Proposition 2
First, consider equilibrium strategies such that ψj(sj, si) = 0. That is, suppose
that firm j chooses
[
sj(θ), sj(θ)
]
in equilibrium, and the firm has beliefs consistent
with the competitor’s strategy
[
si(θ), si(θ)
]
, such that firm j is indifferent between
disclosure and concealment of its information. Using (3.12), the equation ψj(sj, si) =
0 gives:
1− ajsj(θ) =
δai(1− aj)q(θ) [1− aisi(θ)] [1− ajsj(θ)]
[
1− si(θ)
]
N
(3.B.4)
where
N ≡ 2(1− ai)E{1− aisi(θ)} [1− ajsj(θ)]− δai(1− aj)q(θ)
[
1− aisi(θ)
]
[1− si(θ)]
(3.B.5)
Inequality 1 − ajsj(θ) > 0 implies that N > 0. Substitution of (3.B.4) in (3.12)
gives:
ψi(si, sj) = q(θ) [1− aisi(θ)] [1− ajsj(θ)] (1− aj) 1
N
[δ(1− ai)B + C]
where
B ≡ N + q(θ)δai(1− aj)
[
1− aisi(θ)
] [
1− si(θ)
]
(3.B.6)
and
C ≡ 2 [1− aisi(θ)] (N + q(θ)δai(1− aj) [1− aisi(θ)] [1− si(θ)])
−δ2(1− ai)ai [1− ajsj(θ)]
[
1− si(θ)
]
E {1− aisi(θ)} (3.B.7)
It is straightforward to show that δ(1 − ai)B + C > 0 for any si and sj (see next
section for details). This implies that if ψj(sj, si) = 0, then ψi(si, sj) > 0.
Second, consider equilibrium strategies such that ψj(sj, si) < 0. That is, [sj(θ),
sj(θ)] = (0, 1) in equilibrium and beliefs are consistent with this strategy and some
strategy
[
si(θ), si(θ)
]
. Using (3.12), the inequality ψj(0, 1, si(θ), si(θ)) < 0 gives
aj < a
H
j with:
aHj ≡ ai
q(θ) [1− aisi(θ)]
[
1− si(θ)
]
+ q(θ)
[
1− aisi(θ)
]
[1− si(θ)]
q(θ)
[
1− aisi(θ)
]
[1− aisi(θ)]
(3.B.8)
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Suppose that ψi(si(θ), si(θ), 0, 1) ≤ 0. By (3.12), this inequality gives aj ≥ aLj with:
aLj ≡
2 [1− aisi(θ)]
q(θ) [2 (1− aisi(θ)) + δ(1− ai)]
(3.B.9)
Under these conditions, the existence of an equilibrium requires that aLj ≤ aHj . By
(3.B.8), (3.B.9) and q(θ) = 1 − q(θ), this inequality is equivalent to A(q(θ)) ≥ 0,
where:
A(q(θ)) ≡ ([1− q(θ)] [1− aisi(θ)] [1− si(θ)]+ q(θ) [1− aisi(θ)] [1− si(θ)])
· ai [2 (1− aisi(θ)) + δ(1− ai)]− 2 [1− aisi(θ)]2
[
1− aisi(θ)
]
Notice that A is linear in q(θ). Evaluating A for q(θ)→ 1 gives the following:
A(1) = [1− aisi(θ)] ai [1− si(θ)] [2 (1− aisi(θ)) + δ(1− ai)]
−2 [1− aisi(θ)]2
[
1− aisi(θ)
]
=
[
1− aisi(θ)
]
(1− ai) (δai [1− si(θ)]− 2 [1− aisi(θ)])
= − [1− aisi(θ)] (1− ai) (2(1− ai) + (2− δ)ai [1− si(θ)])
< 0
Clearly, aLj in (3.B.9) is decreasing in q(θ), and the extreme value for q(θ) at which
aLj = 1 equals q ≡ 2[1−aisi(θ)]2[1−aisi(θ)]+δ(1−ai) . Taking q(θ)→ q gives the following:
A(q) = δ(1− ai) [1− aisi(θ)] ai
[
1− si(θ)
]
+2 [1− aisi(θ)]
[
1− aisi(θ)
]
ai [1− si(θ)]− 2 [1− aisi(θ)]2
[
1− aisi(θ)
]
= − [1− aisi(θ)]
(
2
[
1− aisi(θ)
]
(1− ai)− δ(1− ai)ai
[
1− si(θ)
])
= − [1− aisi(θ)] (1− ai)
(
2(1− ai) + (2− δ) ai
[
1− si(θ)
])
< 0
Then, linearity of A in q(θ) implies that A < 0 for all q ≤ q(θ) < 1. However, this
implies that aLj > a
H
j , and therefore ψi(si(θ), si(θ), 0, 1) ≤ 0 is not possible. In other
words, if ψj(0, 1, si(θ), si(θ)) < 0 in equilibrium, then ψi(si(θ), si(θ), 0, 1) > 0.
In conclusion, in any equilibrium there is always a firm i with ψi(si, sj) > 0. Then
it follows from Proposition 1 that x∗i (θ; si, sj) < x
f
i (θ) and x
∗
i (θ; si, sj) > x
f
i (θ), which
implies that the optimal disclosure strategy for firm i is
[
si(θ), si(θ)
]
= (1, 0).
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Derivations for proposition 2
Here we show that δ(1 − ai)B + C > 0, where B and C are defined in (3.B.6) and
(3.B.7), respectively. We rewrite (3.B.6) as:
B = 2(1− ai)E{1− aisi(θ)} [1− ajsj(θ)]
+δq(θ)
[
1− aisi(θ)
]
ai(1− aj)
[
si(θ)− si(θ)
]
and we rewrite (3.B.7) as follows:
C = 4
[
1− aisi(θ)
]
(1− ai)E{1− aisi(θ)} [1− ajsj(θ)]
−δ2ai
[
1− si(θ)
]
(1− ai)E {1− aisi(θ)} [1− ajsj(θ)]
−2q(θ) [1− aisi(θ)] δai(1− aj) [1− aisi(θ)] [1− si(θ)]
+2q(θ)
[
1− aisi(θ)
]
δai(1− aj) [1− aisi(θ)]
[
1− si(θ)
]
=
(
4
[
1− aisi(θ)
]− δ2ai [1− si(θ)]) (1− ai)E{1− aisi(θ)} [1− ajsj(θ)]
+2δq(θ)
[
1− aisi(θ)
]
ai(1− aj)(1− ai)
[
si(θ)− si(θ)
]
= (1− ai) ·
[(
4− δ2) [1− aisi(θ)]+ δ2(1− ai)]E{1− aisi(θ)} [1− ajsj(θ)]
+(1− ai) · 2δq(θ)
[
1− aisi(θ)
]
ai(1− aj)
[
si(θ)− si(θ)
]
Hence,
δ(1− ai)B + C = (1− ai)(2 + δ) ·
[
(2− δ) [1− aisi(θ)]+ δ(1− ai)]
·E{1− aisi(θ)} [1− ajsj(θ)]
+(1− ai)(2 + δ) · δq(θ)
[
1− aisi(θ)
]
ai(1− aj)
[
si(θ)− si(θ)
]
≥ (1− ai)(2 + δ) · 2(1− ai)E{1− aisi(θ)} [1− ajsj(θ)]
+(1− ai)(2 + δ) · δq(θ)
[
1− aisi(θ)
]
ai(1− aj)
[
si(θ)− si(θ)
]
> (1− ai)(2 + δ) · δq(θ)
[
1− aisi(θ)
]
ai(1− aj) [1− si(θ)]
+(1− ai)(2 + δ) · δq(θ)
[
1− aisi(θ)
]
ai(1− aj)
[
si(θ)− si(θ)
]
= (1− ai)(2 + δ) · δq(θ)
[
1− aisi(θ)
]
ai(1− aj)
[
1− si(θ)
] ≥ 0
where the first inequality follows from 1 − aisi(θ) ≥ 1 − ai, the second inequality
follows from (3.B.5) and N > 0, and the last inequality follows per definition.
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Proof of proposition 3
Due to Proposition 2, we assume that firm j chooses disclosure strategy
[
s∗j(θ), s
∗
j(θ)
]
= [1, 0], and firms have beliefs consistent with
[
s∗j(θ), s
∗
j(θ)
]
without loss of general-
ity. Hence, we adopt this assumption throughout the proof. Then, for some strategy
S =
[
si(θ), si(θ)
]
, the function ψi from (3.12) reduces as follows:
ψi(S, [1, 0]) = δ(1− ai)(1− aj)
(
q(θ) [1− aisi(θ)] (1− aj) + q(θ)
[
1− aisi(θ)
])
+2(1− aj) [1− aisi(θ)]
[
1− aisi(θ)
] [
q(θ) (1− aj) + q(θ)
]
−δ(1− ai) (1− aj)
(
q(θ) [1− aisi(θ)] + q(θ)
[
1− aisi(θ)
])
= (1− aj) [1− aisi(θ)]
· (2 [1− aisi(θ)] [1− q(θ)aj]− δ(1− ai)q(θ)aj) . (3.B.10)
(a) Also assume that firms have beliefs consistent with
[
si(θ), si(θ)
]
= [1, 0]. Then
Proposition 1 implies that x∗i (θ; [1, 0], [1, 0]) ≤ xfi (θ) and x∗i (θ; [1, 0], [1, 0]) ≥ xfi (θ)
if and only if ψi([1, 0], [1, 0]) ≥ 0. It follows from (3.B.10) that ψi(1, 0, 1, 0) ≥
0 if and only if 2 [1− q(θ)aj] ≥ δq(θ) (1− ai) aj, which can be rewritten as 2 ≥
q(θ)aj [2 + δ (1− ai)].
(b) Now suppose that firms have beliefs consistent with
[
si(θ), si(θ)
]
= [0, 1]. Then
it follows from Proposition 1 that it is optimal for firm i to conceal Θi = θ and
disclose Θi = θ if and only if ψi([0, 1], [1, 0]) ≤ 0. By (3.B.10), the inequality
ψi([0, 1], [1, 0]) ≤ 0 holds if and only if (2 + δ)q(θ)aj ≥ 2.
(c) Here we assume that firms have beliefs consistent with some
[
s∗i (θ), s
∗
i (θ)
]
. Then
firm i is indifferent between disclosure and concealment if and only if ψi([s
∗
i (θ), s
∗
i (θ)],
[1, 0]) = 0. Hence, (3.B.10) implies that the equation ψi([s
∗
i (θ), s
∗
i (θ)], [1, 0]) = 0 is
equivalent to 0 ≤ s∗i (θ) ≤ 1 and:
s∗i (θ) =
1
ai
(
1− δ(1− ai)q(θ)aj
2 [1− q(θ)aj]
)
Feasibility requires that s∗i (θ) ≥ 0, which the reduces to q(θ)aj [2 + δ(1− ai)] ≤ 2,
and s∗i (θ) ≤ 1, which reduces to q(θ)aj(2 + δ) ≥ 2.
(d) Finally, firm i can neither strictly prefer to disclose all demand information, nor
can the firm strictly prefer to conceal all information. This observation is due to the
fact that (3.12) can only have a single sign. This completes the proof.
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Proof of proposition 4
First, after disclosure of θ, profit maximization by firm i gives the best reply function
pi =
1
2
[(1− δ)θ + ci + δpj] for i, j = 1, 2 with i 6= j. Solving the system of equations
yields the equilibrium price (3.16). Second, if no firm disclosed information, and
the firms have beliefs consistent with the disclosure strategies (sj, si), then firm i’s
first-order condition is:
2p∗i (Θi)=(1−δ)Ej{θ|Θi; sj}+ci+δEj
{
Aj(θ; sj)p
∗
j(θ) + [1− Aj(θ; sj)] p∗j(∅)
∣∣Θi; sj}
(3.B.11)
for i, j = 1, 2 with i 6= j, and Θi ∈ {θ, θ,∅} where Ej{θ|θ; sj} = θ. This condition
implies that p∗j(∅; sj, si) = Ei
{
p∗j(θ; sj, si)
∣∣∅; si}. Using this equation and the
identity Qi(θ; si) = 1−Qi(θ̂; si), enables me to rewrite condition (3.B.11) for Θi = θ
as follows (for θ, θ̂ ∈ {θ, θ} with θ 6= θ̂, and i, j = 1, 2 with i 6= j):
2p∗i (θ; si, sj) = (1− δ)θ + ci + δp∗j(θ; sj, si)− δ [1− Aj(θ; sj)]Qi(θ̂; si)∆bj(θ; sj, si)
(3.B.12)
where ∆bj(θ; sj, si) ≡ p∗j(θ; sj, si) − p∗j(θ̂; sj, si). After substituting an analogous
condition of firm j for p∗j(θ), I obtain the following:
p∗i (θ; si, sj)=p
f
i (θ)−
δ
4− δ2
(
2 [1− Aj(θ; sj)]Qi(θ̂; si)∆bj(θ; sj, si)
+ δ [1− Ai(θ; si)]Qj(θ̂; sj)∆bi(θ; si, sj)
)
(3.B.13)
From (3.B.12) I derive the following expression for firm i’s price difference in equi-
librium:
2∆bi(θ; si, sj) = (1−δ)
(
θ − θ̂
)
+δ
[
Aj(θ; sj)Qi(θ̂; si) + Aj(θ̂; sj)Qi(θ; si)
]
∆bj(θ; sj, si)
for θ, θ̂ ∈ {θ, θ} with θ 6= θ̂, and i, j = 1, 2 with i 6= j. Solving for firm i’s price
difference, ∆bi , gives the following:
∆bi(θ; si, sj) =
(1− δ)
(
2 + δ
[
Aj(θ; sj)Qi(θ̂; si) + Aj(θ̂; sj)Qi(θ; si)
])(
θ − θ̂
)
D(si, sj)
(3.B.14)
with D(si, sj) as defined in (3.10), and for θ, θ̂ ∈ {θ, θ} with θ 6= θ̂, and i, j = 1, 2
with i 6= j. Equations (3.B.13) and (3.B.14) define the equilibrium outputs of in-
formed firm i if both firms do not disclose information.
99
By (3.B.13), (3.B.14), it is straightforward to show that the following holds for
any θ, θ̂ ∈ {θ, θ} with θ 6= θ̂, and i, j = 1, 2 with i 6= j:
(4− δ2)D(si, sj)
δ(1− δ)
(
θ − θ̂
) [p∗i (θ; si, sj)− pfi (θ)] =
− 2 [1− Aj(θ; sj)]Qi(θ̂; si)
(
2 + δ
[
Ai(θ; si)Qj(θ̂; sj) + Ai(θ̂; si)Qj(θ; sj)
])
− δ [1− Ai(θ; si)]Qj(θ̂; sj)
(
2 + δ
[
Aj(θ; sj)Qi(θ̂; si) + Aj(θ̂; sj)Qi(θ; si)
])
As in the proof of Proposition 1, the components of the first term can be simplified
by observing the following:
[1− Aj(θ; sj)]Qi(θ̂; si) =
q(θ̂) · (1− aj)E{1− ajsj(θ)} [1− aisi(θ)]
[
1− aisi(θ)
]∏2
h=1 [1− ahsh(θ)]E{1− ahsh(θ)}
Ai(θ; si)Qj(θ̂; sj) +Ai(θ̂; si)Qj(θ; sj) = 1− (1− ai)E {[1− aisi(θ)] [1− ajsj(θ)]}
E{1− ajsj(θ)} [1− aisi(θ)]
[
1− aisi(θ)
]
The second term simplifies in a similar way. Hence, the equilibrium price of firm i
reduces to (3.17), where:
ψbi (si, sj) ≡ 2 [1− aisi(θ)]
[
1− aisi(θ)
]
(1− aj)E{1− ajsj(θ)}
+δ(1− ai)E{1− aisi(θ)} [1− ajsj(θ)]
[
1− ajsj(θ)
]
−δ(1− ai)E {[1− aisi(θ)] [1− ajsj(θ)]} (1− aj). (3.B.15)
Clearly, the first term of (3.B.15) is positive. The sum of the second and third terms
of (3.B.15) is non-negative, since:
E{1− aisi(θ)} [1− ajsj(θ)]
[
1− ajsj(θ)
]− E {[1− aisi(θ)] [1− ajsj(θ)]} (1− aj)
= q(θ) [1− aisi(θ)] [1− ajsj(θ)]
([
1− ajsj(θ)
]− (1− aj))
+ q(θ)
[
1− aisi(θ)
] [
1− ajsj(θ)
]
([1− ajsj(θ)]− (1− aj))
= q(θ) [1− aisi(θ)] [1− ajsj(θ)] aj
[
1− sj(θ)
]
+ q(θ)
[
1− aisi(θ)
] [
1− ajsj(θ)
]
aj [1− sj(θ)]
≥ 0.
Hence, ψbi (si, sj) > 0 for any (si, sj).
Finally, it is easy to derive the equilibrium profits of firm i with Θi = θ by
using the first-order conditions. In particular, the equilibrium profit is pifi (θ) ≡
1
1−δ2
(
pfi (θ)− ci
)2
after disclosure, and it is pi∗i (θ; si, sj) ≡ 11−δ2 (p∗i (θ; si, sj)− ci)2
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after no disclosure. Hence, firm i’s profit from disclosure is pifi (θ), while the firm’s
expected profit from concealment of θ is ajsj(θ)pi
f
i (θ) + [1− ajsj(θ)]pi∗i (θ; si, sj).
Consequently, the firm prefers disclosure if and only if pfi (θ) > p
∗
i (θ; si, sj). From
(3.17) it follows that p∗i (θ; si, sj) > p
f
i (θ) and p
∗
i (θ; si, sj) < p
f
i (θ) for any (si, sj),
which implies that
[
si(θ), si(θ)
]
= (0, 1) is the dominant disclosure strategy for firm
i (for i = 1, 2). This completes the proof.
Derivations for hypotheses
Hypotheses 1 and 2 follow immediately from the propositions. Below we provide the
analytical derivations that underpin Hypotheses 3 and 4, respectively.
Derivations for hypothesis 3
(a) First, we show that if q(θ) = 1
2
, then x∗i (∅; [1, 0], [1, 0]) < x
f
i (θ). If q(θ) =
1
2
,
then we can rewrite the uninformed firm’s equilibrium output as follows:
x∗i (∅; [1, 0], [1, 0]) = Ej {x∗i (θ; [1, 0], [1, 0])|∅; [1, 0]}
= qj(θ; 1, 0)x
f
i (θ) + qj(θ; 1, 0)x
f
i (θ)
−
(
qj(θ; 1, 0)
(1− ai)(1− aj) − qj(θ; 1, 0)
) δ
4−δ2
1
2
(
θ − θ)ψi([1, 0], [1, 0])
D([1, 0], [1, 0]) (1− 1
2
ai
) (
1− 1
2
aj
)
= Ej
{
xfi (θ)
∣∣∣∅; [1, 0]}− ai1−ai δ4−δ2 14 (θ − θ)ψi([1, 0], [1, 0])D([1, 0], [1, 0]) (1− 1
2
ai
) (
1− 1
2
aj
)2
< Ej
{
xfi (θ)
∣∣∣∅; [1, 0]} < xfi (θ).
Second, we show that if q(θ) = 1
2
, then xfi (θ) < x
∗
i (∅; [1, 0], [1, 0]). As we show
above, we can rewrite x∗i (∅; [1, 0], [1, 0]) as follows if q(θ) = 12 :
x∗i (∅; [1, 0], [1, 0]) = Ej
{
xfi (θ)
∣∣∣∅; [1, 0]}− ai1−ai δ4−δ2 14 (θ − θ)ψi([1, 0], [1, 0])D([1, 0], [1, 0]) (1− 1
2
ai
) (
1− 1
2
aj
)2
= xfi (θ) + qj(θ; 1, 0)
[
xfi (θ)− xfi (θ)
]
−
ai
1−ai
δ
(2−δ)(2+δ)
1
4
(
θ − θ)ψi([1, 0], [1, 0])
D([1, 0], [1, 0]) (1− 1
2
ai
) (
1− 1
2
aj
)2
= xfi (θ) +
1
2
(
θ − θ)(
1− 1
2
aj
)
(2 + δ)
(
1−
ai
1−ai
δ
2−δ
1
2
ψi([1, 0], [1, 0])
D([1, 0], [1, 0]) (1− 1
2
ai
) (
1− 1
2
aj
))
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which exceeds xfi (θ), since
ai
1− ai δ
1
2
ψi([1, 0], [1, 0])− (2− δ)D([1, 0], [1, 0])
(
1− 1
2
ai
)(
1− 1
2
aj
)
< 0.
The latter follows from a basic analysis of the inequality’s left-hand-side. We can
rewrite it as follows:
LHS =
1
2
δai(1− aj)
[
2
(
1− 1
2
aj
)
+
1
2
δ [1 + (1− ai)(1− aj)]− δ
(
1− 1
2
ai
)]
−(2− δ)
[
4
(
1− 1
2
ai
)(
1− 1
2
aj
)
− 1
4
δ2aiaj(1− ai)(1− aj)
]
This expression is convex in ai, and it is negative, since it is negative for the extreme
values of ai. In particular, if we evaluate the expression for ai = 0, then it reduces
to −(2− δ)4 (1− 1
2
aj
)
< 0. Moreover, if we evaluate the expression for ai = 1, then
we obtain: 2
(
1− 1
2
aj
) [
1
2
δ(1− aj)− (2− δ)
] ≤ − (1− 1
2
aj
)
(1 + aj) < 0.
(b) Second, we show that xfi (θ) < x
∗
i (∅; [0, 1], [1, 0]) < x
f
i (θ) holds for firm i if the
conditions of Corollary 1(b) are satisfied. Under these conditions, ψbi ([0, 1], [1, 0]) <
0, which implies that xfi (θ) < x
∗
i (θ; [0, 1], [1, 0]) and x
∗
i (θ; [0, 1], [1, 0]) < x
f
i (θ). Fur-
thermore, equation (3.B.3) in the proof of Proposition 1 gives ∆i(θ; [0, 1], [1, 0]) > 0,
which implies that x∗i (θ; [0, 1], [1, 0]) < x
∗
i (θ; [0, 1], [1, 0]). Hence, the following in-
equality emerges:
xfi (θ) < x
∗
i (θ; [0, 1], [1, 0]) < x
∗
i (θ; [0, 1], [1, 0]) < x
f
i (θ).
Due to (3.9), the output x∗i (∅; [0, 1], [1, 0]) is a convex combination of x∗i (θ;[0, 1],[1, 0])
and x∗i (θ; [0, 1], [1, 0]), which immediately gives (3.19).
(c) Finally, we show that pfi (θ) < p
∗
i (∅; [0, 1], [0, 1]) < p
f
i (θ) under Bertrand compe-
tition. Expression (3.17) implies the following inequality:
pfi (θ) < p
∗
i (θ; [0, 1], [0, 1]) < p
∗
i (θ; [0, 1], [0, 1]) < p
f
i (θ),
where the second inequality follows from the observation that ∆bi(θ; si, sj) in (3.B.14)
is positive. The price of an uninformed firm, p∗i (∅; [0, 1], [0, 1]), equals the condition-
ally expected value of the informed firm’s prices, and thereby it is a convex combi-
nation of p∗i (θ; [0, 1], [0, 1]) and p
∗
i (θ; [0, 1], [0, 1]). This immediately gives (3.20).
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Derivations for hypothesis 4
(a) If demand is uniformly distributed (q(θ) = 1
2
), then firms disclose only infor-
mation about low demand in the unique equilibrium, i.e., [si(θ), si(θ)] = [1, 0] for
i = 1, 2. Hence, a firm’s equilibrium outputs (3.11) simplify as follows (for i, j = 1, 2
and i 6= j):
x∗i (θ; [1, 0], [1, 0])=x
f
i (θ)−
δ(θ−θ)
2(4−δ2)
[
2− aj − 12δaj(1− ai)
]
(2− ai) (2− aj)− 14δ2aiaj(1− ai)(1− aj)
(3.B.16)
x∗i (θ; [1, 0], [1, 0])=x
f
i (θ) +
δ(θ−θ)
2(4−δ2)(1− ai)(1− aj)
[
2− aj − 12δaj(1− ai)
]
(2− ai) (2− aj)− 14δ2aiaj(1− ai)(1− aj)
(3.B.17)
Partial differentiation of (3.B.16) with respect to ai gives the following:
∂x∗i (θ; [1, 0], [1, 0])
∂ai
=
− δ(θ−θ)
2(4−δ2)K1[
(2− ai) (2− aj)− 14δ2aiaj(1− ai)(1− aj)
]2
where
K1 ≡ 1
2
δ2aj
[
(2− ai) (2− aj)− 1
4
δ2aiaj(1− ai)(1− aj)
]
+
[
2− aj − 1
2
δaj(1− ai)
] [
2− aj + 1
4
δ2aj(1− 2ai)(1− aj)
]
> 0.
Hence, ∂x∗i (θ; [1, 0], [1, 0])/∂ai < 0.
Similarly, partial differentiation of (3.B.17) with respect to ai gives the following:
∂x∗i (θ; [1, 0], [1, 0])
∂ai
=
− δ(θ−θ)
2(4−δ2)(1− aj) · K2[
(2− ai) (2− aj)− 14δ2aiaj(1− ai)(1− aj)
]2
where
K2 ≡ [2− aj − δaj(1− ai)]
[
(2− ai) (2− aj)− 1
4
δ2aiaj(1− ai)(1− aj)
]
−(1− ai)
[
2− aj − 1
2
δaj(1− ai)
] [
2− aj + 1
4
δ2aj(1− 2ai)(1− aj)
]
= [2− aj − δaj(1− ai)] (2− aj)
− (1− ai)2 1
2
δaj
(
2− aj +
[
2− aj − 1
2
δaj
]
1
2
δ(1− aj)
)
.
103
It is straightforward to show that K2 is decreasing in aj. This implies the following:
K2 ≥ 1− δ(1− ai)− 1
2
δ (1− ai)2 ≥ ai − 1
2
(1− ai)2 .
The right-hand-side of this inequality is positive if ai ≥ 0.3. Hence,
∂x∗i (θ; [1, 0], [1, 0])/∂ai < 0
for all ai ≥ 0.3.
Finally, if q(θ) = 1
2
, then equations (3.9), (3.B.16) and (3.B.17) give:
x∗i (∅; [1, 0], [1, 0]) = Ej {x∗i (θ; [1, 0], [1, 0])|∅; [1, 0]}
=
1− aj
2− aj x
∗
i (θ; [1, 0], [1, 0]) +
1
2− aj x
∗
i (θ; [1, 0], [1, 0])
=
1− aj
2− aj x
f
i (θ) +
1
2− aj x
f
i (θ)
−
δ(θ−θ)
2(4−δ2)
[
2− aj − 12δaj(1− ai)
] (1−aj
2−aj −
(1−ai)(1−aj)
2−aj
)
(2− ai) (2− aj)− 14δ2aiaj(1− ai)(1− aj)
= Ej
{
xfi (θ)
∣∣∣∅; [1, 0]}− δ(θ−θ)2(4−δ2) [2− aj − 12δaj(1− ai)] · 1−aj2−aj ai
(2− ai) (2− aj)− 14δ2aiaj(1− ai)(1− aj)
Partial differentiation of this expression with respect to ai gives the following:
∂x∗i (∅; [1, 0], [1, 0])
∂ai
=
− δ(θ−θ)
2(4−δ2)K1 · 1−aj2−aj ai[
(2− ai) (2− aj)− 14δ2aiaj(1− ai)(1− aj)
]2
−
δ(θ−θ)
2(4−δ2)
[
2− aj − 12δaj(1− ai)
] · 1−aj
2−aj
(2− ai) (2− aj)− 14δ2aiaj(1− ai)(1− aj)
,
which is non-positive, since both terms are non-positive.
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(b) Under Bertrand competition, the firms choose the disclosure strategies [si(θ),
si(θ)] = [0, 1] for i = 1, 2 in the unique equilibrium. This simplifies the equilibrium
prices as follows:
p∗i (θ; [0, 1], [0, 1])=p
f
i (θ) + δ
1− δ
2− δ q(θ)(θ − θ)
· (1− ai)(1− aj)
[
2
(
1− q(θ)aj
)
+ δq(θ)aj(1− ai)
]
4
[
1− q(θ)ai
] [
1− q(θ)aj
]− δ2q(θ)2aiaj(1− ai)(1− aj) (3.B.18)
p∗i (θ; [0, 1], [0, 1])=p
f
i (θ)− δ
1− δ
2− δ q(θ)(θ − θ)
· 2
(
1− q(θ)aj
)
+ δq(θ)aj(1− ai)
4
[
1− q(θ)ai
] [
1− q(θ)aj
]− δ2q(θ)2aiaj(1− ai)(1− aj) (3.B.19)
Partial differentiation of (3.B.18) with respect to probability ai gives the following:
∂p∗i (θ; [0, 1], [0, 1])
∂ai
=
−δ 1−δ
2−δq(θ)(θ − θ)(1− aj) · K3(
4
[
1− q(θ)ai
] [
1− q(θ)aj
]− δ2q(θ)2aiaj(1− ai)(1− aj))2
where
K3 ≡
([
2
(
1− q(θ)aj
)
+ δq(θ)aj(1− ai)
]
+ δq(θ)aj(1− ai)
)
· (4 [1− q(θ)ai] [1− q(θ)aj]− δ2q(θ)2aiaj(1− ai)(1− aj))
−(1− ai)
[
2
(
1− q(θ)aj
)
+ δq(θ)aj(1− ai)
]
· (4q(θ)ai [1− q(θ)aj]+ δ2q(θ)2aj(1− ai)(1− aj)− δ2q(θ)2aiaj(1− aj))
=
[
2
(
1− q(θ)aj
)
+ δq(θ)aj(1− ai)
]
· (4 [1− q(θ)] [1− q(θ)aj]− δ2q(θ)2aj(1− ai)2(1− aj))
+δq(θ)aj(1− ai)
(
4
[
1− q(θ)ai
] [
1− q(θ)aj
]− δ2q(θ)2aiaj(1− ai)(1− aj))
=
[
2
(
1− q(θ)aj
)
+ δq(θ)aj(1− ai)
]
4
[
1− q(θ)] [1− q(θ)aj]
+δq(θ)aj(1− ai)
(
2
[
1− q(θ)ai
] [
1− q(θ)aj
]− δ2q(θ)2aj(1− ai)(1− aj))
+2δq(θ)aj(1− ai)
[
1− q(θ)aj
] (
1− q(θ) [ai + (1− ai)δ(1− aj)]
)
> 0.
This implies that ∂p∗i (θ; [0, 1], [0, 1])/∂ai < 0.
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Using (3.7), (3.B.18) and (3.B.19), we can rewrite the equilibrium price of an
uninformed firm as follows:
p∗i (∅; [0, 1], [0, 1]) = Qj(θ; [0, 1])p∗i (θ; [0, 1], [0, 1]) +Qj(θ; [0, 1])p∗i (θ; [0, 1], [0, 1])
= Qj(θ; [0, 1])p
f
i (θ) +Qj(θ; [0, 1])p
f
i (θ)
−δ1− δ
2− δ q(θ)q(θ)
1− aj
1− p(θ)aj
(θ − θ)
· ai
[
2
(
1− q(θ)aj
)
+ δq(θ)aj(1− ai)
]
4
[
1− q(θ)ai
] [
1− q(θ)aj
]− δ2q(θ)2aiaj(1− ai)(1− aj)
Partial differentiation of this expression with respect to probability ai gives:
∂p∗i (∅; [0, 1], [0, 1])
∂ai
=
−δ 1−δ
2−δq(θ)q(θ)(θ − θ) 1−aj1−p(θ)aj · K4(
4
[
1− q(θ)ai
] [
1− q(θ)aj
]− δ2q(θ)2aiaj(1− ai)(1− aj))2
where
K4 ≡
[
2
(
1− q(θ)aj
)
+ δq(θ)aj(1− ai)− δq(θ)aiaj
]
· (4 [1− q(θ)ai] [1− q(θ)aj]− δ2q(θ)2aiaj(1− ai)(1− aj))
+ai
[
2
(
1− q(θ)aj
)
+ δq(θ)aj(1− ai)
]
· (4q(θ) [1− q(θ)aj]+ δ2q(θ)2aj(1− ai)(1− aj)− δ2q(θ)2aiaj(1− aj))
=
[
2
(
1− q(θ)aj
)
+ δq(θ)aj(1− ai)
] (
4
[
1− q(θ)aj
]− δ2q(θ)2a2i aj(1− aj))
−δq(θ)aiaj
(
4
[
1− q(θ)ai
] [
1− q(θ)aj
]− δ2q(θ)2aiaj(1− ai)(1− aj))
= 2
[
1− q(θ)aj
] (
4
[
1− q(θ)aj
]− δ2q(θ)2a2i aj(1− aj))
+δq(θ)4aj
[
1− q(θ)aj
] (
1− ai
[
2− q(θ)ai
])
≥ 2 [1− q(θ)aj] (4 [1− q(θ)aj]− δ2q(θ)2aj(1− aj))
−δq(θ)4aj
[
1− q(θ)] [1− q(θ)aj]
≥ 2 [1− q(θ)aj] (4 [1− q(θ)aj]− 2q(θ)aj [1− q(θ)]− q(θ)2aj(1− aj))
≥ 2 [1− q(θ)aj]2 (4− q(θ) [2 + aj]) > 0.
Hence, ∂p∗i (∅; [0, 1], [0, 1])/∂ai < 0.
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3.C Table of test results & Stability of disclosure
behavior
Table 3.9: p-values for comparing outputs with high-demand information in Part II
Firm 1 Firm 2
x∗1(θ; ·) > xf1(θ) x∗2(θ; ·) > xf2(θ)
T1 — 0.1124
T2 0.0215 0.0215
T3 0.0215 0.0398
T4 0.0473 0.3429
T5 — 0.2501
Note: In T2 we do not distinguish between firms as they are ex ante identical.
All p-values refer to one-sided Wilcoxon tests.
Table 3.10: p-values for comparing product market choices with complete informa-
tion and no information in Part II
Firm 1 Firm 2
xf1(θ) < x
∗
1(∅; ·) x∗1(∅; ·) < xf1(θ) xf2(θ) < x∗2(∅; ·) x∗2(∅; ·) < xf2(θ)
T1 0.0215 0.0398 0.0215 0.0398
T2 0.0398 0.1124 0.0398 0.1124
T3 0.0215 0.0690 0.0215 0.0215
T4 0.0215 0.0215 0.0215 0.0215
T5 0.0215 0.0215 0.0215 0.0398
pf1(θ) < p
∗
1(∅; ·) p∗1(∅; ·) < pf1(θ) pf2(θ) < p∗2(∅; ·) p∗2(∅; ·) < pf2(θ)
T6 0.0398 0.0215 0.0398 0.0215
T7 0.0215 0.0215 0.0215 0.0215
Note: In T2 and T7 we do not distinguish between firms as they are ex ante identical.
All p-values refer to one-sided Wilcoxon tests.
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Table 3.11: p-values for comparing firm 1’s outputs across T1-T3 in Part II
Incomplete Information
Θ1 = ∅ Θ1 = θ
x1(·;T1) > x1(·;T3) 0.1736 —
x1(·;T3) > x1(·;T2) 0.3007 0.0872
x1(·;T1) > x1(·;T2) 0.0586 —
Note: The p-values correspond to one-sided MWW tests.
Stability of disclosure behavior
Here we summarize our analysis on changes in subjects’ disclosure behavior over
time. Table 3.12 (Table 3.13) gives the average disclosure frequencies of subjects
with the role of firm 1 (firm 2) in the first five instances where these subjects received
a particular informative signal as well as the frequencies in the last five instances
where they observed this signal. Although the disclosure frequencies appear to
increase in time, the two-sided p-values in Table 3.14 indicate that the changes are
not statistically significant in most cases.
Table 3.12: Disclosure frequencies of Firm 1 at start and end of Part II (in %)
Low demand (Θ1 = θ) High demand (Θ1 = θ)
first 5 instances last 5 instances first 5 instances last 5 instances
T1 — — — —
T2 80.0
(21.7)
90.0
(9.7)
47.3
(23.7)
62.6
(23.9)
T3 83.5
(12.1)
86.3
(13.0)
46.6
(21.3)
55.1
(23.9)
T4 92.0
(17.9)
96.0
(8.9)
— —
T5 — — — —
T6 — — — —
T7 36.0
(13.2)
44.7
(19.8)
78.7
(21.0)
90.0
(22.4)
Note: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
In T2 and T7 we do not distinguish between firms as they are ex ante identical.
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Table 3.13: Disclosure frequencies of Firm 2 at start and end of Part II (in %)
Low demand (Θ2 = θ) High demand (Θ2 = θ)
first 5 instances last 5 instances first 5 instances last 5 instances
T1 92.0
(8.7)
100
(0.0)
32.0
(16.6)
52.0
(15.2)
T2 80.0
(21.7)
90.0
(9.7)
47.3
(23.7)
62.6
(23.9)
T3 80.0
(17.0)
88.0
(15.9)
28.0
(19.7)
37.3
(38.2)
T4 77.3
(18.6)
86.7
(18.3)
30.3
(18.4)
31.9
(20.0)
T5 74.7
(11.0)
85.3
(17.2)
10.7
(10.1)
17.3
(18.6)
T6 35.7
(21.8)
41.3
(32.1)
81.3
(11.9)
100
(0.0)
T7 36.0
(13.2)
44.7
(19.8)
78.7
(21.0)
90.0
(22.4)
Note: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
In T2 and T7 we do not distinguish between firms as they are ex ante identical.
Table 3.14: p-values for comparing disclosure frequencies at start of Part II with
those at end of Part II
Firm 1 Firm 2
Θ1 = θ Θ1 = θ Θ2 = θ Θ2 = θ
T1 — — 0.0897 0.0394
T2 0.1736 0.0431 0.1736 0.0431
T3 0.4120 0.0394 0.3961 0.4142
T4 0.3173 — 0.0522 0.3173
T5 — — 0.2763 0.4982
T6 — — 0.5716 0.0422
T7 0.3452 0.0431 0.3452 0.0431
Note: All p-values refer to two-sided Wilcoxon tests.
In T2 and T7 we do not distinguish between firms as they are ex ante identical.
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3.D English Instructions (translated)
The following subsections contain the translated instructions for the homogeneous
goods Cournot treatments (T1-T4), differentiated goods Cournot treatment (T5)
and the differentiated goods Bertrand treatments (T6-T7). The original German
instructions are available upon request.
Curley brackets indicate treatment variations. Naturally, neither the treatment
names, nor the parameter values of the other treatments were part of the original
instructions.
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Homogeneous goods Cournot treatments (T1-T4)
Instructions – General Information
Welcome to the experiment!
In this experiment, you can earn money. How much you will earn depends on your
decisions as well as on the decisions taken by other participants. Regardless of your
decisions during the experiment, you will receive an additional 2.50 Euro for your
presence.
The experiment consists of three parts. Before each part, you receive precise instruc-
tions. All decisions taken during the course of this experiment are payout relevant.
During the experiment, the currency ECU (Experimental Currency Units) is used.
At the end of the experiment, all amounts in ECU are converted into Euro and paid
to you in cash. The exchange rate is 1 Euro for {T1-T3: 28,000; T4: 23,000} ECU.
Amounts are rounded up to full 10 Cent in your favor.
All decisions which you make during the experiment are anonymous. Your payout
at the end of the experiment is confidential.
Please do not communicate any more with the other participants from now on.
In case you have any questions, now or during the experiment, please raise your
hand. Then we will come to you and answer your question. Please ensure addition-
ally that your mobile phone is switched off. Material (books, lecture notes, etc.),
which does not concern the experiment, may not be used during the experiment.
Non-compliance with these rules can lead to exclusion from the experiment and all
payouts.
The following instructions refer to the first part. After the end of the first part, you
receive further instructions.
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Instructions Part I
Part I of the experiment consists of 20 rounds which proceed in identical manner:
In this part of the experiment, you interact as producer with another participant,
your competitor. Your competitor is randomly matched to you. Each round this
random matching is done anew. We ensure that you never have the same competitor
in two consecutive rounds.
You and your competitor produce identical goods for a common market. Each
produced good is sold at market price.
The market price is computed from the market demand minus the quantity produced
by you and your competitor:
⇒Market Price = Market Demand – Your Quantity – Competitor’s Quantity
However, the market price cannot be smaller than zero. If the produced quantity
exceeds the market demand, then the market price equals zero.
Each round the market demand is determined by chance. The market demand is
low with a probability of {T1-T3: 50%; T4: 90%} and amounts to 240. With a
probability of {T1-T3: 50%; T4: 10%} it is high and amounts to 300. The positive
market price is thus given by:
⇒ if market demand is high:
Market Price = 300 – Your Quantity – Competitor’s Quantity
⇒ if market demand is low:
Market Price = 240 – Your Quantity – Competitor’s Quantity
At the beginning of each round, you learn after a few seconds whether the market
demand is high or low. The competitor also learns whether the market demand is
high or low. Afterwards, you choose your quantity (if applicable, including decimal
places). The competitor chooses his quantity simultaneously. While making these
choices, neither you nor your competitor can see what quantity the other chooses.
The market price is determined after you and your competitor have chosen the
production quantities. Your profit is determined by your quantity, which is sold at
market price. Neither you nor your competitor have to bear production costs.
⇒ Profit = Market Price × Your Quantity
At the end of each round, you will be informed about your profit for that round, the
market price, and the chosen quantities.
At the end of the experiment, the profits over all rounds will be converted into EURO
and paid out to you.
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Quiz Part I
Please mark the correct answers
1. The market demand is high and equals 300. You produce 140 goods
and your competitor produces 120 goods:
(a) How high is the market price?
i. 0
ii. 20
iii. 40
iv. 160
v. 180
vi. None of the above
(b) How high is your profit?
i. 2,800
ii. 5,600
iii. 22,400
iv. 25,200
v. None of the above
2. The market demand is low and equals 240. You produce 140 goods
and your competitor produces 25 goods:
(a) How high is the market price?
i. -20
ii. 0
iii. 60
iv. 100
v. 120
vi. None of the above
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(b) How high is your profit?
i. -2,800
ii. 0
iii. 8,400
iv. 14,000
v. 16,800
vi. None of the above
3. Who is your competitor?
(a) A random participant of this experiment is assigned to me over all rounds.
(b) In each round, a random participant is assigned to me. It is possible that
the same participant is assigned to me in consecutive rounds.
(c) In each round, a random participant is assigned to me. It is excluded
that the same participant is assigned to me in consecutive rounds.
(d) None of the above
4. Which round(s) are paid out at the end of the experiment?
(a) All rounds
(b) A randomly picked round
(c) Only the last round
(d) None of the above
5. Do you and/or your competitor know the market demand at the
moment of quantity decisions?
(a) Nobody knows the market demand, because it is random.
(b) Only I know the market demand.
(c) Only my competitor knows the market demand.
(d) My competitor and I know the market demand.
(e) None of the above
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Instructions Part II
This part of the experiment is an extension of the first part. From now on, you do
not always know the market demand. If you do know the market demand, you can
choose to announce it to the competitor. The same applies for your competitor. The
matching of competitors is done as in Part I.
Part II of the experiment consists of 50 rounds with identical proceeding:
As in the first part, the market demand is high with a probability of {T1-T3: 50%;
T4: 10%}, and low with a probability of {T1-T3: 50%; T4: 90%}. How high it
is in the current round is not automatically apparent to you. However, you and
your competitor run a market analysis each round. Whether it is successful
is randomly determined in each round anew:
Independent of the current market demand, and the market analysis of the competi-
tor, Your market analysis is successful or unsuccessful with a certain probability.
In addition, you know the probability of success for the market analysis of your
competitor, but you do not know his result. The same holds for your competitor.
The probabilities of success, depending on your role, are:
Own market analysis Competitor’s market analysis
Successful Not successful Successful Not successful
Role A
{T1:0%}
{T2:90%}
{T3-T4:30%}
{T1:100%}
{T2:10%}
{T3-T4:70%}
90% 10%
Role B 90% 10%
{T1:0%}
{T2:90%}
{T3-T4:30%}
{T1:100%}
{T2:10%}
{T3-T4:70%}
In case of a successful market analysis, you learn how high the market demand is.
If you learned the level of the market demand, then it is correct in any case. In case
the market analysis is not successful, you will not learn the market demand.
After the market analysis is conducted, you can costlessly inform your
competitor about the market demand, provided that you learned it. Your
competitor can also choose to inform you about the result of his market analysis.
All information sent is always truthful. Sending false information is not possible.
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• If you know whether the market demand is high, respectively low:
– You can “inform” your competitor. Your competitor then knows for
certain that the market demand is high, respectively low. In addition, he
knows that you learned the market demand.
– You can“not inform”your competitor. In this case, the competitor only
knows the market demand, if his own market analysis was successful. The
competitor does not know whether you learned the market demand.
• If you do not know whether market demand is high, respectively low:
– You can solely “not inform” your competitor. In this case, the competi-
tor only knows the market demand, if his own market analysis was suc-
cessful. In addition, the competitor does not know whether you learned
the market demand.
Only after you and your competitor have decided to “inform” / “not (to) inform” the
other, information will be transferred.
In case you received information from the competitor and/or your own
market analysis was successful, then you know the market demand. If you
neither received information from the competitor nor was your own market analysis
successful, then you do not know the market demand.
The further course of this part is identical to the first part. You and your
competitor choose your quantities and are informed about the result for that round.
At the end of the experiment, the profits over all rounds are converted into EURO
and paid out to you.
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Quiz Part II
Please mark the correct answers
The market analysis has shown that the market demand is “high”:
a. The market demand is probably high. However, market demand could be low,
if the market analysis was wrong. This depends on chance.
b. The market demand is definitely high. My competitor also knows this, if his
market analysis was successful.
c. The market demand is definitely low. My competitor also knows this, if his
market analysis was successful.
d. The market demand is definitely high. In any case, this is also known to my
competitor.
e. None of the above
My market analysis was not successful:
a. I do not know the market demand. My competitor definitely does not know
the market demand.
b. I do not know the market demand. My competitor definitely knows the market
demand.
c. When deciding on quantity, I only know the market demand if my competitor’s
market analysis was successful and he sent me information.
d. I know the market demand.
e. None of the above
Your competitor has announced that the market demand is “low”:
a. The market demand is definitely low, as it is not possible to send false infor-
mation.
b. The market demand could be high, if my competitor chose to send false infor-
mation on purpose.
c. None of the above
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Instructions Part III
This part is an extension of the experiment from Part II. Now, a department takes
over the task to “inform”/ “not (to) inform” the competitor. You instruct the depart-
ment in which cases the information should be transferred. The quantity decision is
still taken by yourself. The same applies for your competitor. The probabilities for
the market demand, your market analysis, and the market analysis of the competitor
remain as in Part II. The matching of competitors is still determined randomly.
Part III of the experiment consists of one round with the following proceeding:
At the beginning of the round, you do not know the result of your market analysis.
However, you give binding instructions to your internal department about
the instances in which it must inform the competitor about the market
demand, in case the market analysis is successful.
You have 4 options:
1. Never inform
The competitor only knows the market demand, if his market analysis was
successful. he does not know, whether you learned the market demand.
2. Only inform if market demand is low
Case 1: Market analysis is successful and market demand is low
Your competitor knows for certain, that the market demand is low. In addition,
the competitor knows that you learned how high the market demand is.
Case 2: Market analysis is not successful and/or the market demand is high
The competitor only knows the market demand, if his own market analysis
was successful. He does not know whether you learned the market demand.
3. Only inform if market demand is high
Case 1: Market analysis is successful and market demand is high
The competitor knows for certain, that the market demand is high. In addition,
he knows that you learned how high the market demand is.
Case 2: Market analysis is not successful and/or the market demand is low
The competitor only knows the market demand, if his own market analysis
was successful. he does not know whether you learned how high the market
demand is.
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4. Always inform
Case 1: Market analysis is successful
The competitor knows for certain, that the market demand is high/low. In
addition, he knows that you learned the market demand.
Case 2: Market analysis is not successful
The competitor only knows the market demand, if his own market analysis
was successful. he does not know whether you learned how high the market
demand is.
Hereafter, you are informed, as before, whether your market analysis was successful
and whether you received information from the competitor.
As in Part II, the decision about the production quantity follows. Sub-
sequently, you are informed about the outcome of this round, as usual.
At the end of the experiment, the profits over all rounds are converted into EURO
and paid out to you.
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Differentiated goods Cournot treatment (T5)
Instructions – General Information
Welcome to the experiment!
In this experiment, you can earn money. How much you will earn depends on your
decisions as well as on the decisions taken by other participants. Regardless of your
decisions during the experiment, you will receive an additional 2.50 Euro for your
presence.
The experiment consists of three parts. Before each part, you receive precise instruc-
tions. All decisions taken during the course of this experiment are payout relevant.
During the experiment, the currency ECU (Experimental Currency Units) is used.
At the end of the experiment, all amounts in ECU are converted into Euro and paid
to you in cash. The exchange rate is 1 Euro for 40,000 ECU. Amounts are rounded
up to full 10 Cent in your favor.
All decisions which you make during the experiment are anonymous. Your payout
at the end of the experiment is confidential.
Please do not communicate any more with the other participants from now on.
In case you have any questions, now or during the experiment, please raise your
hand. Then we will come to you and answer your question. Please ensure addition-
ally that your mobile phone is switched off. Material (books, lecture notes, etc.),
which does not concern the experiment, may not be used during the experiment.
Non-compliance with these rules can lead to exclusion from the experiment and all
payouts.
The following instructions refer to the first part. After the end of the first part, you
receive further instructions.
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Instructions Part I
Part I of the experiment consists of 20 rounds which proceed in identical manner:
In this part of the experiment, you interact as producer with another participant,
your competitor. Your competitor is randomly matched to you. Each round this
random matching is done anew. We ensure that you never have the same competitor
in two consecutive rounds.
You and your competitor produce different goods. The prices for these goods depend
on your own production quantity, the competitor’s production quantity, and the
general market demand. Each produced good is sold at market price.
Your price is computed from the general market demand minus the own production
quantity and half of the competitor’s production quantity:
⇒Your Price = General Market Demand
– Your Quantity
– 0.5×Competitor’s Quantity
⇒Competitor’s Price = General Market Demand
– Competitor’s Quantity
– 0.5×Your Quantity
However, the market prices cannot be smaller than zero. If the above calculation
would give a negative market price, then the market price equals zero.
Each round the general market demand is determined by chance. The general market
demand is low with a probability of 50% and amounts to 240. With a probability
of 50% it is high and amounts to 300. The positive prices are thus given by:
⇒ if general market demand is high:
Your Price = 300 – Your Quantity – 0.5×Competitor’s Quantity
Competitor’s Price = 300 – Competitor’s Quantity – 0.5×Your Quantity
⇒ if general market demand is low:
Your Price = 240 – Your Quantity – 0.5×Competitor’s Quantity
Competitor’s Price = 240 – Competitor’s Quantity – 0.5×Your Quantity
At the beginning of each round, you learn after a few seconds whether the general
market demand is high or low. The competitor also learns whether the general
market demand is high or low. Afterwards, you choose your quantity (if applica-
ble, including decimal places). The competitor chooses his quantity simultaneously.
While making these choices, neither you nor your competitor can see what quantity
the other chooses.
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The market prices are determined after you and your competitor have chosen the
production quantities. Your profit is determined by your quantity, which is sold at
your price. Neither you nor your competitor have to bear production costs.
⇒ Your Profit = Your Price × Your Quantity
At the end of each round, you will be informed about your profit for that round,
your price, and the chosen quantities.
At the end of the experiment, the profits over all rounds will be converted into EURO
and paid out to you.
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Quiz Part I
Please mark the correct answers
1. The general market demand is high and equals 300. You produce
140 goods and your competitor produces 120 goods:
(a) How high is your market price?
i. 0
ii. 20
iii. 40
iv. 160
v. 170
vi. None of the above
(b) How high is the market price of your competitor?
i. 0
ii. 20
iii. 40
iv. 80
v. 110
vi. 170
vii. None of the above
(c) How high is your profit?
i. 2,800
ii. 11,200
iii. 14,000
iv. 23,800
v. None of the above
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2. Who is your competitor?
(a) A random participant is assigned to me for all rounds.
(b) In each round, a random participant is assigned to me. It is possible that
the same participant is assigned to me in consecutive rounds.
(c) In each round, a random participant is assigned to me. It is excluded
that the same participant is assigned to me in consecutive rounds.
(d) None of the above
3. The general market demand is low and equals 240. You produce 140
goods and your competitor produces 240 goods:
(a) How high is your market price?
i. -20
ii. 0
iii. 50
iv. 100
v. 120
vi. None of the above
(b) How high is the market price of the competitor?
i. -20
ii. 0
iii. 50
iv. 100
v. 120
vi. None of the above
(c) How high is your profit?
i. -8,400
ii. -2,800
iii. 0
iv. 7,000
v. 14,000
vi. 16,800
vii. None of the above
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4. Which round(s) are paid out at the end of the experiment?
(a) All rounds
(b) A randomly picked round
(c) Only the last round
(d) None of the above
5. Do you and/or your competitor know the market demand at the
moment of quantity decisions?
(a) Nobody knows the market demand, because it is random.
(b) Only I know the market demand.
(c) Only my competitor knows the market demand.
(d) My competitor and I know the market demand.
(e) None of the above
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Instructions Part II
This part of the experiment is an extension of the first part. From now on, you do
not always know the general market demand. If you do know the general market
demand, you can choose to announce it to the competitor. The same applies for
your competitor. The matching of competitors is done as in Part I.
Part II of the experiment consists of 50 rounds with identical proceeding:
As in the first part, the general market demand is high with a probability of 50%,
and low with a probability of 50%. How high it is in the current round is not
automatically apparent to you. However, you and your competitor run a
market analysis each round. Whether it is successful is randomly determined in
each round anew:
Independent of the current general market demand, and the market analysis of
the competitor, Your market analysis is successful or unsuccessful with a certain
probability. In addition, you know the probability of success for the market analysis
of your competitor, but you do not know his result. The same holds for your
competitor.
The probabilities of success, depending on your role, are:
Own market analysis Competitor’s market analysis
Successful Not successful Successful Not successful
Role A 0% 100% 90% 10%
Role B 90% 10% 0% 100%
In case of a successful market analysis, you learn how high the general market
demand is. If you learned the level of the market demand, then it is correct in any
case. In case the market analysis is not successful, you will not learn the market
demand.
After the market analysis is conducted, you can costlessly inform your
competitor about the general market demand, provided that you learned
it. Your competitor can also choose to inform you about the result of his market
analysis. All information sent is always truthful. Sending false information is not
possible.
• If you know whether the general market demand is high, respectively low:
– You can “inform” your competitor. Your competitor then knows for
certain that the general market demand is high, respectively low. In
addition, he knows that you learned the general market demand.
126
– You can“not inform”your competitor. In this case, the competitor only
knows the general market demand, if his own market analysis was suc-
cessful. The competitor does not know whether you learned the general
market demand.
• If you do not know whether the general market demand is high, respectively
low:
– You can solely “not inform” your competitor. In this case, the competi-
tor only knows the general market demand, if his own market analysis
was successful. In addition, the competitor does not know whether you
learned the general market demand.
Only after you and your competitor have decided to “inform” / “not (to) inform” the
other, information will be transferred.
In case you received information from the competitor and/or your own
market analysis was successful, then you know the general market de-
mand. If you neither received information from the competitor nor was your own
market analysis successful, then you do not know the general market demand.
The further course of this part is identical to the first part. You and your
competitor choose your quantities and are informed about the result for that round.
At the end of the experiment, the profits over all rounds are converted into EURO
and paid out to you.
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Quiz Part II
Please mark the correct answers
The market analysis has shown that the general market demand is “high”:
a. The general market demand is probably high. However, market demand could
be low, if the market analysis was wrong. This depends on chance.
b. The general market demand is definitely high. My competitor also knows this,
if his market analysis was successful.
c. The general market demand is definitely low. My competitor also knows this,
if his market analysis was successful.
d. The general market demand is definitely high. In any case, this is also known
to my competitor.
e. None of the above
My market analysis was not successful:
a. I do not know the general market demand. My competitor definitely does not
know the general market demand.
b. I do not know the general market demand. My competitor definitely knows
the general market demand.
c. When deciding on quantity, I only know the general market demand if my
competitor’s market analysis was successful and he sent me information.
d. I know the general market demand.
e. None of the above
Your competitor has announced that the general market demand is “low”:
a. The general market demand is definitely low, as it is not possible to send false
information.
b. The general market demand could be high, if my competitor chose to send
false information on purpose.
c. None of the above
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Instructions Part III
This part is an extension of the experiment from Part II. Now, a department takes
over the task to “inform”/ “not (to) inform” the competitor. You instruct the depart-
ment in which cases the information should be transferred. The quantity decision
is still taken by yourself. The same applies for your competitor. The probabilities
for the general market demand, your market analysis, and the market analysis of
the competitor remain as in Part II. The matching of competitors is still determined
randomly.
Part III of the experiment consists of one round with the following proceeding:
At the beginning of the round, you do not know the result of your market analysis.
However, you give binding instructions to your internal department about
the instances in which it must inform the competitor about the general
market demand, in case the market analysis is successful.
You have 4 options:
1. Never inform
The competitor only knows the general market demand, if his market analysis
was successful. he does not know, whether you learned the general market
demand.
2. Only inform if market demand is low
Case 1: Market analysis is successful and general market demand is low
Your competitor knows for certain, that general market demand is low. In
addition, the competitor knows that you learned how high the general market
demand is.
Case 2: Market analysis is not successful and/or general market demand
is high
The competitor only knows the general market demand, if his own market
analysis was successful. He does not know whether you learned the general
market demand.
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3. Only inform if market demand is high
Case 1: Market analysis is successful and general market demand is high
The competitor knows for certain, that the general market demand is high. In
addition, he knows that you learned how high the general market demand is.
Case 2: Market analysis is not successful and/or general market demand
is low
The competitor only knows the general market demand, if his own market
analysis was successful. he does not know whether you learned how high the
general market demand is.
4. Always inform
Case 1: Market analysis is successful
The competitor knows for certain, that the general market demand is high/low.
In addition, he knows that you learned the general market demand.
Case 2: Market analysis is not successful
The competitor only knows the general market demand, if his own market
analysis was successful. he does not know whether you learned how high the
general market demand is.
Hereafter, you are informed, as before, whether your market analysis was successful
and whether you received information from the competitor.
As in Part II, the decision about the production quantity follows. Sub-
sequently, you are informed about the outcome of this round, as usual.
At the end of the experiment, the profits over all rounds are converted into EURO
and paid out to you.
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Differentiated goods Bertrand treatments (T6-T7)
Instructions – General Information
Welcome to the experiment!
In this experiment, you can earn money. How much you will earn depends on your
decisions as well as on the decisions taken by other participants. Regardless of your
decisions during the experiment, you will receive an additional 2.50 Euro for your
presence.
The experiment consists of three parts. Before each part, you receive precise instruc-
tions. All decisions taken during the course of this experiment are payout relevant.
During the experiment, the currency ECU (Experimental Currency Units) is used.
At the end of the experiment, all amounts in ECU are converted into Euro and paid
to you in cash. The exchange rate is 1 Euro for 56,000 ECU. Amounts are rounded
up to full 10 Cent in your favor.
All decisions which you make during the experiment are anonymous. Your payout
at the end of the experiment is confidential.
Please do not communicate any more with the other participants from now on.
In case you have any questions, now or during the experiment, please raise your
hand. Then we will come to you and answer your question. Please ensure addition-
ally that your mobile phone is switched off. Material (books, lecture notes, etc.),
which does not concern the experiment, may not be used during the experiment.
Non-compliance with these rules can lead to exclusion from the experiment and all
payouts.
The following instructions refer to the first part. After the end of the first part, you
receive further instructions.
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Instructions Part I
Part I of the experiment consists of 20 rounds which proceed in identical manner:
In this part of the experiment, you interact as producer with another participant,
your competitor. Your competitor is randomly matched to you. Each round this
random matching is done anew. We ensure that you never have the same competitor
in two consecutive rounds.
You and your competitor produce different goods. The salable quantities for these
goods depend on your price, the competitor’s price, and the general market demand.
You and your competitor produce exactly your salable quantities.
The salable quantities are computed from the general market demand minus twice
your own price plus the competitor’s price:
⇒Your Quantity = General Market Demand
– 2×Your Price
+ Competitor’s Price
⇒Competitor’s Quantity = General Market Demand
– 2×Competitor’s Price
+ Your Price
However, the quantities cannot be smaller than zero. If the above calculation would
give a negative quantity, then this quantity equals zero.
Each round the general market demand is determined by chance. The general market
demand is low with a probability of 50% and amounts to 240. With a probability
of 50% general market demand is high and amounts to 300. The positive quantities
are thus given by:
⇒ if general market demand is high:
Your Quantity = 300 – 2×Your Price + Competitor’s Price
Competitor’s Quantity = 300 – 2×Competitor’s Price + Your Price
⇒ if general market demand is low:
Your Quantity = 240 – 2×Your Price + Competitor’s Price
Competitor’s Quantity = 240 – 2×Competitor’s Quantity + Your Price
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At the beginning of each round, you learn after a few seconds whether the general
market demand is high or low. The competitor also learns whether the general
market demand is high or low. Afterwards, you choose your price (if applicable,
including decimal places). The competitor chooses his price simultaneously. While
making these choices, neither you nor your competitor can see what price the other
chooses.
The salable quantities are determined after you and your competitor have chosen
the prices. Your profit is determined by your quantity, which is sold at your price.
Neither you nor your competitor have to bear production costs.
⇒ Your Profit = Your Price × Your Quantity
At the end of each round, you will be informed about your profit for that round,
your chosen price, and your quantity.
At the end of the experiment, the profits over all rounds will be converted into EURO
and paid out to you.
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Quiz Part I
Please mark the correct answers
1. The general market demand is high and equals 300. You choose a
price of 200 ECU/unit and your competitor a price of 150 ECU/unit:
(a) How high is your salable quantity?
i. -50
ii. 0
iii. 50
iv. 100
v. 150
vi. 200
vii. None of the above
(b) How high is the salable quantity of the competitor?
i. -50
ii. 0
iii. 50
iv. 100
v. 150
vi. 200
vii. None of the above
(c) How high is your profit?
i. -10,000
ii. 0
iii. 10,000
iv. 20,000
v. 30,000
vi. 40,000
vii. None of the above
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2. Who is your competitor?
(a) A random participant of this experiment is assigned to me over all rounds.
(b) In each round, a random participant is assigned to me. It is possible that
the same participant is assigned to me in consecutive rounds.
(c) In each round, a random participant is assigned to me. It is excluded
that the same participant is assigned to me in consecutive rounds.
(d) None of the above
3. The general market demand is low and equals 240. You choose a
price of 200 ECU/unit and your competitor a price of 150 ECU/unit:
(a) How high is your salable quantity?
i. -210
ii. -10
iii. 0
iv. 10
v. 120
vi. 140
vii. None of the above
(b) How high is the salable quantity of the competitor?
i. -210
ii. -10
iii. 0
iv. 10
v. 120
vi. 140
vii. None of the above
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(c) How high is your profit?
i. -42,000
ii. -2,000
iii. 0
iv. 2,000
v. 24,000
vi. 28,000
vii. None of the above
4. Which round(s) are paid out at the end of the experiment?
(a) All rounds
(b) A randomly picked round
(c) Only the last round
(d) None of the above
5. Do you and/or your competitor know the market demand at the
moment of price decisions?
(a) Nobody knows the market demand, because it is random.
(b) Only I know the market demand.
(c) Only my competitor knows the market demand.
(d) My competitor and I know the market demand.
(e) None of the above
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Instructions Part II
This part of the experiment is an extension of the first part. From now on, you do
not always know the general market demand. If you do know the general market
demand, you can choose to announce it to the competitor. The same applies for
your competitor. The matching of competitors is done as in Part I.
Part II of the experiment consists of 50 rounds with identical proceeding:
As in the first part, the general market demand is high with a probability of 50%,
and low with a probability of 50%. How high it is in the current round is not
automatically apparent to you. However, you and your competitor run a
market analysis each round. Whether it is successful is randomly determined in
each round anew:
Independent of the current general market demand, and the market analysis of
the competitor, Your market analysis is successful or unsuccessful with a certain
probability. In addition, you know the probability of success for the market analysis
of your competitor, but you do not know his result. The same holds for your
competitor.
The probabilities of success, depending on your role, are:
Own market analysis Competitor’s market analysis
Successful Not successful Successful Not successful
Role A
{T6:0%}
{T7:90%}
{T6:100%}
{T7:10%} 90% 10%
Role B 90% 10%
{T6:0%}
{T7:90%}
{T6:100%}
{T7:10%}
In case of a successful market analysis, you learn how high the general market
demand is. If you learned the level of the market demand, then it is correct in any
case. In case the market analysis is not successful, you will not learn the market
demand.
After the market analysis is conducted, you can costlessly inform your
competitor about the general market demand, provided that you learned
it. Your competitor can also choose to inform you about the result of his market
analysis. All information sent is always truthful. Sending false information is not
possible.
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• If you know whether the general market demand is high, respectively low:
– You can “inform” your competitor. Your competitor then knows for
certain that the general market demand is high, respectively low. In
addition, he knows that you learned the general market demand.
– You can“not inform”your competitor. In this case, the competitor only
knows the general market demand, if his own market analysis was suc-
cessful. The competitor does not know whether you learned the general
market demand.
• If you do not know whether the general market demand is high, respectively
low:
– You can solely “not inform” your competitor. In this case, the competi-
tor only knows the general market demand, if his own market analysis
was successful. In addition, the competitor does not know whether you
learned the general market demand.
Only after you and your competitor have decided to “inform” / “not (to) inform” the
other, information will be transferred.
In case you received information from the competitor and/or your own
market analysis was successful, then you know the general market de-
mand. If you neither received information from the competitor nor was your own
market analysis successful, then you do not know the general market demand.
The further course of this part is identical to the first part. You and your
competitor choose your prices and are informed about the result for that round.
At the end of the experiment, the profits over all rounds are converted into EURO
and paid out to you.
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Quiz Part II
Please mark the correct answers
The market analysis has shown that the general market demand is “high”:
a. The general market demand is probably high. However, market demand could
be low, if the market analysis was wrong. This depends on chance.
b. The general market demand is definitely high. My competitor also knows this,
if his market analysis was successful.
c. The general market demand is definitely low. My competitor also knows this,
if his market analysis was successful.
d. The general market demand is definitely high. In any case, this is also known
to my competitor.
e. None of the above
My market analysis was not successful:
a. I do not know the general market demand. My competitor definitely does not
know the general market demand.
b. I do not know the general market demand. My competitor definitely knows
the general market demand.
c. When deciding on quantity, I only know the general market demand if my
competitor’s market analysis was successful and he sent me information.
d. I know the general market demand.
e. None of the above
Your competitor has announced that the general market demand is “low”:
a. The general market demand is definitely low, as it is not possible to send false
information.
b. The general market demand could be high, if my competitor chose to send
false information on purpose.
c. None of the above
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Instructions Part III
This part is an extension of the experiment from Part II. Now, a department takes
over the task to “inform”/ “not (to) inform” the competitor. You instruct the depart-
ment in which cases the information should be transferred. The quantity decision
is still taken by yourself. The same applies for your competitor. The probabilities
for the general market demand, your market analysis, and the market analysis of
the competitor remain as in Part II. The matching of competitors is still determined
randomly.
Part III of the experiment consists of one round with the following proceeding:
At the beginning of the round, you do not know the result of your market analysis.
However, you give binding instructions to your internal department about
the instances in which it must inform the competitor about the general
market demand, in case the market analysis is successful.
You have 4 options:
1. Never inform
The competitor only knows the general market demand, if his market analysis
was successful. he does not know, whether you learned the general market
demand.
2. Only inform if market demand is low
Case 1: Market analysis is successful and general market demand is low
Your competitor knows for certain, that general market demand is low. In
addition, the competitor knows that you learned how high the general market
demand is.
Case 2: Market analysis is not successful and/or general market demand
is high
The competitor only knows the general market demand, if his own market
analysis was successful. He does not know whether you learned the general
market demand.
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3. Only inform if market demand is high
Case 1: Market analysis is successful and general market demand is high
The competitor knows for certain, that the general market demand is high. In
addition, he knows that you learned how high the general market demand is.
Case 2: Market analysis is not successful and/or general market demand
is low
The competitor only knows the general market demand, if his own market
analysis was successful. he does not know whether you learned how high the
general market demand is.
4. Always inform
Case 1: Market analysis is successful
The competitor knows for certain, that the general market demand is high/low.
In addition, he knows that you learned the general market demand.
Case 2: Market analysis is not successful
The competitor only knows the general market demand, if his own market
analysis was successful. he does not know whether you learned how high the
general market demand is.
Hereafter, you are informed, as before, whether your market analysis was successful
and whether you received information from the competitor.
As in Part II, the decision about the price follows. Subsequently, you are
informed about the outcome of this round, as usual.
At the end of the experiment, the profits over all rounds are converted into EURO
and paid out to you.
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3.E German Instructions (original)
In this the section, the original German Instructions are presented for the homo-
geneous goods Cournot treatments. The original instructions for the differentiated
goods Cournot treatments as well as the differentiated Bertrand treatments are writ-
ten in a similar style.
Homogeneous goods Cournot treatments (T1-T4)
Instruktionen – Allgemeiner Teil
Herzlich Willkommen zum Experiment!
In diesem Experiment ko¨nnen Sie Geld verdienen. Wie viel Sie verdienen werden,
ha¨ngt von Ihren Entscheidungen bzw. den Entscheidungen anderer Experiment-
teilnehmer ab. Unabha¨ngig von den Entscheidungen wa¨hrend des Experimentes
erhalten Sie zusa¨tzlich 2,50 Euro fu¨r Ihr Erscheinen.
Das Experiment besteht aus drei Teilen. Vor allen Teilen erhalten Sie jeweils genaue
Instruktionen. Alle Entscheidungen, die Sie im Verlauf des Experimentes treffen,
sind auszahlungsrelevant. Wa¨hrend des Experimentes wird die Wa¨hrung ECU (Ex-
perimental Currency Units) verwendet. Am Ende des Experimentes werden alle
ECU-Betra¨ge in Euro umgerechnet und Ihnen ausgezahlt. Der Umrechnungskurs
betra¨gt 1 Euro fu¨r {T1=T2=T3=28.000; T4=23.000} ECU. Bei der Umrechnung
wird auf volle 10 Cent zu Ihren Gunsten aufgerundet.
Alle Entscheidungen, die Sie wa¨hrend des Experimentes treffen, sind anonym. Ihre
Auszahlung am Ende des Experimentes wird vertraulich behandelt.
Bitte kommunizieren Sie ab sofort nicht mehr mit den anderen Teilnehmern. Falls Sie
jetzt oder wa¨hrend des Experimentes eine Frage haben, heben Sie bitte die Hand.
Wir werden dann zu Ihnen kommen und Ihre Frage beantworten. Wa¨hrend des
Experimentes bitten wir Sie außerdem Ihr Mobiltelefon auszuschalten. Unterlagen
(Bu¨cher, Vorlesungsskripte, etc.), die nichts mit dem Experiment zu tun haben,
du¨rfen wa¨hrend des Experimentes nicht verwendet werden. Bei Versto¨ßen gegen
diese Regeln ko¨nnen wir Sie vom Experiment und allen Auszahlungen ausschließen.
Die folgenden Instruktionen beziehen sich auf den ersten Teil. Nach Ende des ersten
Teils erhalten Sie weitere Instruktionen.
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Instruktionen Teil I
Teil I des Experimentes besteht aus 20 Runden mit identischem Ablauf:
In diesem Teil des Experimentes agieren Sie als Produzent mit einem anderen Exper-
imentteilnehmer, Ihrem Wettbewerber. Ihr Wettbewerber ist Ihnen zufa¨llig zugeord-
net. Die zufa¨llige Zuordnung erfolgt jede Runde neu. Dabei stellen wir sicher, dass
Sie in zwei aufeinanderfolgenden Runden niemals denselben Wettbewerber haben.
Sie und Ihr Wettbewerber produzieren identische Gu¨ter fu¨r einen gemeinsamen
Markt. Jedes produzierte Gut wird zum Marktpreis verkauft.
Der Marktpreis berechnet sich aus der Marktnachfrage abzu¨glich der Produktions-
menge von Ihnen und Ihrem Wettbewerber:
⇒ Marktpreis = Marktnachfrage — Ihre Produktionsmenge
— Produktionsmenge des Wettbewerbers
Der Marktpreis kann jedoch nicht kleiner als null sein. Falls mehr Gu¨ter als die
Marktnachfrage produziert wurden, ist der Marktpreis genau 0.
Die Marktnachfrage wird in jeder Runde durch Zufall neu bestimmt. Mit einer
Wahrscheinlichkeit von {T1=T2=T3=50%,T4=90%} ist die Marktnachfrage niedrig
und betra¨gt 240. Mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit von {T1=T2=T3=50%,T4=10%} ist
sie hoch und betra¨gt 300. Der positive Marktpreis berechnet sich somit
⇒ bei hoher Marktnachfrage durch:
Marktpreis = 300 – Ihre Produktionsmenge – Produktionsmenge des Wettbewerbers
⇒ bei niedriger Marktnachfrage durch:
Marktpreis = 240 – Ihre Produktionsmenge – Produktionsmenge des Wettbewerbers
Zu Beginn jeder Runde erfahren Sie nach wenigen Sekunden, ob die Marktnach-
frage hoch oder niedrig ist. Der Wettbewerber erfa¨hrt ebenfalls, ob die Marktnach-
frage hoch oder niedrig ist. Hiernach wa¨hlen Sie Ihre Produktionsmenge (ggf. mit
Nachkommastellen). Der Wettbewerber wa¨hlt simultan seine Produktionsmenge.
Weder fu¨r Sie noch fu¨r Ihren Wettbewerber ist dabei die Menge des jeweils Anderen
ersichtlich.
Der Marktpreis wird ermittelt, nachdem Sie und Ihr Wettbewerber die Produktions-
mengen gewa¨hlt haben. Ihr Gewinn wird durch die Anzahl Ihrer produzierten Gu¨ter
bestimmt, die jeweils zum Marktpreis verkauft werden. Es fallen weder fu¨r Sie noch
fu¨r Ihren Wettbewerber Produktionskosten an.
⇒ Gewinn = Marktpreis × Ihre Produktionsmenge
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Ihr Rundengewinn sowie der Marktpreis und die gewa¨hlten Produktionsmengen wer-
den Ihnen am Ende jeder Runde mitgeteilt.
Am Ende des Experimentes werden alle Rundengewinne in EURO umgerechnet und
Ihnen ausbezahlt.
Quiz Teil I
Bitte markieren Sie die richtigen Antworten
1. Die Marktnachfrage ist hoch und betra¨gt 300. Sie produzieren 140
Gu¨ter und Ihr Wettbewerber 120 Gu¨ter:
(a) Wie hoch ist der Marktpreis?
i. 0
ii. 20
iii. 40
iv. 160
v. 180
vi. Keines der genannten
(b) Wie hoch ist Ihr Gewinn?
i. 2800
ii. 5600
iii. 22400
iv. 25200
v. Keines der genannten
2. Die Marktnachfrage ist niedrig und betra¨gt 240. Sie produzieren
140 Gu¨ter und Ihr Wettbewerber 25 Gu¨ter:
(a) Wie hoch ist der Marktpreis?
i. -20
ii. 0
iii. 60
iv. 100
v. 120
vi. Keines der genannten
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(b) Wie hoch ist Ihr Gewinn?
i. -2800
ii. 0
iii. 8400
iv. 14000
v. 16800
vi. Keines der genannten
3. Wer ist Ihr Wettbewerber?
(a) Ein zufa¨lliger Teilnehmer dieses Experimentes ist mir u¨ber alle Runden
fest zugeordnet.
(b) In jeder Runde wird mir ein zufa¨lliger Teilnehmer zugeordnet. Dabei
ist es mo¨glich, dass mir mehrmals hintereinander derselbe Teilnehmer
zugeordnet wird.
(c) In jeder Runde wird mir ein zufa¨lliger Teilnehmer zugeordnet. Dabei ist
es ausgeschlossen, dass mir mehrmals hintereinander derselbe Teilnehmer
zugeordnet wird.
(d) Keines der genannten
4. Welche Runde(n) werden am Ende des Experimentes ausbezahlt?
(a) Alle Runden
(b) Eine zufa¨llige Runde
(c) Nur die letzte Runde
(d) Keines der genannten
5. Kennen Sie und/oder Ihr Wettbewerber die Marktnachfrage zum
Zeitpunkt der Produktionsentscheidung?
(a) Niemand kennt die Marktnachfrage, da sie vom Zufall abha¨ngig ist.
(b) Nur ich kenne die Marktnachfrage.
(c) Nur mein Wettbewerber kennt die Marktnachfrage.
(d) Ich und mein Wettbewerber kennen die Marktnachfrage.
(e) Keines der genannten
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Instruktionen Teil II
Dieser Teil des Experimentes ist eine Erweiterung des ersten Teils. Die Marktnach-
frage ist Ihnen nun nicht immer bekannt. Wenn Sie die Marktnachfrage kennen,
haben Sie die Wahl diese dem Wettbewerber mitzuteilen. Gleiches gilt fu¨r Ihren
Wettbewerber. Die Zuordnung von Wettbewerbern erfolgt wie in Teil I.
Teil II des Experimentes besteht aus 50 Runden mit identischem Ablauf:
Die Marktnachfrage ist wie im ersten Teil mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit von {T1=T2=
T3=50%, T4=10%} hoch und einer Wahrscheinlichkeit von {T1=T2=T3=50%,
T4=90%} niedrig. Wie hoch Sie in der jeweils aktuellen Runde ist, ist Ihnen nicht
automatisch ersichtlich. Sie und Ihr Wettbewerber betreiben jedoch in jeder
Runde eine Marktanalyse. Ob diese erfolgreich ist, wird in jeder Runde durch
Zufall neu bestimmt:
Unabha¨ngig von der aktuellen Marktnachfrage und der Marktanalyse des Wettbe-
werbers ist Ihre Marktanalyse mit einer bestimmten Wahrscheinlichkeit erfolgreich
oder nicht erfolgreich. Sie kennen daru¨ber hinaus die Erfolgswahrscheinlichkeit der
Marktanalyse Ihres Wettbewerbers, nicht jedoch sein Ergebnis. Gleiches gilt fu¨r
Ihren Wettbewerber.
Die Erfolgswahrscheinlichkeiten, in Abha¨ngigkeit Ihrer Rolle, betragen:
Eigene Marktanalyse Marktanalyse Wettbewerber
Erfolgreich Nicht erfolgreich Erfolgreich Nicht erfolgreich
Rolle A
{T1:0%}
{T2:90%}
{T3-T4:30%}
{T1:100%}
{T2:10%}
{T3-T4:70%}
90% 10%
Rolle B 90% 10%
{T1:0%}
{T2:90%}
{T3-T4:30%}
{T1:100%}
{T2:10%}
{T3-T4:70%}
Bei erfolgreicher Marktanalyse erfahren Sie die Ho¨he der Marktnachfrage. Falls Sie
die Ho¨he der Marktnachfrage erfahren haben, ist diese in jedem Fall korrekt. Ist die
Marktanalyse nicht erfolgreich, erfahren Sie die Marktnachfrage nicht.
Nach erfolgter Marktanalyse ko¨nnen Sie Ihren Wettbewerber ohne Ent-
stehung von Kosten u¨ber die Marktnachfrage informieren, sofern Ihnen
diese bekannt ist. Ihr Wettbewerber hat ebenfalls die Wahl, Sie u¨ber das Ergebnis
seiner Marktanalyse zu informieren. Alle gesendeten Informationen entsprechen im-
mer der Wahrheit. Eine U¨bermittlung von falschen Informationen ist nicht mo¨glich.
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• Falls Sie wissen, dass die Marknachfrage hoch bzw. niedrig ist:
– Sie ko¨nnen den Wettbewerber
”
informieren“. Der Wettbewerber weiß
dann mit Sicherheit, dass die Marktnachfrage hoch bzw. niedrig ist.
Ebenfalls weiß er, dass Sie die Marktnachfrage erfahren haben.
– Sie ko¨nnen den Wettbewerber
”
nicht informieren“. In diesem Fall
kennt der Wettbewerber die Marktnachfrage nur, wenn seine eigene Mark-
tanalyse erfolgreich war. Der Wettbewerber weiß nicht, ob Sie die Mark-
tnachfrage erfahren haben.
• Falls sie nicht wissen, ob die Marktnachfrage hoch bzw. niedrig ist:
– Sie ko¨nnen den Wettbewerber lediglich
”
nicht informieren“. In diesem
Fall kennt der Wettbewerber die Marktnachfrage nur wenn seine eigene
Marktanalyse erfolgreich war. Ebenfalls weiß der Wettbewerber nicht, ob
Sie die Marktnachfrage erfahren haben.
Erst nachdem Sie und Ihr Wettbewerber entschieden haben den jeweils Anderen zu
”
informieren“ /
”
nicht (zu) informieren“, werden die Informationen u¨bermittelt.
Falls Sie eine Information des Wettbewerbers erhalten haben und/oder
Ihre eigene Marktanalyse erfolgreich war, ist Ihnen die Marktnachfrage
bekannt. Wenn Sie weder eine Information des Wettbewerbers erhalten haben,
noch die eigene Marktanalyse erfolgreich war, kennen Sie die Marktnachfrage nicht.
Der weitere Verlauf dieses Teiles ist wie im ersten Teil. Sie und Ihr Wettbe-
werber wa¨hlen Ihre Produktionsmengen und bekommen das Rundenergebnis mit-
geteilt.
Am Ende des Experimentes werden alle Rundengewinne in EURO umgerechnet und
Ihnen ausbezahlt.
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Quiz Teil II
Bitte markieren Sie die richtigen Antworten
Die Marktanalyse hat ergeben, dass die Marktnachfrage
”
hoch“ ist:
a. Die Marktnachfrage ist wahrscheinlich hoch. Sie ko¨nnte jedoch niedrig sein,
falls sich die Marktanalyse geirrt hat. Dies ha¨ngt vom Zufall ab.
b. Die Marktnachfrage ist mit absoluter Sicherheit hoch. Der Wettwerber weiß
dies auch, falls seine Marktanalyse erfolgreich war.
c. Die Marktnachfrage ist mit absoluter Sicherheit niedrig. Der Wettwerber weiß
dies auch, falls seine Marktanalyse erfolgreich war.
d. Die Marktnachfrage ist mit absoluter Sicherheit hoch. Dies ist in jedem Fall
auch meinem Wettbewerber bekannt.
e. Keines der genannten
Meine Marktanalyse war nicht erfolgreich:
a. Ich kenne die Marktnachfrage nicht. Mein Wettbewerber kennt die Markt-
nachfrage definitiv nicht.
b. Ich kenne die Marktnachfrage nicht. Mein Wettbewerber kennt die Markt-
nachfrage definitiv.
c. Ich kenne die Marktnachfrage zum Zeitpunkt der Produktionsentscheidung
nur, falls die Marktanalyse des Wettbewerbers erfolgreich war und er mir In-
formationen u¨bermittelt hat.
d. Ich kenne die Marktnachfrage.
e. Keines der genannten
Ihr Wettbewerber hat mitgeteilt, dass die Marktnachfrage
”
niedrig“ ist:
a. Die Marktnachfrage ist mit absoluter Sicherheit niedrig, da keine falschen In-
formationen u¨bermittelt werden ko¨nnen.
b. Die Marktnachfrage ko¨nnte hoch sein, falls der Wettbewerber bewusst eine
falsche Information gesendet hat.
c. Keines der genannten
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Instruktionen Teil III
Dieser Teil ist eine Erweiterung des Experimentes aus Teil II. Eine Abteilung u¨ber-
nimmt nun die Aufgabe den Wettbewerber zu
”
informieren“/
”
nicht (zu) informieren“.
Sie erteilen der Fachabteilung die Anweisung in welchen Fa¨llen die Informationen
u¨bermittelt werden sollen. Die Entscheidung u¨ber die Produktionsmenge treffen Sie
weiterhin selbst. Gleiches gilt fu¨r Ihren Wettbewerber. Die Wahrscheinlichkeiten
fu¨r die Marktnachfrage, Ihre Marktanalyse und die Marktanalyse des Wettbewerbers
bleiben wie in Teil II. Die Zuordnung Ihres Wettbewerbers wird weiterhin durch den
Zufall bestimmt.
Teil III des Experimentes besteht aus einer Runde mit folgendem Ablauf:
Zu Beginn der Runde kennen Sie das Ergebnis Ihrer Marktanalyse nicht. Sie geben
jedoch Ihrer Fachabteilung verbindliche Anweisungen in welchen Fa¨llen
diese den Wettbewerber u¨ber die Marktnachfrage informieren soll, falls
die Marktanalyse erfolgreich ist.
Sie haben hierbei 4 Optionen:
1. Niemals informieren
Der Wettbewerber kennt die Marktnachfrage nur, wenn seine eigene Markt-
analyse erfolgreich war. Er weiß nicht, ob Sie die Ho¨he der Marktnachfrage
erfahren haben.
2. Nur bei niedriger Nachfrage informieren
Fall 1: Marktanalyse ist erfolgreich und Marktnachfrage ist niedrig
Der Wettbewerber weiß mit Sicherheit, dass die Marktnachfrage niedrig ist.
Ebenfalls weiß der Wettbewerber, dass Sie die Ho¨he der Marktnachfrage er-
fahren haben.
Fall 2: Marktanalyse ist nicht erfolgreich und/oder die Marktnachfrage ist hoch
Der Wettbewerber kennt die Marktnachfrage nur, wenn seine eigene Markt-
analyse erfolgreich war. Er weiß nicht, ob Sie die Ho¨he der Marktnachfrage
erfahren haben.
3. Nur bei hoher Nachfrage informieren
Fall 1: Marktanalyse ist erfolgreich und Marktnachfrage ist hoch
Der Wettbewerber weiß mit Sicherheit, dass die Marktnachfrage hoch ist.
Ebenfalls weiß er, dass Sie die Ho¨he der Marktnachfrage erfahren haben.
Fall 2: Marktanalyse ist nicht erfolgreich und/oder die Marktnachfrage ist niedrig
Der Wettbewerber kennt die Marktnachfrage nur, wenn seine eigene Markt-
analyse erfolgreich war. Er weiß nicht, ob Sie die Ho¨he der Marktnachfrage
erfahren haben.
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4. Immer informieren
Fall 1: Marktanalyse ist erfolgreich
Der Wettbewerber weiß mit Sicherheit, dass die Marktnachfrage hoch/niedrig
ist. Ebenfalls weiß er, dass Sie die Ho¨he der Marktnachfrage erfahren haben.
Fall 2: Marktanalyse ist nicht erfolgreich
Der Wettbewerber kennt die Marktnachfrage nur, wenn seine eigene Markt-
analyse erfolgreich war. Er weiß nicht, ob Sie die Ho¨he der Marktnachfrage
erfahren haben.
Hieran anschließend wird Ihnen, wie bisher, mitgeteilt, ob ihre Marktanalyse erfol-
greich war und ob Sie eine Information vom Wettbewerber erhalten haben.
Es folgt wie in Teil II die Entscheidung u¨ber die Produktionsmenge.
Danach wird das Rundenergebnis in gewohnter Form mitgeteilt.
Am Ende des Experimentes werden alle Rundengewinne in EURO umgerechnet und
Ihnen ausbezahlt.
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4.1 Introduction
Inspired by Wilson (1987), Bergemann and Morris (2005) have provided a formaliza-
tion of mechanisms that are robust in the sense that they do not rely on a common
prior distribution of material payoffs. We add another dimension in which we seek
robustness. A mechanism that works well under selfish preferences might fail un-
der social preferences. Indeed, behavioral economics has shown that many agents
behave socially. One challenge is, though, that social preferences can differ with
respect to their nature and intensity, leading to different kinds of social preference
models, including altruism, inequity-aversion, and intentionality (Cooper and Kagel
(2013)). Because we want a mechanism to work not only for selfish preferences but
also for a large set of social preferences, we introduce the notion of social-preference-
robust mechanism: a mechanism must not depend on specific assumptions about the
nature and intensity of selfish and social preferences.
In this paper, we show theoretically that optimal mechanisms that are derived
under the assumption of selfish preferences may not generate the intended behavior
if individuals have social preferences. Second, and most importantly, we introduce
the notion of a social-preference-robust mechanism and derive mechanisms that are
optimal in this class. Finally, we use laboratory experiments to demonstrate that
social preferences are a non-negligible factor in our context, and to compare the
performance of the optimal mechanisms under selfish preferences and the optimal
social-preference-robust mechanisms.
For the applications studied in this paper, the notion of robustness due to Berge-
mann and Morris is equivalent to the requirement that a mechanism has a dominant
strategy equilibrium. Depending on the application, this may significantly restrict
the set of implementable outcomes.1 Thus, there may be the concern that adding
another robustness-requirement will restrict the set of admissible mechanisms even
further and is therefore problematic. In our view, comparing mechanisms that, ac-
cording to theory, sacrifice performance for a more robust solution concept to mech-
anisms that, according to theory, sacrifice robustness in return for performance, is
ultimately an empirical question. Our laboratory experiments are first steps in this
direction.
1For instance, Hagerty and Rogerson (1987) study the bilateral trade-problem due to Myerson
and Satterthwaite (1983) and show that, with incentive and participation constraints that are
robust in the Bergemann and Morris (2005)-sense, the set of admissible mechanisms is heavily
restricted. For other applications, there is no restriction at all. For instance, for a problem of
redistributive income taxation, Bierbrauer (2011) shows that there is an optimal mechanism with
a dominant strategy equilibrium.
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Throughout, we use two classic applications of mechanism design theory, a ver-
sion of the bilateral-trade problem due to Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) and
versions of the optimal income tax problem due to Mirrlees (1971) and Piketty
(1993) to illustrate our theoretical analysis.
The bilateral trade problem. The bilateral-trade problem provides us with a
simple, and stylized setup that facilitates a clear exposition of our approach. More-
over, it admits interpretations that are of interest in public economics, environmental
economics, or contract theory. The basics are as follows: A buyer either has a high
or low valuation of a good produced by a seller. The seller either has a high or a
low cost of producing the good. An economic outcome specifies, for each possible
combination of the buyer’s valuation and the seller’s cost, the quantity to be ex-
changed, the price paid by the buyer and the revenue received by the seller. Both
the buyer and the seller have private information. Thus, an allocation mechanism
has to ensure that the buyer does not understate his valuation so as to get a desired
quantity at a lower price. Analogously, the seller has to be incentivized so that she
does not exaggerate her cost in order to receive a larger compensation.
The essence of the bilateral trade problem is that there are two parties and that
each party has private information on its benefits (or costs) from a transaction with
the other party. The labels “buyer” and “seller” need not to be taken literally. This
environment can be reinterpreted as a problem of public-goods provision in which
one party (the buyer) benefits from larger provision levels whereas the other party
(the seller) bears a cost. By how much the first party benefits and the second party
loses is private information. It can also be reinterpreted as a problem to control
externalities. One party (the seller) can invest so as to avoid emissions which harm
the other party (the buyer). The cost of the investment to one party and the benefit
of reduced emissions to the other party are private information. In a principal-agent-
framework, we may think of one party (the buyer) as benefiting from effort that is
exerted by the other party (the seller). The size of the benefit and the disutility of
effort are, respectively, private information of the principal and the agent.
Our analysis proceeds as follows: We first characterize an optimal direct mecha-
nism for the bilateral trade problem under the standard assumption of selfish pref-
erences, i.e. both, the buyer and the seller, are assumed to maximize their own
payoff, respectively, and this is common knowledge. We solve for the mechanism
that maximizes the seller’s expected profits subject to incentive constraints, partic-
ipation constraints, and a resource constraint. We work with ex post incentive and
participation constraints, i.e. we insist that after the outcome of the mechanism and
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the other party’s private information have become known, no party regrets to have
participated and to have revealed its own information.
As has been shown by Bergemann and Morris (2005), ex post constraints imply
that a mechanism is robust in the sense that its outcome does not depend on the indi-
vidual’s probabilistic beliefs about the other party’s private information. Moreover,
we use the arguments in Bergemann and Morris (2005) for our experimental test-
ing strategy. In their characterization of robust mechanisms complete information
environments play a key role. In such an environment, the buyer knows the seller’s
cost and the seller knows the buyer’s valuation, and, moreover, this is commonly
known among them. The mechanism designer, however, lacks this information and
therefore still has to provide incentives for a revelation of privately held information.
Bergemann and Morris provide conditions so that the requirement of robustness is
equivalent to the requirement that a mechanism generates the intended outcome in
every complete information environment, which in turn is equivalent to the require-
ment that incentive and participation constraints hold in an ex post sense.2
In our laboratory approach, we investigate the performance of an optimally de-
signed robust mechanism in all complete information environments. This approach
is useful because it allows us to isolate the role of social preferences in a highly con-
trolled setting, which eliminates complications that are related to decision-making
under uncertainty. For instance, it is well-known that, even in one-person decision
tasks, people often do not maximize expected utility (see Camerer (1995)), and that
moreover, in social contexts, social and risk preferences may interact in non-trivial
ways (see, e.g., Bolton and Ockenfels (2010), and the references therein). The com-
plete information environments in our study avoid such complicating factors.3
For the bilateral trade problem, the mechanism which maximizes the seller’s ex-
pected profits under selfish preferences has the following properties: (i) The trading
surplus is allocated in an asymmetric way, i.e. the seller gets a larger fraction than
the buyer; (ii) Whenever the buyer’s valuation is low, his participation constraint
binds, so that he does not realize any gains from trade; (iii) Whenever the buyer’s
2Throughout we focus on social choice functions, as opposed to social choice correspondences.
Consequently, by Corollary 1 in Bergemann and Morris (2005), ex post implementability is both
necessary and sufficient for robust implementability. Moreover, if agents are selfish, then our
environment gives rise to private values so that incentive compatibility in an ex post sense is
equivalent to the requirement that truth-telling is a dominant strategy under a direct mechanism
for the given social choice function.
3Thus, for our experimental testing strategy, we take for granted the equivalence between im-
plementability in all complete information environments and implementability in all incomplete
information environments. We explicitly investigate the former and draw conclusions for the lat-
ter. We also take for granted the validity of the revelation principle. That is, we only check
whether individuals behave truthfully under a direct mechanism for a given social choice function.
We discuss the advantages and limits of this approach in our concluding section.
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valuation is high, his incentive constraint binds, so that he is indifferent between
revealing his valuation and understating it. Experimentally, we find that under this
mechanism, a non-negligible fraction of high valuation buyers understates their val-
uation. In all other situations, deviations — if they occur at all — are significantly
less frequent.
We argue that this pattern is consistent with models of social preferences such as
Fehr and Schmidt (1999), and Falk and Fischbacher (2006), among others. The basic
idea is the following. A buyer with a high valuation can understate his valuation at
a very small personal cost since the relevant incentive constraint binds. The benefit
of this strategy is that this reduces the seller’s payoff and therefore brings the seller’s
payoff closer to his own, thereby reducing inequality. In fact, as we will demonstrate
later, many social preference models would predict this behavior.
We then introduce a class of direct mechanisms that “work” if the possibility
of social preferences is acknowledged. Specifically, we introduce the notion of a
direct mechanism that is externality-free. Under such a mechanism, the buyer’s
equilibrium payoff does not depend on the seller’s type and vice versa; i.e. if, say,
the buyer reveals his valuation, his payoff no longer depends on whether the seller
communicates a high or a low cost to the mechanism designer. Hence, the seller
cannot influence the buyer’s payoff.
Almost all widely-used models of social preferences satisfy a property of selfish-
ness in the absence of externalities, i.e. if a player considers a choice between two
actions a and b, and moreover, if the monetary payoffs of everybody else are unaf-
fected by this choice, then the player will choose a over b if her own payoff under
a is higher than her own payoff under b. Now, suppose that a direct mechanism
is ex post incentive-compatible and externality-free. Then truth-telling will be an
equilibrium for any social preference model in which individuals are selfish in the
absence of externalities.
We impose externality-freeness as an additional constraint on our problem of
robust mechanism design. We then characterize the optimal robust and externality-
free mechanism and investigate its performance in an experiment. We find that there
are no longer deviations from truth-telling. We interpret this finding as providing
evidence for the relevance of social preferences in mechanism design: If there are
externalities a significant fraction of individuals deviates from truth-telling. If those
externalities are shut down, individuals behave truthfully.
Externality-freeness is an additional constraint. While it makes sure that in-
dividuals behave in a predictable way it reduces expected profits relative to the
theoretical benchmark of a model with selfish preferences. This raises the question
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whether the seller makes more money if she uses an externality-free mechanism.
We answer this both theoretically and empirically: The externality-free mechanism
makes more money if the number of participants whose behavior is motivated by
social preferences exceeds a threshold. In our laboratory context, this number was
below the threshold, so that the “conventional” mechanism made more money than
the externality-free mechanism.
Based on these observations, we finally engineer a mechanism that satisfies the
property of externality-freeness only locally. Specifically, we impose externality-
freeness for those action-profiles where deviations from selfish behavior were fre-
quently observed in our experiment data. We show theoretically that local exter-
nality-freeness is a constraint that can be satisfied without having to sacrifice per-
formance: If all agents are selfish then there is an optimal mechanism that is lo-
cally externality-free. In our experiment data, however, an optimal mechanism that
is locally externality-free performs significantly better than an optimal mechanism
that is not externality-free. Hence, if one knows precisely which deviations from
selfish behavior are tempting, one can design a mechanism that performs strictly
better than both the optimal mechanism for selfish agents and the optimal globally
externality-free mechanism.
Income Taxation. The bilateral trade setup is one in which externalities are
at the center of the allocation problem: More consumption for the buyer can be
realized only with higher costs for the seller, and additional revenue for the seller
can only be realized if the buyer pays more. Hence, it seems natural that the buyer’s
behavior will affect the seller’s payoff and vice versa. A requirement of externality-
freeness which shuts down this interdependence may therefore appear demanding.
In settings different from the bilateral trade problem, externality-freeness may arise
naturally. For example, price-taking behavior in markets with a large number of
participants gives rise to externality-freeness. If a single individual changes her
demand, this leaves prices unaffected and so remain the options available to all
other agents. Market behavior is therefore unaffected by social preferences, see
Dufwenberg et al. (2011). Another setting in which externality-freeness may appear
natural is the design of tax systems. Here, externality-freeness requires that income
taxes paid by one individual depend only on this individual’s income, and not on the
income earned by other individuals. Thus, when formalizing the modern approach
to optimal income taxation, Mirrlees (1971) and his followers have looked exclusively
at externality-free allocations.
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However, as has been shown by Piketty (1993), for an economy with finitely
many individuals and a commonly known cross-section distribution of types, an
optimal Mirrleesian income tax system can be outperformed by one that is not
externality-free. Specifically, Piketty shows that first-best utilitarian redistribution
from high-skilled individuals to low-skilled individuals can be reached, while this is
impossible with a Mirrleesian approach. A crucial feature of Piketty’s approach is
that types are assumed to be correlated in a particular way. For instance, if there
are two individuals and it is commonly known that one of them is high-skilled and
one is low-skilled, then the individuals’ types are perfectly negatively correlated: If
person 1 is of high ability, then person 2 is of low ability and vice versa. Piketty’s
construction of a mechanism that reaches the first-best utilitarian outcome heavily
exploits this feature of the environment. If individual types are the realizations of
independent random variables, then the optimal mechanism is externality-free, see
Bierbrauer (2011).
Piketty’s observations challenge the appeal of the Mirrleesian approach to tax
policy in the same way as the seminal analysis of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976)
has challenged Ramsey models of taxation: Atkinson and Stiglitz argued that the
Ramsey approach lacks a satisfactory theoretical foundation as it is based on an
optimization in a set of policies that can be shown to be suboptimal. Piketty’s
analysis also resembles the possibility results by Cre´mer and McLean (1985, 1988) in
auction theory. There are also some important differences though. Piketty uses the
solution concept of a dominant strategy equilibrium which implies that his approach
is robust in the sense of Bergemann and Morris (2005). The approach of Cre´mer
and McLean is based on the solution concept of a Bayes-Nash equilibrium and
strongly depends on specific properties of a common prior. It is therefore not robust
in the sense of Bergemann and Morris (2005). Cre´mer and McLean have shown
that, with correlated values and selfish agents, there exist Bayes-Nash equilibria
that achieve first-best outcomes. These findings have then been generalized to other
types of allocation problems, see e.g., Kosenok and Severinov (2008). Importantly,
the mechanisms that achieve first-best outcomes in the presence of correlated types
give rise to payoff interdependencies or externalities among the players. Therefore,
they raise the question whether social preferences might interfere with the possibility
to achieve first-best outcomes. Piketty’s treatment of the income tax problem is an
example that allows us to get at this more general question in a particular context.
We run an experiment and show that Piketty’s mechanism indeed provokes devi-
ations from the intended behavior, and again, we argue that these deviations can be
explained by models of social preferences. We then compare Piketty’s mechanism to
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an optimal Mirrleesian mechanism. The latter is externality-free and we find that it
successfully controls behavior; there are no longer significant deviations from truth-
telling. We also find that the level of welfare that is generated by the Mirrleesian
mechanism is significantly larger than the level of welfare generated by Piketty’s
mechanism. This last observation makes an interesting difference to our findings for
the bilateral trade problem. With the income tax problem, imposing externality-
freeness is also good for the performance of the mechanism. The difference is not
due to different social preferences, but reflects the fact that the externality-free
mechanism is preferable only if the number of socially motivated agents exceeds a
threshold. For the simple illustrative models that we use in the experiment, this
threshold is much larger for the bilateral trade problem (and too large for what we
observe in the laboratory).
Outline. The next section discusses related literature. In Section 4.3 we elabo-
rate on why models of social preferences are consistent with the observation that
individuals deviate from truth-telling under a mechanism that would be optimal if
all individuals were selfish, and with the observation that they do not deviate under
a mechanism that is externality-free. It also contains a detailed description of the
bilateral trade problem that we study. In addition, Section 4.4 describes our lab-
oratory findings for the bilateral trade problem, and in Section 4.5, we clarify the
conditions under which an optimal externality-free mechanism outperforms an op-
timal mechanism for selfish agents and relate them to our experiment data. Section
4.6 contains our analysis of the income tax problem. The last section concludes.
4.2 Related literature
There is a rich literature on models of social preferences. Within this literature
there are different subcategories, such as, for instance, the distinction between
outcomes-based and intention-based models of social preferences. Well-known mod-
els of outcomes-based social preferences are Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton
and Ockenfels (2000). Models of intention-based social preferences include Rabin
(1993) and Falk and Fischbacher (2006). There is a large literature on mechanism
design with interdependent valuations, see e.g. the survey in Jehiel and Moldovanu
(2006). In principle, models of outcomes-based social preferences can be viewed as
specific models with interdependent valuations. By contrast, models with intention-
based social preferences cannot be viewed as models with interdependent valuations.
In these models, preferences are menu-dependent, see Sobel (2005) for a discussion.
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Such a menu dependence does not arise in the literature on mechanism design with
interdependent valuations. We introduce social preferences into a model of robust
mechanism design. This complements the analysis of Bergemann and Morris (2005)
who were seeking robustness with respect to the specification of the individuals’
probabilistic beliefs.
Our work builds on earlier contributions by Bierbrauer and Netzer (2016) and
Bartling and Netzer (2016), see also Netzer and Volk (2014) for an extension of some
of the analysis in Bierbrauer and Netzer (2016). These papers share the broad moti-
vation to incorporate social preferences into mechanism design. There are, however,
important differences. Bierbrauer and Netzer (2016) and Netzer and Volk (2014)
focus on a specific model of social preference, the intention-based model of Rabin
(1993), so that there is no concern for social-preference robustness. Bartling and Net-
zer (2016) discuss a broader class of social-preferences and study a race between an
auction format that is social-preference-robust but requires Bayesian sophistication
and an auction format that is Bergemann-Morris-robust but not social preference-
robust. In this paper, we formalize social-preference-robustness and, moreover, make
sure that we do not sacrifice robustness with respect to specification of probabilistic
beliefs along the way. We can then have a race between mechanisms that are social-
preference-robust and mechanisms that are optimal if agents are selfish – subject
to the constraint that all of these mechanisms are Bergemann-Morris-robust. An
advantage of this approach is that we can be more confident to identify the role of
social preferences, as opposed to the limits to Bayesian sophistication.
For the purpose of illustration, we focus on two classic applications of mecha-
nism design, the bilateral trade problem and the problem of redistributive income
taxation. Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) establish an impossibility result for ef-
ficient trade in a setting with two privately informed parties.4 Our focus is different.
We look at a second-best mechanism for this problem and ask how its performance
is affected by social preferences. The classical reference for redistributive income
taxation is Mirrlees (1971). We relate the Mirrleesian treatment to an alternative
one that has been proposed by Piketty (1993).5
There is a large experimental economics literature testing mechanisms. Most
laboratory studies deal with mechanisms to overcome free-riding in public goods
environments (Chen (2008)), auction design (e.g., Ariely et al. (2005), Kagel et al.
4Related impossibility results hold for problems of public-goods provision, see Gu¨th and Hellwig
(1986) and Mailath and Postlewaite (1990).
5The mechanism design approach to the problem of optimal income taxation is also discussed
in Hammond (1979), Stiglitz (1982), Dierker and Haller (1990), Guesnerie (1995), and Bierbrauer
(2011).
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(2010)), and the effectiveness of various matching markets (e.g., Kagel and Roth
(2000), Chen and So¨nmez (2006)). Roth (2012) provides a survey. Some studies
take into account social preferences when engineering mechanisms. For instance, it
has been shown that feedback about others’ behavior or outcomes, which would be
irrelevant if agents were selfish, can strongly affect social comparison processes and
reciprocal interaction, and thus the effectiveness of mechanisms to promote efficiency
and resolve conflicts (e.g., Chen et al. (2010), Bolton et al. (2013), Ockenfels et al.
(2014); Bolton and Ockenfels (2012) provide a survey). Social preferences are also
important in bilateral bargaining with complete information, most notably in ulti-
matum bargaining (Gu¨th et al. (1982); Gu¨th and Kocher (2013) provide a survey).
In fact, this literature has been a starting point for various social preference models
that we are considering in this paper — yet the observed patterns of behavior have
generally not been related to the mechanism design literature. This is different with
laboratory studies of bilateral trade with incomplete information, such as Radner
and Schotter (1989), Valley et al. (2002) and Kittsteiner et al. (2012). One major
finding in this literature is, for instance, that cheap talk communication among bar-
gainers can significantly improve efficiency. These findings are generally not related
to social preference models, though.
4.3 Mechanism design with and without social
preferences
This section contains theoretical results which relate mechanism design theory to
models of social preferences. Throughout, we use the bilateral trade problem to
illustrate the conceptual questions that arise. We begin with the benchmark of
optimal mechanism design under the assumption that individuals are purely selfish.
We then show that many models of social preferences give rise to the prediction that
such mechanisms will not generate truthful behavior. However, while maximizing
expected payoffs is a well-defined goal, there are many ways to be socially motivated.
In fact, one of the most robust insights from behavioral economics and psychology
is the large variance of social behaviors across individuals (e.g., Camerer (2003)).
As a result, there is now a plethora of social preference models, and almost all
models permit individual heterogeneity by allowing different parameter values for
different individuals (e.g., Cooper and Kagel (2013)). This poses a problem for
mechanism design because optimal mechanisms depend on the nature of the agents’
preferences. Our approach to deal with this problem is neither to just select one of
those models, nor are we even attempting to identify the best model. We will also
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not assume that idiosyncratic social preferences are commonly known. All these
approaches would violate the spirit of robust mechanism design. Rather, we restrict
our attention to a property of social preferences which is shared by almost all widely-
used social preference models and which is independent of the exact parameter
values: individuals maximize their own payoffs, regardless of their social preferences,
if there is no possibility to affect the payoffs of others. As we will show, this general
property of social behavior is sufficient to construct “externality-free” mechanisms
which generate truthful behavior, regardless of what is known about the specific
type and parameters of the agents’ social preferences.
There are two dimensions in this comparison of social choice functions that are
externality-free with social choice functions that are implementable if individuals are
selfish. First, we ask, whether, under a direct mechanism, individual behavior is as
intended by the mechanism designer. Second, we use welfare measures to compare
the performances of these social choice functions.
The second comparison is complicated by the need to provide an answer to the
following question: What is the appropriate objective function for a mechanism de-
sign approach that seeks robustness with respect to the nature and intensity of social
preferences? The conventional approach in welfare economics would be to postulate
a social welfare objective that respects individual preferences and hence is a non-
decreasing function of any one individual’s utility. If, for instance, individuals have
social preferences that exhibit inequity aversion as in the social preferences models
of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) then the individuals’
inequity aversion should be reflected in the social welfare function. If individuals
have intention-based social preferences as in the models of Rabin (1993) or Falk and
Fischbacher (2006) then the individuals’ experiences of kindness in the interaction
with others should show up in the social welfare function. Thus, the appropriate
objective function depends itself on the nature and the intensity of the individuals’
social preferences.
All social preference models allow that the individuals’ preferences put some or
all weight on own payoffs. Inequity aversion models additionally involve a disutility
that is associated with unequal outcomes. As will become clear from our char-
acterizations below, if we impose externality-freeness as an additional constraint,
the resulting social choice functions will be more egalitarian than the ones that
result from a conventional mechanism design approach under the assumption that
individuals are selfish. Consequently, if individuals assign sufficient weight to the
disutility of unequal outcomes then the externality-free social choice function gener-
ates more welfare than a social choice function that is incentive-compatible, but not
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externality-free. The more interesting question is therefore whether the externality-
free social choice function outperforms the conventional social choice function even if
the weight on the social preference term is small. We will focus on this case and ask
whether the performance of an externality-free social choice function is higher under
the extreme assumption that social preferences receive zero weight in the welfare
objective.
Analogously, the utility function that is invoked by models of intention-based so-
cial preferences involves not only a concern for selfish payoff but also for the kindness
or unkindness experienced in the interaction with others. If we impose externality-
freeness, then – according to Rabin (1993) and Falk and Fischbacher (2006) – the
kindness term takes a value of zero because individuals no longer have a chance of
affecting each other’s payoffs. By contrast, a truthful equilibrium of a direct mech-
anism for an incentive compatible social choice function generates an equilibrium
kindness that is negative: If individuals behave selfishly this means that oppor-
tunities to make others better off remain unused so that kindness cannot become
positive. Again, if kindness sensations receive sufficient weight in the individuals’
utility functions, then the externality-free social choice function will generate more
welfare. It is therefore more challenging to check whether the externality-free social
choice function looks better even with a small weight on kindness sensations. If the
externality-free social choice function generates more welfare even with a zero weight
on kindness, we can conclude that the externality-free social choice function outper-
forms the conventional social function, whatever the weight on kindness sensations
in the welfare objective.
4.3.1 The bilateral trade problem
There are two agents, referred to as the buyer and the seller. An economic outcome
is a triple (q, ps, pb), where q ∈ R+ is the quantity that is traded, pb ∈ R is a payment
made by the buyer, and ps ∈ R is a payment received by the seller. Monetary payoffs
are pib = θbq − pb, for the buyer and pis = −θsk(q) + ps, for the seller where k is an
increasing and convex cost function. The buyer’s valuation θb either takes a high or
a low value, θb ∈ Θb = {θb, θ¯b}. Similarly, the seller’s cost parameter θs can take a
high or a low value so that θs ∈ Θs = {θs, θ¯s}. A pair (θb, θs) ∈ Θb × Θs is referred
to as a state of the economy. A social choice function or direct mechanism f :
Θb×Θs → R+×R×R specifies an economic outcome for each state of the economy.
Occasionally, we write f = (qf , pfb , p
f
s ) to distinguish the different components of f .
6
6Our setting differs from the one originally studied by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) in that
we have a convex cost function for the seller and allow for quantities in R+. In the original paper,
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With a requirement of ex post budget balance, the price paid by the buyer
equals the price received by the seller in every state of the world, i.e. for all (θb, θs),
pfb (θb, θs) = p
f
s (θb, θs). Below, we also formalize a requirement of expected budget
balance. This allows for states in which the payment of the buyer is not equal to
the payment received by the seller, as long as they are equal when computing an
average across states. (Possibly, the mechanism is executed frequently, so that the
designer expects to break even if budget balance holds on average.) The flexibility
provided by the requirement of expected budget balance is important for some of
the results that follow. With a requirement of ex post budget balance there is less
scope for adjusting the traded quantities and the corresponding payments to the
privately held information of the buyer and the seller.7
We denote by
pib(θb, f(θ
′
b, θ
′
s)) := θbq
f (θ′b, θ
′
s)− pfb (θ′b, θ′s)
the payoff that is realized by a buyer with type θb if he announces a type θ
′
b and the
seller announces a type θ′s under direct mechanism f . The expression pis(θs, f(θ
′
b, θ
′
s))
is defined analogously.
We assume that the buyer has private information on whether his valuation
θb is high or low. Analogously, the seller privately observes whether θs takes a
high or a low value. Hence, a direct mechanism induces a game of incomplete
information. Our analysis in the following focuses on a very specific and artificial
class of incomplete information environments, namely the ones in which the types
are commonly known among the players but unknown to the mechanism designer.
In total there are four such complete information environments, one for each state
of the economy. “Complete information” refers to a situation in which the players’
monetary payoffs are commonly known. Information may still be incomplete in
other dimensions, e.g., regarding the weight of fairness considerations in the other
player’s utility function. It has been shown by Bergemann and Morris (2005) that
the seller’s cost function is linear and quantities are in [0, 1] so that constrained efficient social choice
functions take values in {0, 1}, either there is trade or there is no trade. In our setting, constrained
efficient social choice functions do not have this “all-or-nothing” property. Instead, quantities vary
with the state of the economy. As will become clear, optimal social choice functions are then
characterized by binding incentive and participation constraints that give rise to a familiar pattern
with “downward distortions at the bottom” and “no distortions at the top”. This facilitates the
discussion of the relevance of social preferences for mechanism design.
7We do not wish to argue that the requirement of expected budget balance is, for practical
purposes, more relevant than the requirement of ex post budget balance. This will depend on the
application. The mechanisms that we study in this paper are primarily meant as diagnostic tools
for the relevance of social preferences in mechanism design. In this respect, the requirement of
expected budget balance proves useful.
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the implementability of a social choice function in all such complete information
environments is not only necessary but also sufficient for the robust implementability
of a social choice function, i.e. for its implementability in all conceivable incomplete
information environments. Thus, our focus on complete information environments
is not only useful to cleanly isolate the effect of social preferences, but also justified
by the robustness criterion.
Suppose that individuals are only interested in their own payoff. Then truth-
telling is an equilibrium in all complete information environments if and only if the
following ex post incentive compatibility constraints are satisfied: For all (θb, θs) ∈
Θb ×Θs,
pib(θb, f(θb, θs)) ≥ pib(θb, f(θ′b, θs)) for all θ′b ∈ Θb , (4.1)
and
pis(θs, f(θb, θs)) ≥ pis(θs, f(θb, θ′s)) for all θ′s ∈ Θs . (4.2)
Moreover, individuals prefer to play the mechanism over a status quo outcome with
no trade if and only if the following ex post participation constraints are satisfied:
For all (θb, θs) ∈ Θb ×Θs,
pib(θb, f(θb, θs)) ≥ 0 and pis(θs, f(θb, θs)) ≥ 0 . (4.3)
In the body of the text, we limit attention to direct mechanisms and to truth-telling
equilibria. For models with selfish individuals, or more generally, for models with
outcome-based preferences – which possibly include a concern for an equitable dis-
tribution of payoffs – this is without loss of generality by the revelation principle.
For models with intention-based social preferences, such as Rabin (1993) or Dufwen-
berg and Kirchsteiger (2004), the revelation principle does not generally hold, see
Bierbrauer and Netzer (2016) for a proof. Still, it is a sufficient condition for the
implementability of a social choice function that it can be implemented as the truth-
telling equilibrium of a direct mechanism. We focus on this sufficient condition. It
can also be viewed as a necessary condition for social preference robustness because
there is a class of social preference models – namely those with outcomes-based pref-
erences – that require the implementability as the truthful equilibrium of a direct
mechanism.
Another property of interest to us is the externality-freeness of a social choice
function f . This property holds if, for all θb ∈ Θb,
pib(θb, f(θb, θs)) = pib(θb, f(θb, θ¯s)),
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and if, for all θs ∈ Θs,
pis(θs, f(θb, θs)) = pis(θs, f(θ¯b, θs)).
If these properties hold, then the buyer, say, cannot influence the seller’s payoff,
provided that the latter tells the truth. I.e. the buyer’s report does not come with
an externality on the seller. As we will argue later in more detail, many models of
social preferences give rise to the prediction that externality-freeness in conjunction
with ex post incentive compatibility is a sufficient condition for the implementability
of a social choice function.
4.3.2 Optimal mechanism design under selfish preferences
A mechanism designer wishes to come up with a mechanism for bilateral trade. De-
sign takes place at the ex ante stage, i.e. before the state of the economy is realized.
The designer acts in the interest of one of the parties, here the seller. The designer
does not know what information the buyer and the seller have about each other
at the moment where trade takes place. Hence, he seeks robustness with respect
to the information structure and employs ex post incentive and participation con-
straints. The designer assumes that individuals are selfish so that these constraints
are sufficient to ensure that individuals are willing to play the corresponding direct
mechanism and to reveal their types. Finally, he requires budget balance only in an
average sense, see equation (4.4) below.
Formally, we assume that a social choice function f is chosen with the objective
to maximize expected seller profits,
∑
Θb×Θs g(θb, θs)pis(θ, f(θb, θs)) , where g is a
probability mass function that gives the mechanism designer’s subjective beliefs on
the likelihood of the different states of the economy. The incentive and participation
constraints in (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3) have to be respected. In addition, the following
resource constraint has to hold∑
Θb×Θs
g(θb, θs)p
f
b (θb, θs) ≥
∑
Θb×Θs
g(θb, θs)p
f
s (θb, θs) . (4.4)
To solve this full problem, we first study a relaxed problem which leaves out the
incentive and participation constraints for the seller. Proposition 1 characterizes its
solution. This solution to the relaxed problem is also a solution to the full problem
if it satisfies all constraints of the full problem, as is the case for Example 1 below.
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Proposition 1. A social choice function f solves the relaxed problem of robust
mechanism design if and only if it has the following properties:
(a) For any one θs ∈ Θs, the participation constraint of a low type buyer is binding:
pib(θb, f(θb, θs)) = 0 .
(b) For any one θs ∈ Θs, the incentive constraint of a high type buyer is binding:
pib(θb, f(θb, θs)) = pib(θb, f(θb, θs)) .
(c) The trading rule is such that, for any one θs ∈ Θs, there is a downward
distortion at the bottom
qf (θb, θs) ∈ argmaxq
(
θb −
g(θb, θs)
g(θb, θs)
(θb − θb)
)
q − θsk(q) ,
and no distortion at the top
qf (θb, θs) ∈ argmaxq θbq − θsk(q) .
(d) The payment rule for the buyer is such that, for any one θs,
pfb (θb, θs) = θbq
f (θb, θs) ,
and
pfb (θb, θs) = θbq
f (θb, θs)− (θb − θb)qf (θb, θs) .
(e) The revenue for the seller is such that∑
Θb×Θs
g(θb, θs)p
f
b (θb, θs) =
∑
Θb×Θs
g(θb, θs)p
f
s (θb, θs) .
A formal proof of Proposition 1 is provided in Appendix 4.B. Here, we provide
a sketch of the main argument: Since we leave out the seller’s incentive constraint,
we can treat the seller’s cost parameter as a known quantity. Hence, we think of the
relaxed problem as consisting of two separate profit-maximization problems, one for
a high-cost seller and one for a low-cost seller, which are linked only via the resource
constraint. In each of these problems, however, the buyer’s incentive and participa-
tion constraints remain relevant. Therefore, we have two profit-maximization prob-
lems. The formal structure of any one of those problems is the same as the structure
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of a non-linear pricing problem with two buyer types. This problem is well-known
so that standard arguments can be used to derive properties (a)-(e) above. A clas-
sical reference is Mussa and Rosen (1978), see Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) for a
textbook treatment.
The solution to the relaxed problem leaves degrees of freedom for the specification
of the payments to the seller. Consequently, any specification of the seller’s revenues,
so that the expected revenue is equal to the buyer’s expected payment, is part of
a solution to the relaxed problem. If there is one such specification that satisfies
the seller’s ex post incentive and participation constraints, then this solution to the
relaxed problem is also a solution to the full problem. In the following we provide
a specific example in which these payments are specified in such a way that they
satisfy not only these constraints, but also give rise to ex post budget balance:8 In
every state (θb, θs), the price paid by the buyer equals the revenue obtained by the
seller,
pfb (θb, θs) = p
f
s (θb, θs) . (4.5)
Example 1: An optimal robust social choice function. Suppose that θb =
1.00, θb = 1.30, θs = 0.20, and θs = 0.65 and that the designer assigns equal
probability mass to all possible combinations of buyer and seller types. Also assume
that the seller has a quadratic cost function k(q) = 1
2
q2. Finally, assume that the
reservation utility levels of both the buyer and the seller are given by p¯ib = p¯is = 2.68.
For these parameters, an optimal robust social choice function f looks as follows:
The traded quantities are given by
qf (θb, θs) = 3.50, q
f (θb, θ¯s) = 1.08, q
f (θ¯b, θs) = 6.50 and q
f (θ¯b, θ¯s) = 2.00 .
The buyer’s payments are
pfb (θb, θs) = 3.50, p
f
b (θb, θ¯s) = 1.08, p
f
b (θ¯b, θs) = 7.40 and p
f
b (θ¯b, θ¯s) = 2.28 .
Finally, the seller’s revenues are
pfs (θb, θs) = 3.50, p
f
s (θb, θ¯s) = 1.08, p
f
s (θ¯b, θs) = 7.40 and p
f
s (θ¯b, θ¯s) = 2.28 .
8With bounded provision levels and linear costs, as in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), the
optimal mechanism would not admit an implementation with ex post budget balance. This follows
from Hagerty and Rogerson (1987). Thus, only with a convex cost function, there is an optimal
mechanism for selfish agents that looks natural in the sense that, in every state, the buyer’s payment
is equal to the seller’s revenue.
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By construction, f is ex post incentive compatible and satisfies the ex post partici-
pation constraints. However, it is not externality-free.
These properties can be verified by looking at the games which are induced by
this social choice function on the various complete information environments. For
instance, the following matrix represents the normal form game that is induced by
f in a complete information environment so that the buyer has a low valuation and
the seller has a low cost.
More specifically, the payoffs in this and the following matrices result from affine
transformations p˜ib and p˜i
s of pib and pi
s, respectively, that are of no consequence for
the validity of Proposition 1 (and of Propositions 3 and 5 below). We used these
payoff matrices also for the laboratory experiments described in Section 4.4. The
transformations were helpful in making sure that the participants earned 10 Euros
on average.
Moreover, this and the following normal form games are generated by an ap-
proximation fx of f which is such that, whenever an incentive constraint is binding
under f , a deviation from truth-telling has a small cost of two cents under fx. Our
laboratory experiments used fx rather than f . Thus, under fx it is less tempting
to deviate from truth-telling and we can be more confident that the deviations from
truth-telling that we observe reflect social preferences, as opposed to an arbitrary
selection from a set of best responses.
Table 1: The game induced by f for (θb, θs) = (θb, θs).
(p˜ib, p˜is) θs θs
θb (2.68, 5.52) (2.68, 3.88)
θb (1.56, 6.65) (2.33, 5.03)
The first entry in each cell is an affine transformation of the buyer’s payoff
p˜ib(θb, f(θ
′
b, θ
′
s)) = α pib(θb, f(θ
′
b, θ
′
s)) + β = α
{
θbq
f (θ′b, θ
′
s)− pfb (θ′b, θ′s)
}
+ β ,
where (θ′b, θ
′
s) is the action profile chosen by the buyer and the seller. We chose α = 1.25
and β = 2.68 to ensure that participants earned 10 Euros on average. The second entry in
the cell is an affine transformation of the seller’s payoff
p˜is(θs, f(θ
′
b, θ
′
s)) = α pis(θs, f(θ
′
b, θ
′
s)) + β = α
{
pfs (θ
′
b, θ
′
s)− θsk(qf (θ′b, θ′s))
}
+ β .
If both individuals truthfully reveal their types, the payoffs in the upper left corner are
realized. Note that under truth-telling both payoffs are weakly larger than the reservation
utility of 2.68 so that the relevant ex post participation constraints are satisfied. Also note
that the seller does not benefit from an exaggeration of her cost, if the buyer communicates
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his low valuation truthfully. Likewise, the buyer does not benefit from an exaggeration of
his willingness to pay, given that the seller communicates her low cost truthfully. Hence, the
relevant ex post incentive constraints are satisfied. Finally, note that externality-freeness is
violated: If the seller behaves truthfully, her payoff is higher if the buyer communicates a
high willingness to pay.
For later reference, we also describe the normal form games that are induced in the
remaining complete information environments.
Table 2: The game induced by f for (θb, θs) = (θb, θs).
(p˜ib, p˜is) θs θs
θb (2.68, 2.08) (2.68, 3.56)
θb (1.56,−5.23) (2.33, 3.90)
Table 3: The game induced by f for (θb, θs) = (θb, θs).
(p˜ib, p˜is) θs θs
θb (3.97, 5.52) (3.06, 3.88)
θb (3.99, 6.65) (3.08, 5.03)
Table 4: The game induced by f for (θb, θs) = (θb, θs).
(p˜ib, p˜is) θs θs
θb (3.97, 2.08) (3.06, 3.56)
θb (3.99,−5.23) (3.08, 3.90)
An inspection of Tables 1 through 4 reveals the following properties of f : (i) Under
truth-telling the seller’s payoff exceeds the buyer’s payoff in all states of the economy,
(ii) if the buyer’s type is low (Tables 1 and 2), then his payoff under truth-telling is
equal to β = 2.68, i.e. the participation constraint of a low type buyer binds, (iii)
if the buyer’s type is high (Tables 3 and 4), then the buyer’s incentive constraint
is binding in the sense that understating comes at a very small personal cost (the
payoff drops from 3.99 to of 3.97).
4.3.3 An observation on models of social preferences
We now show that the social choice function in Proposition 1 is not robust in the
following sense: It provokes deviations from truth-telling if individuals are motivated
by social preferences. To formalize a possibility of social preferences, we assume that
169
any one individual i ∈ {b, s} has a utility function Ui(θi, ri, rbi , rbbi ) which depends in
a parametric way on the individual’s true type θi and, in addition, on the following
three arguments: the individual’s own report ri, the individual’s (first order) belief
about the other player’s report, rbi , and the individuals’ (second order) belief about
the other player’s first-order belief, rbbi . Different models of social preferences make
different assumptions about these utility functions.
Intention-based social preferences. Second-order beliefs play a role in mod-
els with intention-based social preferences such as Rabin (1993), Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger (2004) or Falk and Fischbacher (2006). In these models, the utility
function takes the following form
Ui(θi, ri, r
b
i , r
bb
i ) = pii(θi, f(ri, r
b
i )) + yi κi(ri, r
b
i , r
bb
i )κj(r
b
i , r
bb
i ) . (4.6)
The interpretation is that the players’ interaction gives rise to sensations of kindness
or unkindness, as captured by yi κi(ri, r
b
i , r
bb
i )κj(r
b
i , r
bb
i ). In this expression, yi ≥ 0
is an exogenous parameter, interpreted as the weight that agent i places on kind-
ness considerations. The term κi(ri, r
b
i , r
bb
i ) is a measure of how kindly i intends
to treat the other agent j. While the models of Rabin (1993), Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger (2004) and Falk and Fischbacher (2006) differ in some respects, they
all make the following assumption: Given rbi and r
bb
i , for any two reports r
′
i and r
′′
i ,
pij(θj, f(r
′
i, r
b
i )) ≥ pij(θj, f(r′′i , rbi )) implies that κi(r′i, rbi , rbbi ) ≥ κi(r′′i , rbi , rbbi ), i.e. the
kindness intended by i is larger if her report yields a larger payoff for j. Second-order
beliefs are relevant here if player i expresses kindness by increasing j’s payoff relative
to the payoff that, according to the beliefs of i, j expects to be realizing. The latter
payoff depends on the beliefs of i about the beliefs of j about i’s behavior.
Whether or not i’s utility is increasing in κi depends on i’s belief about the
kindness that is intended by player j and which is denoted by κj. If κj > 0,
then i believes that j is kind and her utility increases, ceteris paribus, if j’s payoff
goes up. By contrast, if κj < 0, then i believes that j is unkind and her utility
goes up if j is made worse off. Rabin (1993), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004)
and Falk and Fischbacher (2006) all assume that the function κj is such that, for
given second-order beliefs rbbi , κj(r
b
i
′
, rbbi ) ≥ κi(rbi ′′, rbbi ) whenever pii(θi, f(rbi ′, rbbi )) ≥
pii(θi, f(r
b
i
′′
, rbbi )). Second-order beliefs play a role here because, in order to assess
the kindness that is intended by j, i has to form a belief about j’s belief about i’s
report.
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Outcome-based social preferences. In models with outcome-based social pref-
erences such as Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), or Charness
and Rabin (2002) second order beliefs play no role and individuals are assumed to
care about their own payoff and the distribution of payoffs among the players. For
instance, with Fehr-Schmidt-preferences, the utility function of individual i reads as
Ui = pii(θi, f(ri, r
b
i )) −αi max{pij(θj, f(ri, rbi ))− pii(θi, f(ri, rbi )), 0}
−βi max{pii(θi, f(ri, rbi ))− pij(θj, f(ri, rbi )), 0} ,
(4.7)
where it is assumed that αi ≥ βi and that 0 ≤ βi < 1.
Implications for the social choice function in Proposition 1. Many mod-
els of social preferences give rise to the prediction that a social choice function that
would be optimal if individual were selfish will trigger deviations from truth-telling.
Specifically, for our bilateral trade problem, high valuation buyers will understate
their valuation. Models of outcome-based and intention-based social preferences
provide different explanations for this: With outcome-based social preferences, the
buyer may wish to harm the seller so as to make their expected payoffs more equal.
The reasoning for intention-based models, such as Rabin (1993), would have a differ-
ent logic. For the game in Table 4, the buyer would argue as follows: My expected
payoff would be higher if the seller deviated from truth-telling and communicated
a low cost. Since the seller does not make use of this opportunity to increase my
payoff, he is unkind. I therefore wish to reciprocally reduce his expected payoff.
Whatever the source of the desire to reduce the seller’s payoff, a high valuation
buyer can reduce the seller’s payoff by understating his valuation. Since the relevant
incentive constraint binds, such an understatement is costless for the buyer, i.e. he
does not have to sacrifice own payoff if he wishes to reduce the seller’s payoff.
The following observation states this more formally for the case of Fehr-Schmidt-
preferences. In Appendix 4.C we present analogous results for other models of social
preferences.
Observation 1. Consider a complete information types space for state (θb, θs) and
suppose that θb = θ¯b. Suppose that f is such that
pis(θs, f(θb, θs)) > pis(θs, f(θb, θs)) > pib(θb, f(θb, θs)) = pib(θb, f(θb, θs)) (4.8)
Suppose that the seller behaves truthfully. Also suppose that the buyer has Fehr-
Schmidt-preferences as in (4.7) with αb 6= 0. Then the buyer’s best response is to
understate his valuation.
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The social choice function in Example 1 fulfills Condition (4.8). Consider Tables
3 and 4. The buyer’s incentive constraint binds. Moreover, if the buyer understates
his valuation, this harms the seller. The harm is, however, limited in the sense that
the seller’s reduced payoff still exceeds the buyer’s payoff. For such a situation the
Fehr-Schmidt-model of social preferences predicts that the buyer will deviate from
truth-telling, for any pair of parameters (αb, βb) so that αb 6= 0. Put differently,
truth-telling is a best response for the buyer only if αb = 0, i.e. only if the buyer is
selfish.
4.3.4 Social-preference-robust mechanisms
The models of social preferences mentioned so far differ in many respects. They are,
however, all consistent with the following assumption of selfishness in the absence
of externalities.
Assumption 1. Given rbi and r
bb
i , if r
′
i and r
′′
i are such that
pij(θj, f(r
′
i, r
b
i )) = pij(θj, f(r
′′
i , r
b
i )) and pii(θi, f(r
′
i, r
b
i )) > pii(θi, f(r
′′
i , r
b
i )), then
Ui(θi, r
′
i, r
b
i , r
bb
i ) ≥ Ui(θi, r′′i , rbi , rbbi ).
Assumption 1 holds provided that individuals prefer to choose strategies that
increase their own payoff, whenever they can do so without affecting others. This
does not preclude a willingness to sacrifice own payoff so as to either increase or
reduce the payoff of others. It is a ceteris paribus assumption: In the set of strategies
that have the same implications for player j, player i weakly prefers the ones that
yield a higher payoff for herself. Assumption 1 has the following implication: In
situations where players do not have the possibility to affect the payoffs of others,
social preferences will be behaviorally irrelevant, and the players act as if they were
selfish payoff maximizers.
The following observation illustrates that the utility function underlying the Fehr
and Schmidt (1999)-model of social preferences satisfies Assumption 1 for all possible
parametrization of the model. Appendix 4.C confirms this observation for other
models of social preferences.9
Observation 2. Suppose the buyer and the seller have preferences as in (4.7) with
parameters (αb, βb) and (αs, βs), respectively. The utility functions Ub and Us satisfy
9Assumption 1 is also satisfied in models of pure altruism, see Becker (1974). All parameterized
versions that Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) propose for their model are consistent with Assumption
1, too, although we note that it is theoretically possible to construct preferences that are consistent
with their general assumptions and may still violate Assumption 1. Such preferences would be the
only possible exception that we encountered among prominent social preference models.
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Assumption 1, for all (αb, βb) so that αb ≥ βb and 0 ≤ βb < 1 and for all (αs, βs) so
that αs ≥ βs and 0 ≤ βs < 1.
We now define a mechanism that is robust in the following sense: For any in-
dividual i, given correct first- and second-order beliefs, a truthful report maximizes
Ui, for all utility functions satisfying Assumption 1.
Definition 1. A direct mechanism for social choice function f is said to be social-
preference-robust if it satisfies the following property: On any complete information
environment, given correct first- and second-order beliefs, truth-telling by any player
i ∈ {b, s} is a best response to truth-telling by player j 6= i, for all utility functions
Ui satisfying Assumption 1.
Social-preference-robustness of a mechanism is an attractive property. It is robust
against widely varying beliefs both of the mechanism designer and the participants
about what is the appropriate specification and intensity of social preferences across
individuals. As long as preferences satisfy Assumption 1, we can be assured that
individuals behave truthfully under such a mechanism.
The following Proposition justifies our interest in externality-free mechanisms. If
we add externality-freeness to the requirement of incentive compatibility, we arrive
at a social-preference-robust mechanism.
Proposition 2. Suppose that f is ex post incentive-compatible and externality-free.
Then f is social-preference-robust.
Proof. Consider a complete information environment for types (θi, θj). Sup-
pose that player i believes that player j acts truthfully so that rbi = θj and that
he believes that player j believes that he acts truthfully so that rbbi = θi. By
ex post incentive compatibility, pii(θi, f(ri, r
b
i )) is maximized by choosing ri = θi.
By externality-freeness, pij(θj, f(r
′
i, r
b
i )) = pij(θj, f(r
′′
i , r
b
i )) for any pair r
′
i, r
′′
i ∈ Θi.
Hence, by Assumption 1, ri = θi solves maxri∈Θi Ui(θi, ri, r
b
i , r
bb
i ). 2
Proposition 2 asserts that incentive-compatibility and externality-freeness are suf-
ficient conditions for social-preference-robustness. This raises the question of nec-
essary conditions. Above we said that a condition is sufficient if it ensures im-
plementability for all social preference models so that individuals are selfish in
the absence of externalities. Hence, it is natural to say that a condition is nec-
essary for social-preference-robustness if there exists one relevant social preference
model so that incentive-compatibility and externality-freeness are necessary for im-
plementability. Bierbrauer and Netzer (2016) show that, under an ancillary con-
dition, incentive-compatibility and externality-freeness are indeed necessary for the
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implementability of a social choice function for a version of the intention-based model
of Rabin (1993) that allows for private information both on material payoffs and on
the reciprocity weights in the players’ overall utility function. However, Bierbrauer
and Netzer (2016) employ Bayesian incentive compatibility constraints, as opposed
to ex post incentive compatibility constraints. As we show in Appendix 4.D, this
difference is of no consequence for the validity of the conclusion that externality-
freeness is a necessary condition.
It may appear counterintuitive that incentive compatibility remains a necessary
condition even though individuals may be motivated by social preferences. Shouldn‘t
it be possible to use these social preferences in such a way that efficient outcomes
can be reached that are out of reach if all individuals are selfish. Our answer to this
question is “No” because we ask for social-preference-robustness and hence always
include the possibility that agents are selfish. As a consequence, we cannot relax
any of the constraints from conventional mechanism design. Quite to the contrary,
we add a constraint, externality-freeness to ensure social-preference-robustness. The
set of implementable outcomes therefore tends to become smaller if compared to a
benchmark where all individuals are assumed to be selfish.
4.3.5 Optimal robust and externality-free mechanism de-
sign
We now add the requirement of externality-freeness to the bilateral trade problem.
To characterize the solution of this problem it is instructive to begin, again, with
a relaxed problem in which only a subset of all constraints is taken into account.
Specifically, the relevant constraints are: the resource constraint in (4.4), the par-
ticipation constraints for a low valuation buyer,
pib(θb, f(θb, θs)) ≥ 0, for all θs ∈ Θs ,
the incentive constraint for a high type buyer who faces a low cost seller,
pib(θ¯b, f(θ¯b, θs)) ≥ pib(θ¯b, f(θb, θs)) ,
and, finally, the externality-freeness condition for a high valuation buyer
pib(θ¯b, f(θ¯b, θs)) = pib(θ¯b, f(θ¯b, θ¯s)) .
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Proposition 3. A social choice function f ′ solves the relaxed problem of robust and
externality-free mechanism design if and only if it has the following properties:
(a)’ For any one θs ∈ Θs, the participation constraint of a low type buyer is binding:
pib(θb, f
′(θb, θs)) = 0 .
(b)’ For θs = θs, the incentive constraint of a high type buyer is binding.
(c)’ The trading rule is such that there is a downward distortion only for state
(θb, θs);
qf
′
(θb, θs) ∈ argmaxq
(
θb −
gm(θb)
g(θb, θs)
(θb − θb)
)
q − θsk(q) ,
where gm(θb) := g(θb, θs) + g(θb, θs). Otherwise, there is no distortion.
(d)’ The payment rule for the buyer is such that, for any one θs,
pf
′
b (θb, θs) = θbq
f ′(θb, θs) .
In addition
pf
′
b (θb, θs) = θbq
f ′(θb, θs)− (θb − θb)qf
′
(θb, θs) ,
and
pf
′
b (θb, θs) = θbq
f ′(θb, θs)− (θb − θb)qf
′
(θb, θs) ,
(e)’ The revenue for the seller is such that∑
Θb×Θs
g(θb, θs)p
f ′
b (θb, θs) =
∑
Θb×Θs
g(θb, θs)p
f ′
s (θb, θs) .
A formal proof of the Proposition is relegated to Appendix 4.B . It proceeds
as follows: The first step is to show that all inequality constraints of the relaxed
problem have to be binding. Otherwise, it would be possible to implement the
given trading rule qf
′
with higher payments of the buyer. This establishes (a)′ and
(b)′. Second, we solve explicitly for the payments of the buyer as a function of
the trading rule qf
′
— this yields (d)′ — and substitute the resulting expressions
into the objective function. This resulting unconstrained optimization problem has
first order conditions which characterize the optimal trading rule, see the optimality
conditions in (c)′.
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After having obtained the solution to the relaxed problem, we need to make sure
that it is also a solution to the full problem. For the buyer, it can be shown that the
neglected participation, incentive and externality-freeness constraints are satisfied
provided that the solution to the relaxed problem is such that the traded quantity
increases in the buyer’s valuation and decreases in the seller’s cost. If there is a
solution to the relaxed problem that satisfies the seller’s incentive, participation and
externality-freeness constraints, then this solution to the relaxed problem is also a
solution to the full problem. The social choice function f ′ in Example 2 below has
all these properties.
The substantive difference between the optimal robust mechanism in Proposition
1 and the optimal robust and externality-free mechanism in Proposition 3 is in the
pattern of distortions. The optimal robust mechanism has downward distortions
whenever the buyer has a low valuation. The optimal robust and externality-free
mechanism has a downward distortion in only one state, namely the state in which
the buyer’s valuation is low and the seller’s cost is low. This distortion, however,
is more severe than the distortion that arises for this state with the optimal robust
mechanism.
Example 2: An optimal robust and externality-free social choice func-
tion. Suppose the parameters of the model are as in Example 1. The social choice
function f ′, specified in Proposition 3, solves the problem of optimal robust and
externality-free mechanism design formally defined in the previous paragraph: The
traded quantities are given by
qf
′
(θb, θs) = 2.00, q
f ′(θb, θ¯s) = 1.54, q
f ′(θ¯b, θs) = 6.50 and q
f ′(θ¯b, θ¯s) = 2.00 .
The buyer’s payments are
pf
′
b (θb, θs) = 2.00, p
f ′
b (θb, θ¯s) = 1.54, p
f ′
b (θ¯b, θs) = 7.85 and p
f ′
b (θ¯b, θ¯s) = 2.00 .
Finally, the seller’s revenues are
pf
′
s (θb, θs) = 2.52, p
f ′
s (θb, θ¯s) = 1.99, p
f ′
s (θ¯b, θs) = 6.35 and p
f ′
s (θ¯b, θ¯s) = 2.52 .
To illustrate the property of externality-freeness, we consider, once more, the various
complete information games which are associated with this social choice function.
Table 1’: The game induced by f ′ for (θb, θs) = (θb, θs).
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(p˜ib, p˜is) θs θs
θb (2.68, 5.33) (2.68, 4.86)
θb (0.97, 5.33) (2.66, 5.31)
Along the same lines as for Table 1, one may verify that the relevant ex post incentive
and participation constraints are satisfied. In addition, externality-freeness holds: If the
seller communicates her low cost truthfully, then she gets a payoff of 5.33 irrespectively of
whether the buyer communicates a high or a low valuation. Also, if the buyer reveals his
low valuation, he gets 2.68 irrespectively of whether the seller communicates a high or a low
cost.
Again, we also describe the normal form games that are induced by f ′ in the re-
maining complete information environments.
Table 2’: The game induced by f ′ for (θb, θs) = (θb, θs).
(p˜ib, p˜is) θs θs
θb (2.68, 4.19) (2.68, 4.21)
θb (0.97,−6.57) (2.66, 4.21)
Table 3’: The game induced by f ′ for (θb, θs) = (θb, θs).
(p˜ib, p˜is) θs θs
θb (3.41, 5.33) (3.24, 4.86)
θb (3.43, 5.33) (3.43, 5.31)
Table 4’: The game induced by f ′ for (θb, θs) = (θb, θs).
(p˜ib, p˜is) θs θs
θb (3.41, 4.19) (3.24, 4.21)
θb (3.43,−6.57) (3.43, 4.21)
On top of externality-freeness, the social choice function f ′ in Tables 1’ to 4’ has
the following properties: (i) The seller’s payoff under truth-telling is higher than
the buyer’s payoff under truth-telling, (ii) a low type buyer realizes his reservation
utility (see Tables 1’ and 2’), and (iii) the buyer’s incentive constraint binds if the
seller’s cost is low, but not if the seller’s cost is high (see Tables 3’ and 4’).
A comparison of the social choice functions f and f ′ shows that the imposition
of externality-freeness has a moderating effect on inequality. The difference between
the equilibrium payoffs of the seller and the buyer is reduced as we move from the
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game in Table 1 to the game in Table 1’, from the game in Table 3 to the game
in Table 3’ and from the game in Table 4 to the game in Table 4’. The pattern is
reversed for Tables 2 and 2’. On average, there is less inequality with the externality-
free social choice function. Ceteris paribus, an inequality-averse mechanism designer
would therefore prefer an externality-free social choice function. In Section 4.5 below,
we clarify the conditions under which even a mechanism designer with no inequality
aversion whatsoever would opt for externality-freeness.
Everything else being equal, a mechanism designer with an objective that reflects
the participants’ intention-based social preferences would also prefer the externality-
free social choice function. The prominent intention-based models (see Appendix 4.C
for details) give rise to an equilibrium kindness of zero if the social choice function
is externality-free. By contrast, equilibrium kindness is negative under an incentive-
compatible social choice function that is not externality-free. Section 4.5 shows that
externality-freeness may be desirable even if kindness sensations receive no weight
in the designer’s objective function.
4.4 A laboratory experiment
We conducted a laboratory experiment with five treatments. The first treatment is
based on the optimal mechanism f under selfish preferences in Example 1 (T1), and
the second treatment is based on the optimal externality-free mechanism f ′ under
social preferences in Example 2 (T2). The three additional treatment variations
(T3-5) will be described in subsequent sections. All treatments were conducted
employing exactly the same laboratory procedures which are described below.
We designed the experiments so that the connection to the theory, in particu-
lar to Propositions 1 and 3, is immediate. As a consequence, the experiments may
appear as “unnatural” or “artificial” as the tools of mechanism design theory such
as direct mechanisms or complete information type spaces. We also kept the fram-
ing as neutral as possible. Participants were confronted with generic normal form
games that had no explicit reference to trade, externalities or redistributive taxa-
tion. Finally, we implemented generic examples of social choice functions. This led
to payoffs that are aesthetically not as appealing as natural numbers, but gives us
confidence that we did not lure participants into social comparisons.
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Laboratory Procedures. The experiments were conducted in the Cologne Lab-
oratory for Economic Research at the University of Cologne. They had been pro-
grammed with z-Tree developed by Fischbacher (2007), and participants were re-
cruited with the online recruitment system ORSEE developed by Greiner (2015).
In total, we recruited 632 subjects who participated in twenty sessions, four for each
of the five treatments. Each subject was allowed to participate in one session and in
one treatment only (between-subject design). We collected at least 63 independent
observations for each treatment and player role. Subjects were students from all
faculties of the University of Cologne, mostly female (380 subjects), with an average
age of 24 years. A session lasted 45-60 minutes. Average payments to subjects,
including the show-up fee, was 10.76 Euro.
Upon arrival, subjects were randomly assigned to computer-terminals and re-
ceived identical written instructions, which informed them about all general rules
and procedures of the experiment. All treatment- and role-specific information was
given on the computer-screen (see Appendix 4.F for instructions and screenshot).
We used neutral terms to describe the game; e.g., player-roles were labeled Partici-
pant A (B) and strategies were labeled Top (Left) and Bottom (Right) respectively.
In the following we refer to the specific roles within the experiment as buyers and
sellers, to make this section consistent with previous ones.
Subjects then went through a learning stage, with no interaction among subjects
and no decision-dependent payments. In the learning stage, subjects had to choose
actions for each player role in each complete information game and then to state the
resulting payoffs for the corresponding self-selected strategy combination. Subjects
had to give the right answer before proceeding to the decision stage. This way
we assured that all subjects were able to correctly read the payoff tables, without
suggesting specific actions which might create anchoring or experimenter demand
effects.
Then subjects entered the decision stage and were informed about their role in
their matching group. The matching into groups and roles was anonymous, random
and held constant over the course of the experiment. Within the decision stage,
subjects had to choose one action for each of the four complete information games
of their specific treatment. The order of the four games was identical to the order in
Table 5. Only after all subjects submitted their choices, feedback was given to each
subject on all choices and resulting outcomes in their group. Finally, one of the four
games was randomly determined for being paid in addition to a 2.50 Euro show-up
fee.
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Results. Table 5 summarizes the decisions made in the experiment. Sellers report
their true valuation in almost all cases. Buyers with a low type also make truthful
reports in both treatments. This is different for high type buyers in T1, though.
Here, 13% (17%) of the buyers understate their true valuation when facing a seller
with a low (high) valuation.
Table 5: Choice Data T1 and T2
Buyer Seller
Game induced by θb θb θs θs
T1
f for (θb, θs) 63 0 63 0
optimal mechanism under
f for (θb, θs) 63 0 0 63
selfish preferences
f for (θb, θs) 8 55 63 0
f for (θb, θs) 10 53 1 62
T2
f ′ for (θb, θs) 64 0 62 2
externality-free
f ′ for (θb, θs) 64 0 0 64
mechanism
f ′ for (θb, θs) 1 63 64 0
f ′ for (θb, θs) 2 62 0 64
The table describes the behavior that we observed in the experiments. The first half of the table
gives the observations for treatment 1 that was based on the social choice function f , characterized
in Example 1, that would be optimal if all agents were selfish. The first line gives the outcome of
the game that is induced by f on a complete information type space with a low valuation buyer
and a low cost seller. All 63 buyers truthfully revealed their valuation, and all 63 sellers truthfully
revealed their cost. The second line gives the outcome of the game induced by f on a complete
information type space with a low valuation buyer and a high cost seller. Again, all buyers and
sellers revealed their types. The third line documents the outcome for a high valuation buyer and a
low cost seller. Of the 63 buyers, 8 understated and 55 revealed their valuation. All sellers revealed
their cost truthfully. Line 4 documents the outcome for a high valuation buyer and a high cost
seller: 10 buyers understated their valuation and one seller understated her cost. The lower half of
the table gives analogous observations for treatment 2 that was based on the externality-free social
choice function f ′ characterized in Example 2. There are some deviations from truth-telling, but
they are less frequent.
This pattern of buyer and seller behavior is in line with models of social pref-
erences. In particular, for T1, which is based on an optimal mechanism for selfish
agents, these models imply that high type buyers cannot be expected to always make
truthful reports. By contrast, for T2, which is based on an optimal externality-free
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mechanism, these models unambiguously predict truthful behavior. We observe sig-
nificantly higher shares of truthful high type buyer reports in T2 in comparison to
T1 (two-sided Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.017 for the games with a low type seller and
p = 0.014 for the games with a high type seller).
4.5 Which mechanism is more profitable?
We now turn to the question which of the two mechanisms the designer would
prefer. We focus on expected profits as the measure of profitability which implies
that no explicit weight is given to the individuals’ social preferences. As we argued
earlier, this makes the case for externality-freeness most difficult. We first clarify
the conditions under which the optimal mechanism for selfish agents outperforms
the optimal externality-free mechanism. We then check whether these conditions
are satisfied in our experiment data.
Based on our experiment results, we introduce a distinction between different be-
havioral types of buyers. There is the“truthful type”and the“understatement type”.
The former communicates his valuation truthfully in all the complete information
games induced by the optimal robust mechanism f . The latter communicates a low
valuation in all such games. We assume throughout that the seller always behaves
truthfully, which is also what we observed in the experiment. We denote the proba-
bility that a buyer is of the “truthful type” by σ. We denote by Πf (σ) the expected
profits that are realized under f . We denote by Πf
′
the expected profits that are
realized under the optimal externality-free social choice function f ′, under the as-
sumption that the buyer and the seller behave truthfully in all complete information
games.
Proposition 4. Suppose that Πf (0) < Πf
′
. Then there is a critical value σˆ so that
Πf (σ) ≥ Πf ′ if and only if σ ≥ σˆ.
Proof. We first note that
Πf (σ) =
∑
Θb×Θs
g(θb, θs)
{
σ(pfb (θb, θs)− θsk(qf (θb, θs)))
+(1− σ)(pfb (θb, θs)− θsk(qf (θb, θs)))
}
= σΠf (1) + (1− σ)Πf (0) .
We also note that Πf (1) > Πf
′
since Πf (1) gives expected profits if there are only
truthful buyer types, which is the situation in which f is the optimal mechanism.
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The term σΠf (1) + (1− σ)Πf (0) is a continuous function of σ. It exceeds Πf ′ for σ
close to one. If Πf (0) < Πf
′
, it falls short of Πf
′
for σ close to zero. Hence, there
is σˆ ∈ (0, 1) so that Πf (σ) = σΠf (1) + (1 − σ)Πf (0) exceeds Πf ′ if and only if σ
exceeds σˆ. 2
Our experiment data revisited. For the Examples 1 and 2 on which our ex-
periments were based, the premise of Proposition 4 that Πf (0) < Πf
′
is fulfilled.
Specifically,
Πf (0) = 4.54 , Πf (1) = 4.91 , Πf (σ) = 4.91− 0.37σ , Πf ′ = 4.77 and σˆ = 0.62
Thus, the fraction of deviating buyers must rise above 38% if the optimal externality-
free mechanism is to outperform the optimal robust mechanism. In our experiment
data, however, the fraction of deviating buyer types was only 14%. As a consequence,
actual average seller profits are smaller under the externality-free mechanism (4.77)
than under the optimal robust mechanism (4.82). This difference was not found to
be statistically significant, though (two-sided t-test based on independent average
profits, p = 0.143).
One might have expected more deviations from truth-telling. For instance, the
social preference model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) is consistent with truthful buy-
ers only for one special case, namely the case in which buyers are completely selfish
so that αb = 0, and Fehr and Schmidt estimate that often roughly 50% of sub-
jects behave in a fair way. This would have been more than enough to make the
externality-free mechanism more profitable. However, the degree of selfishness may
vary with the framing of the context, size of payments, etc., and moreover not all
social preference models predict deviations. For instance, according to the model
of Charness and Rabin (2002), individuals have a concern for welfare, so that an
efficiency-damaging action such as communicating a low valuation instead of high
valuation seems less attractive. This uncontrolled uncertainty about the mix of pref-
erences among negotiators in a specific context justifies our approach to not further
specify (beliefs about) social preferences.
A superior mechanism. Our experiment has shown that the optimal social
choice function for selfish agents provokes deviations from truth-telling. A certain
fraction of high valuation buyers deviates, whereas all other agents behave truth-
fully. As we now argue, this observation can be used to construct a mechanism that
outperforms both the conventional mechanism in Example 1 and the externality-free
mechanism in Example 2. In deriving this mechanism we do not follow the axiomatic
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approach that is germane to the theory of mechanism design. Instead, we engage in
behavioral “engineering” (see Roth (2002) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2012)) and use
the insights from our laboratory experiments for a revision of the design problem.
As deviations from truth-telling were tempting only for buyers we consider a
mechanism design problem in which the requirement of externality-freeness is im-
posed only locally, namely such that the buyer is unable to influence the seller’s
payoff. Formally, we require that, for all θs ∈ Θs,
pis(θs, f(θb, θs)) = pis(θs, f(θ¯b, θs)) . (4.9)
Remember that the optimal social choice function that we characterize in Proposi-
tion 1 leaves degrees of freedom for the specification of the payments to the seller.
In particular, the payments can be chosen so that the local externality-freeness con-
dition (4.9) is satisfied. Hence, local externality-freeness can be ensured without
having to sacrifice performance. This is stated formally in the following Proposition
that we prove in part B of the Appendix.
Proposition 5. There is a solution to the relaxed problem of robust mechanism
design, characterized in Proposition 1, that satisfies (4.9).
Proposition 5 shows that if everybody is selfish then an optimal mechanism that
satisfies ex post budget balance (as in Example 1 above) and an optimal mech-
anism that satisfies local externality-freeness (as in Example 3 in Appendix 4.E)
are equivalent in terms of the expected profits that they generate. However, if the
locally externality-free mechanism eliminates deviations that occur under ex post
budget balance, it will perform strictly better. This hypothesis was confirmed in
a laboratory treatment (T3), see the Supplementary Material in Appendix 4.E for
details.
4.6 Redistributive income taxation
We now turn to another application of mechanism design, namely redistributive
income taxation. Our motivation for looking at this is twofold: First, for this ap-
plication, what can be achieved with an externality-free mechanism has a natural
interpretation: Such allocations can be decentralized by means of a non-linear in-
come tax schedule. This raises the question how these“natural”mechanisms perform
relative to ones that are not externality-free and predicted to generate more welfare
if all individuals are selfish. Second, this case serves as an important robustness
check for our results: A general theory of social-preference-robust mechanism design
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is appealing only if the fraction of individuals who act according to social preferences
does not depend on the specific application.
As in our analysis of the bilateral trade problem, we consider an economy with
two individuals, I = {1, 2}. Individual i derives utility from private goods consump-
tion, or after-tax-income, ci, and dislikes productive effort. Individual i’s productive
effort is measured by yi
ωi
, where yi denotes the individual’s contribution to the econ-
omy’s output, or pre-tax-income, and ωi is a measure of the individual’s productive
abilities. Thus, an individual with high productive abilities can generate a given
level of output with less effort than an individual with low productive abilities. We
assume that individual preferences can be represented by an additively separable
utility function u(ci)− v
(
yi
ωi
)
, where u is an increasing and concave function, and v
is an increasing and convex function. Both functions are assumed to satisfy the usual
Inada conditions. Note that the individuals’ preferences satisfy the single-crossing
property: For any point in a (y, c)-diagram the indifference curve of an individual
with low abilities through this point is steeper than the indifference curve of an
individual with high abilities.
We assume that ωi is the realization of a random variable that is privately ob-
served by individual i. This random variable either takes a high value, ωh, or a
low value, ωl. A state of the economy is a pair ω = (ω1, ω2) which specifies the
productive ability of individual 1 and the productive ability of individual 2. The set
of states is equal to {ωl, ωh}2. A social choice function or direct mechanism consists
of functions ci : {ωl, ωh}2 → R+ and yi : {ωl, ωh}2 → R+ which specify, for each
state of the economy, and for each individual, a consumption and an output level.
An important benchmark is the first-best utilitarian welfare optimum. This is
the social choice function which is obtained by choosing, separately for each state
ω, c1(ω), c2(ω), y1(ω) and y2(ω) so as to maximize the sum of utilities,
u(c1(ω))− v
(
y1(ω)
ω1
)
+ u(c2(ω))− v
(
y2(ω)
ω2
)
,
subject to the economy’s resource constraint,
c1(ω) + c2(ω) ≤ y1(ω) + y2(ω) .
For a state where one individual is high-skilled and one is low-skilled this has the
following implication: Both individuals get the same consumption level because
marginal consumption utilities ought to be equalized. However, the high-skilled in-
dividual has to deliver more output than the low-skilled individual because marginal
costs of effort ought to be equalized as well.
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It will prove useful to have specific notation which refers to the first-best util-
itarian welfare maximum for an economy with one highly productive and one less
productive individual. The former is assigned an income requirement of y∗h and a
consumption level of c∗h. The latter gets a lower income requirement, denoted by y
∗
l ,
but receives the same consumption level c∗l = c
∗
h.
This social choice function raises questions of incentive compatibility. Clearly,
the high-skilled individual would prefer the outcome intended for the low-skilled
individual since the latter has the same consumption level but a smaller workload.
As we will describe in the following, whether or not the first-best utilitarian welfare
optimum can be reached in the presence of private information on productive abilities
depends on the economy’s information structure and on whether or not we impose
a condition of externality-freeness.
Information structure. We assume that it is commonly known that, with prob-
ability 1, one individual is high-skilled and one individual is low-skilled. This setup
is due to Piketty (1993). We investigate the Mirrleesian approach under the same
information structure. That is to say, only the states (ωl, ωh) and (ωh, ωl) have pos-
itive probability, whereas the states (ωl, ωl) and (ωh, ωh) have probability zero. This
implies that any one individual knows the other individual’s type: If individual 1
observes that the own productive ability is high, then she can infer that the produc-
tive ability of individual 2 is low and vice versa. Put differently, each possible state
of the economy gives rise to a complete information type space, with the mechanism
designer as the only uninformed party.
The Mirrleesian approach. A Mirrleesian analysis imposes externality-freeness
and anonymity. Externality-freeness requires that the outcome for any one individ-
ual depends only on that individual’s productive ability and not on the productive
ability of the other person. Anonymity requires that these outcomes are identi-
cal across individuals, so that e.g., the outcome specified for person 1 in case that
ω1 = ωl, equals the outcome specified for person 2 in case that ω2 = ωl. Con-
sequently, a social choice function can be represented by two bundles (yl, cl) and
(yh, ch) so that, for all i,
(yi(ω), ci(ω)) =
(yl, cl) whenever ωi = ωl ,(yh, ch) whenever ωi = ωh .
Incentive compatibility then requires that an individual with low productive abil-
ity prefers (yl, cl) over (yh, ch), and that an individual with high productive ability
185
prefers (yh, ch) over (yl, cl). According to the Taxation Principle, see Hammond
(1979) and Guesnerie (1995), these incentive constraints are equivalent to the pos-
sibility to reach a social choice function by specifying a tax schedule T : y 7→ T (y)
so that any one individual i chooses ci and yi so as to maximize utility subject to
the constraint that ci ≤ yi − T (yi). Formally,
u(cl)− v
(
yl
wl
)
≥ u(ch)− v
(
yh
wl
)
and u(ch)− v
(
yh
wh
)
≥ u(cl)− v
(
yl
wh
)
.
(4.10)
Obviously, these Mirrleesian incentive constraints are violated by the first-best utili-
tarian welfare maximum. An optimal Mirrleesian allocation is obtained by choosing
(cl, yl) and (ch, yh) so as to maximize the sum of utilities
u(cl)− v
(
yl
ωl
)
+ u(ch)− v
(
yh
wh
)
,
subject to the incentive constraints in (4.10) and the resource constraint
cl + ch ≤ yl + yh.
Piketty’s approach. Piketty (1993) constructs a mechanism which achieves the
first-best utilitarian outcome in dominant strategies. This mechanism is anonymous,
but not externality-free. The construction is illustrated in Figure 1. In this Figure,
point A is the outcome for any one individual if it reports ωl and the other individual
reports ωh. Point B is the outcome for an individual that reports ωh if the other
individual reports ωl. Point C is the outcome for an individual that reports ωh if the
other individual also reports ωh. Analogously, D is the outcome for an individual
that reports ωl if the other individual also reports ωl. It can easily be verified
that truth-telling is a dominant strategy for selfish individuals if (i) point C lies
above point A and between the two individuals’ indifference curves through A, and
(ii) point D lies below point B and between the two individuals’ indifference curves
through B. Also note that this is incompatible with externality-freeness which would
require that A = D and B = C.
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Figure 1. The Figure illustrates how the first-best utilitarian welfare maximum can be
achieved with a mechanism that is not externality-free. I∗l is the less able individual’s
indifference curve through A = (y∗l , c
∗
l ). Analogously, I
∗
h is the more able individual’s
indifference curve trough B = (y∗h, c
∗
h). The less able individual’s indifference curve through
B is denoted by Iˆl, and the more able individual’s indifference curve through A is denoted
by Iˆh.
Social preferences. Models of social preferences can rationalize deviations from
this dominant strategy equilibrium. Consider first a model with intentions, such as
Rabin (1993). The high-skilled individual might reason in the following way: The
other individual could have reported a high ability type, in which case I would have
gotten point C. This would have been good for me. So, the other individual is unkind
since she did not make use of this possibility to increase my payoff. I am therefore
willing to give up own payoff, so as to reciprocally harm the other individual. So, I
should declare to be of the low ability type. In this case we both get D. This clearly
harms myself and the other person. However, the point D is not that much worse for
me, so the possibility to harm the other person is worth the sacrifice. Alternatively,
we may consider a model with inequity aversion such as the Fehr-Schmidt-model. In
this case, the same deviation could be rationalized by the observation that if both
get D, their outcomes are equal, whereas they are very unequal in the dominant
strategy equilibrium. Again, if point D is sufficiently close to B achieving this gain
in equity is not too costly for an individual with high ability. With the Mirrleesian
approach, by contrast, models of social preferences would predict truthful behavior.
Since the Mirrleesian mechanism is externality-free, Proposition 2 implies that it is
social-preference-robust.
An experiment. In the following we report on a laboratory experiment so as to
check whether Piketty’s approach does indeed provoke more deviations from truth-
telling, and, if, yes, what this implies for the levels of utilitarian welfare that are
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generated by the two mechanisms. The experiment was based on functional form
assumptions and parameter choices that are detailed in the following example.
Example 4. We impose the following functional form assumption on preferences:
Ui = u(ci)− v
(
yi
ωi
)
=
√
ci − 1
2
(
yi
wi
)2
.
In addition, we let ωl = 4 and ωh = 6. Under these assumptions, the optimal Mir-
rleesian allocation is given by (cMl , y
M
l ) = (4.19, 3.66) and (c
M
h , y
M
h ) = (6.52, 7.05).
The normal form game that is induced by the Mirrleesian mechanism on a complete
information type space so that individual 1 is of low ability and individual 2 is of
high ability is summarized in the following table. The entries in the matrix are the
players’ utility levels under the assumption of selfish preferences.
Table 6: The game induced by the Mirrleesian mechanism for (ω1, ω2) =
(ωl, ωh).
(U˜1, U˜2) ωl ωh
ωl (3.26, 3.70) (3.26, 3.72)
ωh (1.99, 3.70) (1.99, 3.72)
The payoffs in this matrix are based on an affine transformation of utilities, U˜j = α Uj + β
with α = 2 and β = 0. To see that incentive compatibility holds note that first that player 1
does not benefit from claiming to be of high ability if player 2 behaves truthfully. His payoff
would drop from 3.26 to 1.99. Analogously, if player 1 behaves truthfully, player 2 does not
benefit from understating her ability, her payoff would drop from 3.72 to 3.70. In addition,
externality-freeness holds: If player 1 communicates her low type truthfully, then she gets a
payoff of 3.26 irrespectively of whether player 2 communicates a high or a low type. Also, if
player 2 reveals his high type, he gets 3.72 irrespectively of whether player 1 communicates
a high or a low valuation.
Piketty’s mechanism is characterized by four points A, B, C and D, as illustrated
in Figure 2. Points A and B coincide with the first-best utilitarian welfare maximum,
so that
A = (c∗l , y
∗
l ) = (5.53, 3.40) and B = (c
∗
h, y
∗
h) = (5.53, 7.66) .
There is a degree of freedom for the location of the points C and D. To have a
completely specified example we need to determine these points in a specific way.
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We do this so as to capture the desire for welfare-maximizing redistribution which
is the basic premise of an analysis of optimal income tax systems. In particular,
suppose that there is a small probability, possibly zero, that both types have low
abilities. In this case truth-telling of both individuals yields point D. Also suppose
that there is an equally small probability that both types have high abilities, which
would yield point C. We now allow for the possibility to redistribute resources away
from the lucky state in which everybody is of high ability to the unlucky state in
which everybody is of low ability. Moreover, we maximize this level of redistribution
subject to the constraint of satisfying the principles of Piketty’s construction. More
formally, we choose point C = (yC , cC) so that we extract a maximal tax payment
subject to the constraint that C lies above point A and between the two relevant
indifference curves through A.10 We then choose point D = (yD, cD) so as to maxi-
mize u(cD)− v
(
yD
wl
)
subject to the constraint that cD − yD = yC − cC and subject
to the requirement that point D lies below point B and between the two relevant
indifference curves through B. This construction is illustrated in Figure 3. It yields
the following numerical values
C = (cC , yC) = (7.74, 6.47) and D = (cD, yD) = (3.32, 4.59) .
c
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∗
h
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∗
h
y
r
r
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Figure 2. The Figure illustrates a specific Piketty mechanism. Point C is chosen so as
to extract maximal tax revenues which yields the tangency condition that is shown in the
Figure. These tax revenues are then used to make point D as attractive as possible, so that
D is determined by the intersection of indifference curve I∗h and a line with slope 1 and
intercept yC − cC .
10Formally, it is obtained as a solution to the following problem: Maximize yC − cC , s.t.
u(cC)− v
(
yC
wh
)
≥ u(cA)− v
(
yA
wh
)
and u(cC)− v
(
yC
wl
)
≤ u(cA)− v
(
yA
wl
)
.
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The normal form game that is induced by this version of a Piketty mechanism
on a complete information type space, so that individual 1 is of low ability and
individual 2 is of high ability, is summarized in Table 7. Again, the entries in the
matrix are the players utility levels under the assumption of selfish preferences.
Table 7: The game induced by the Piketty mechanism in Figure 2 for (ω1, ω2) =
(ωl, ωh).
(U˜1, U˜2) ωl ωh
ωl (2.32, 3.06) (3.98, 3.08)
ωh (1.04, 4.38) (2.94, 4.40)
Again, the payoffs in this matrix are based on an affine transformation of utilities, U˜j =
α Uj + β with α = 2 and β = 0. Truth-telling is a dominant strategy equilibrium under
the assumption of selfish preferences. Externality-freeness is violated: If player 1 truthfully
communicates a low ability type, his payoff depends on what player 2 communicates. Like-
wise, if player 2 communicates her high ability type truthfully, then her payoff depends on
the type declared by player 1.
We conducted two laboratory treatments, one for the Mirrleesian approach and
one for Piketty’s approach.11 As expected, we find hardly any deviations from truth-
telling with the Mirrleesian approach: 124 of 126 low skilled individuals and 122 of
126 high skilled individuals truthfully report their ability. With Piketty’s approach
we also find almost no deviations from truth-telling for low skilled individuals, 121
of 126 reports are truthful. This changes with high skilled individuals in Piketty’s
approach where we observed 21 of 126 individuals to understate their skill level.
This is a significantly larger proportion of deviations than with the Mirrleesian
approach (two-sided Fisher’s exact test, p<0.001). As a result, the Mirrleesian
approach reaches an average welfare level that is with 6.93 significantly larger than
the average welfare level of 6.78 which results from Piketty’s approach (two-sided
t-test, p = 0.014).
Again, this welfare comparison does not take social preferences into account. An
inspection of Tables 6 and 7 shows once more that equilibrium payoffs are more
equal under the externality-free Mirrleesian outcome. Hence, if the social welfare
function incorporated social preferences with inequity aversion, the preference for
11In Piketty’s approach only states with a low and a high skilled individual have a positive
probability in theory. Despite this, we asked subjects to report actions for all four skill combinations
in order to use the same procedures as in our other treatments. The results reported in this section
are based on the two states with positive probability. The full experiment data can be found in
Appendix 4.E.
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the Mirrleesian outcome would be even more pronounced. As explained earlier, the
same would be true with intention-based social preferences in the welfare function
since equilibrium kindness is zero with an externality-free mechanism and negative
otherwise.
At first glance, our results seem to suggest that insisting on externality-freeness
is a good idea for a problem of income taxation, but a bad idea for the bilateral
trade problem. Yet, in fact, social behavior is robust across applications: The
fraction of individuals who deviated from selfish behavior was 14 % in our bilateral
trade application and with 17 % for the income tax application not significantly
different.12 These numbers are clearly below the corresponding threshold for the
profitability of the externality-free mechanism in bilateral trade (34 %), yet clearly
above the threshold in taxation (5 %). We conclude that behavior is robust against
our different mechanism design contexts, but the mechanisms systematically differ
in their robustness towards social behavior.
4.7 Concluding remarks
This paper shows how social preferences can be taken into account in robust mech-
anism design. We have first characterized optimal mechanisms for a bilateral trade
problem and a problem of redistributive income taxation under selfish preferences.
We have argued theoretically that such a mechanism will not generally produce the
desired behavior if individuals have social preferences, and we have illustrated in
a laboratory experiment that deviations from the intended behavior indeed occur.
We have then introduced an additional constraint on mechanism design, which we
termed externality-freeness. We have shown theoretically that such a mechanism
does generate the intended behavior if individuals are motivated by social prefer-
ences, without a need to specify (beliefs about) the nature and intensity of social
preferences. We have finally confirmed in a series of experiments, taking other as-
sumptions in mechanism design for granted (see below), that an externality-free
mechanism does indeed generate the intended behavior.
We also investigated under which conditions externality-freeness improves the
performance of a mechanism. Our specification of the bilateral trade problem was
such that, to justify externality-freeness, many deviations from selfish behavior were
required. By contrast, for our income tax application, a small number of devia-
tions was sufficient. We found that the fraction of deviating individuals was the
12The difference between these two fractions was not found to be statistically different from zero
(two-sided Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.728).
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same across applications, and moreover that this number was high enough to make
externality-freeness desirable for the income tax application, but not high enough
to make it desirable for the bilateral trade problem.
Externality-freeness is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for the ability
to predict behavior. Its advantage is that it successfully controls the underlying
motivations across a wide variety of social preferences discussed in the literature,
as well as the frequently observed large heterogeneity in parameter values across
individuals. It is not guaranteed, however, that externality-freeness also improves
the performance of a mechanism. An alternative to imposing externality-freeness is a
mechanism design approach that elicits not only the monetary payoffs of individuals
but also the precise functional form of their social preferences. However, a need to
specify the details of the nature and intensity of social preferences, which typically
differ across individuals and contexts, would work against our goal to develop robust
mechanisms in the spirit of the Wilson doctrine. We leave the question what can
and what cannot be reached with a fine-tuned approach to future research.
As an alternative to such an axiomatic approach one might simply try to iden-
tify the relevant deviations from selfish behavior empirically, e.g., with a laboratory
experiment, and then impose externality-freeness conditions only locally so as to
eliminate the specific deviations that pose problems for the mechanism design prob-
lem at hand. This approach has the advantage that it does not impose as many
additional constraints on the mechanism design problem. The disadvantage is that
it does not eliminate all the deviations from selfish behavior that can be rational-
ized by models of social preferences. Thus, it is not as robust as an externality-free
mechanism. We demonstrated the attractiveness of such an engineering approach in
the context of the bilateral trade problem. Imposing externality-freeness only locally
enabled us to find a mechanism that outperformed both an optimal mechanism for
selfish agents and an optimal externality-free mechanism.
Adding behavioral aspects to the mechanism design literature is a promising line
of research. That said, we caution that our study cannot, of course, capture all
behavioral aspects that seem relevant. For instance, our experiments do not shed
light on social preference robustness with incomplete information about monetary
payoffs. As a first step, we rather take the theoretically predicted equivalence of
implementability in all complete information environments and implementability
in all incomplete information environments, as well as the revelation principle, for
granted. This way, we can focus on the role of social preferences under certainty
in mechanism design, abstracting away from other potential influencing behavioral
factors which may arise in cognitively and socially more demanding environments.
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For instance, recent evidence and theory suggest that some patterns of risk-taking
in social context are not easily explained by either standard models of decision mak-
ing under uncertainty nor standard models of social preferences (e.g., Bohnet et al.
(2008), Bolton et al. (2015), Saito (2013), Ockenfels et al. (2014)). The implica-
tions of such findings for robust mechanism design need further attention. By the
same token, our approach leaves open the question whether we can generate the
behavior that is needed to implement a given social choice function also with an
indirect mechanism, which may be empirically more plausible, than a direct reve-
lation mechanism, e.g. one that simply asks individuals whether they are willing
to trade at particular prices. These are fundamental questions, and their answers
likely generate more important insights on how motivational and cognitive forces
affect the behavioral effectiveness and efficiency of economic mechanisms. We are
planning to check robustness along those lines in separate studies.
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4.B Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. The relaxed problem imposes only the buyer’s ex post
participation and incentive constraints, as well as the constraint that the expected
payments to the seller are equal to the expected payments of the buyer, with ex-
pectations computed using the designer’s subjective beliefs. Thus, the problem is to
choose, for every state (θb, θs) ∈ Θb ×Θs, qf (θb, θs), pfb (θb, θs) and pfs (θb, θs) so as to
maximize ∑
Θb×Θs
g(θb, θs)
(
pfs (θb, θs)− θsk(qf (θb, θs))
)
subject to the following constraints: (i) the resource constraint∑
Θb×Θs
g(θb, θs)p
f
b (θb, θs) ≥
∑
Θb×Θs
g(θb, θs)p
f
s (θb, θs) , (4.11)
(ii) the incentive and participation constraints for the buyer that are relevant if the
seller is of the high cost type,
θb q
f (θb, θs)− pfb (θb, θs) ≥ 0 , (4.12)
θb q
f (θb, θs)− pfb (θb, θs) ≥ 0 , (4.13)
θb q
f (θb, θs)− pfb (θb, θs) ≥ θb qf (θb, θs)− pfb (θb, θs) , (4.14)
and
θb q
f (θb, θs)− pfb (θb, θs) ≥ θb qf (θb, θs)− pfb (θb, θs) , (4.15)
and finally (iii) the incentive and participation constraints for the buyer that are
relevant if the seller is of the low cost type. These constraints have the same structure
as those in (4.12)-(4.15), except that θs is everywhere replaced by θs.
Obviously, the resource constraint will be binding, so that the objective becomes
to maximize ∑
Θb×Θs
g(θb, θs)
(
pfb (θb, θs)− θsk(qf (θb, θs))
)
subject to the constraints in (ii) and (iii). The solution can be obtained by solving
a separate optimization problem for each seller type. Thus, optimality requires that
qf (θb, θs), q
f (θb, θs), p
f
b (θb, θs), and p
f
f (θb, θs) are chosen so as to maximize∑
Θb
g(θb, θs)
(
pfb (θb, θs)− θsk(qf (θb, θs))
)
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subject to the constraints in (ii); likewise qf (θb, θs), q
f (θb, θs), p
f
b (θb, θs), and p
f
f (θb, θs)
are chosen so as to maximize∑
Θb
g(θb, θs)
(
pfb (θb, θs)− θsk(qf (θb, θs))
)
subject to the constraints in (iii).
The solution to these problems is well-known, see e.g., Bolton and Dewatripont
(2005). Thus, at a solution, the high-valuation buyer’s incentive constraint and the
low-valuation buyer’s participation constraints bind and the other constraints are
slack. For example, if θs = θs, then (4.12) and (4.15) bind, and (4.13) and (4.14)
are not binding. The optimal quantities are then obtained by substituting
pfb (θb, θs) = θbq
f (θb, θs)
and
pfb (θb, θs) = θbq
f (θb, θs)− (θb − θb)qf (θb, θs)
into the objective function which yields
g(θb, θs)
((
θb − g(θb,θs)g(θb,θs)(θb − θb)
)
qf (θb, θs)− θsk(qf (θb, θs))
)
+g(θb, θs)
(
θbq
f (θb, θs)− θsk(qf (θb, θs))
)
.
Choosing qf (θb, θs) and q
f (θb, θs) to maximize this expression yields the optimality
conditions that are stated in Proposition 1 in the body of the text. 2
Proof of Proposition 3. For the relaxed problem of optimal externality-free
mechanism design the objective is, again, the maximization of∑
Θb×Θs
g(θb, θs)
(
pfs (θb, θs)− θsk(qf (θb, θs))
)
.
The resource constraint in (4.11) is binding at a solution to this problem, so that
the objective can be equivalently written as∑
Θb×Θs
g(θb, θs)
(
pfb (θb, θs)− θsk(qf (θb, θs))
)
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The constraints are the low valuation buyer’s ex post participation constraints,
θbq
f (θb, θs)− pfb (θb, θs) ≥ 0 , (4.16)
and
θbq
f (θb, θs)− pfb (θb, θs) ≥ 0 ; (4.17)
the incentive constraint for a high type buyer who faces a low cost seller,
θbq
f (θb, θs)− pfb (θb, θs) ≥ θbqf (θb, θs)− pfb (θb, θs) , (4.18)
and the constraint, that the seller must not be able to influence the high valuation
buyer’s payoff,
θbq
f (θb, θs)− pfb (θb, θs) = θbqf (θb, θs)− pfb (θb, θs) . (4.19)
Note first that the constraint in (4.17) has to bind at a solution to this problem.
The payment pfb (θb, θs) enters only in this constraint. Hence, if we hypothesize a
solution to the optimization problem with slack in (4.17), we can raise pfb (θb, θs)
without violating any constraint, thereby arriving at a contradiction to the assump-
tion that the initial situation has been an optimum.
Second, the constraint in (4.16) binds as well. Suppose otherwise, then it is
possible to raise pfb (θb, θs) by some small ε > 0, without violating this constraint.
If at the same time, pfb (θb, θs) and p
f
b (θb, θs) are also raised by ε, then also the
constraints in (4.18) and (4.19) remain satisfied. These increases of the buyer’s
payments raise the objective function, again contradicting the assumption that the
initial situation has been optimal.
Third, the constraint in (4.18) has to be binding. Otherwise, it would be possible
to raise pfb (θb, θs) without violating this constraint. If at the same time, p
f
b (θb, θs) is
raised by ε, then also (4.19) remains satisfied. One more time, this contradicts the
assumption that the initial situation has been optimal.
These observations enables to express the buyer’s payments as functions of the
traded quantities, so that
pfb (θb, θs) = θbq
f (θb, θs) ,
pfb (θb, θs) = θbq
f (θb, θs) ,
pfb (θb, θs) = θbq
f (θb, θs)− (θb − θb)qf (θb, θs) ,
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and
pfb (θb, θs) = θbq
f (θb, θs)− (θb − θb)qf (θb, θs) .
Substituting these payments into the objective function yields
g(θb, θs)
((
θb − g(θb,θs)+g(θb,θs)g(θb,θs) (θb − θb)
)
qf (θb, θs)− θsk(qf (θb, θs))
)
+g(θb, θs)(θbq
f (θb, θs)− θsk(qf (θb, θs)))
+g(θb, θs)(θbq
f (θb, θs)− θsk(qf (θb, θs)))
+g(θb, θs)(θbq
f (θb, θs)− θsk(qf (θb, θs)))) .
Choosing qf (θb, θs), q
f (θb, θs), q
f (θb, θs) and q
f (θb, θs) so as to maximize this expres-
sion yields the optimality conditions stated in Proposition 3. 2
Proof of Proposition 5. We need to show that there is a solution to the opti-
mization problem in Proposition 1 that satisfies
pfs (θb, θs)− θsk(qf (θb, θs)) = pfs (θb, θs)− θsk(qf (θb, θs)) ,
and
pfs (θb, θs)− θsk(qf (θb, θs)) = pfs (θb, θs)− θsk(qf (θb, θs)) ,
or, equivalently,
pfs (θb, θs)− pfs (θb, θs) = θsk(qf (θb, θs))− θsk(qf (θb, θs)) , (4.20)
and
pfs (θb, θs)− pfs (θb, θs) = θsk(qf (θb, θs))− θsk(qf (θb, θs)) . (4.21)
The right-hand-side of equations (4.20) and (4.21) is pinned down by the charac-
terization in Proposition 1. However, this solution leaves degrees of freedom with
respect to the specification of the seller’s payments. It only requires that the resource
constraint binds which implies that∑
Θb×Θs
g(θb, θs)p
f
s (θb, θs) =
∑
Θb×Θs
g(θb, θs)p
f
b (θb, θs) . (4.22)
Again the right-hand side of this equation is pinned down by the characterization in
Proposition 1. Thus, the four payments to the seller pfs (θb, θs), p
f
s (θb, θs), p
f
s (θb, θs)
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and pfs (θb, θs) need to satisfy the three linear equations in (4.20), (4.21) and (4.22).
Obviously, there will be more than one combination of payments to the seller that
satisfy all of these conditions. 2
4.C Other models of social preferences
In the body of the text, we have shown that the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
predicts deviations from truth-telling in certain situations (see Observation 1 ). Be-
low, we present analogous findings for two other models of social preferences, Rabin
(1993) and Falk and Fischbacher (2006). The Rabin (1993)-model is an example
of intention-based social preferences, as opposed to the outcome-based model of
Fehr and Schmidt (1999). The model by Falk and Fischbacher (2006) is a hybrid
that combines considerations that are outcome-based with considerations that are
intention-based. We show that these models also satisfy Assumption 1, i.e. selfish-
ness in the absence of externalities.
Similar exercises could be undertaken for other models, such as Charness and Ra-
bin (2002), and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004). Whether or not these models
would predict deviations from truth-telling under the optimal mechanism for selfish
agents depends on the values of specific parameters in these models. To avoid a
lengthy exposition, we do not present these details here. The preferences in Char-
ness and Rabin (2002), and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) do, however satisfy
the assumption of selfishness in the absence of externalities (Assumption 1 ).
Rabin (1993). The utility function of any one player i utility takes the form
in (4.6). Rabin models the kindness terms in this expression in a particular way.
Kindness intended by i towards j is the difference between j’s actual material payoff
and an equitable reference payoff,
κi(ri, r
b
i , r
bb
i ) = pij(ri, r
b
i )− pieij (rbi ). (4.23)
The equitable payoff pieij (r
b
i ) is to be interpreted as a norm, or a payoff that j deserves
from i’s perspective. According to Rabin (1993), this reference point is the average
of the best and the worst player i could do to player j, i.e.
pieij (r
b
i ) =
1
2
(
maxri∈Eij(rbi )pij(θj, f(ri, r
b
i )) +minri∈Eij(rbi )pij(θj, f(ri, r
b
i ))
)
,
where Eij(ri) is the set of Pareto-efficient reports: A report ri belongs to Eij(r
b
i )
if and only if there is no alternative report r′i so that pii(r
′
i, r
b
i ) ≥ pii(ri, rbi ) and
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pij(r
′
i, r
b
i ) ≥ pij(ri, rbi ), with at least one inequality being strict. Rabin models the
beliefs of player i about the kindness intended by j in a symmetric way. Thus,
κj(r
b
i , r
bb
i ) = pii(r
b
i , r
bb
i )− pieji (rbbi ).
For later reference, it is useful to note that by equation (4.23), κi(ri, r
b
i , r
bb
i ) does
not explicitly depend on rbbi . In the context of Rabin’s model, we can therefore
simplify notation and write κi(ri, r
b
i ) rather than κi(ri, r
b
i , r
bb
i ).
Observation 3. Let f be a social choice function that solves a problem of optimal
robust mechanism design as defined in Section 4.3.2. Consider a complete informa-
tion types space for state (θb, θs) and suppose that θb = θ¯b. Suppose that f is such
that
pib(θb, f(θb, θs)) = pib(θb, f(θb, θs)) > pib(θb, f(θb, θs)) = pib(θb, f(θb, θs)) . (4.24)
Suppose that the buyer’s and the seller’s first and second order beliefs are as in a
truth-telling equilibrium. Also suppose that the buyer has Rabin (1993)-preferences
with yb 6= 0. Then the buyer’s best response is to truthfully reveal his valuation.
The social choice function in Example 1 fulfills Condition (4.24). Consider Table
3. The buyer’s incentive constraint binds. Moreover, if the buyer understates his
valuation this harms the seller. Since the seller’s intention, when truthfully reporting
his type, is perceived as kind, the buyer maximizes utility by rewarding the seller.
By (4.8), the buyer will therefore announce his type truth-fully for all yb.
Observation 4. Let f be a social choice function that solves a problem of optimal
robust mechanism design as defined in Section 4.3.2. Consider a complete informa-
tion types space for state (θb, θs) and suppose that θb = θ¯b. Suppose that f is such
that (4.24) holds. Suppose that the buyer’s and the seller’s first and second order
beliefs are as in a truth-telling equilibrium. Also suppose that the buyer has Rabin
(1993)-preferences with yb 6= 0. Then the buyer’s best response is to understate his
valuation.
The social choice function in Example 1 fulfills Condition (4.24). Consider Table
4. We hypothesize that truth-telling is an equilibrium and show that this leads to
a contradiction unless the buyer is selfish: The buyer’s incentive constraint binds.
Moreover, if the buyer understates his valuation this harms the seller. Since the
seller’s intention, when truthfully reporting his type, is perceived as unkind, the
buyer maximizes utility by punishing the seller. By (4.8), the buyer will therefore
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understate his type for all yb 6= 0. Hence, the Rabin model predicts that the buyer
will deviate from truth-telling, for all yb 6= 0. Put differently, truth-telling is a best
response for the buyer only if yb = 0, i.e. only if the buyer is selfish.
Finally, we note that the utility function in the Rabin (1993) model satisfies
Assumption 1 for all possible parametrization of the model. The reason is that two
actions which have the same implications for the other player generate the same
kindness. The one that is better for the own payoff is thus weakly preferred.
Observation 5. Suppose the buyer and the seller have preferences as in (4.6) with
parameters yb and ys, respectively. The utility functions Ub and Us satisfy Assump-
tion 1, for all yb 6= 0 and for all ys 6= 0,
Falk and Fischbacher (2006). We present a version of the Falk-Fischbacher-
model that is adapted to the two player simultaneous move games that we study.
The utility function takes again the general form in (4.6). The kindness intended
by player i is now given as
κi(ri, r
b
i , r
bb
i ) = pij(ri, r
b
i )− pij(rbi , rbbi ) ,
Moreover, κj(r
b
i , r
bb
i ) is modeled by Falk and Fischbacher in such a way that
κj(r
b
i , r
bb
i ) ≤ 0 , (4.25)
whenever pii(r
b
i , r
bb
i ) − pij(rbi , rbbi ) ≤ 0. More specifically, the following assumptions
are imposed:
(a) If pii(r
b
i , r
bb
i )− pij(rbi , rbbi ) = 0, then κj(rbi , rbbi ) = 0.
(b) The inequality in (4.25) is strict whenever pii(r
b
i , r
bb
i )−pij(rbi , rbbi ) < 0 and there
exists rj so that pii(rj, r
bb
i ) > pii(r
b
i , r
bb
i ).
(c) If pii(r
b
i , r
bb
i )− pij(rbi , rbbi ) < 0 and there is no rj so that pii(rj, rbbi ) > pii(rbi , rbbi ),
then κj(r
b
i , r
bb
i ) may be zero or positive.
The case distinction in (c) is decisive for the predictions of the Falk-Fischbacher-
model. If κj(r
b
i , r
bb
i ) > 0, then Observation 1 for the Fehr-Schmidt-model also holds
for the Falk-Fischbacher-model. If, by contrast, κj(r
b
i , r
bb
i ) = 0, then Observations 3
and 4 for the Rabin-model also hold for the Falk-Fischbacher-model. In any case,
the Falk-Fischbacher satisfies Assumption 1, the assumption of selfishness in the
absence of externalities.
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Observation 6. Suppose the buyer and the seller have preferences as in the model
of Falk and Fischbacher (2006) with parameters yb and ys, respectively. The utility
functions Ub and Us satisfy Assumption 1, for all yb 6= 0 and for all ys 6= 0.
This follows since pij(ri, r
b
i ) = pij(r
′
i, r
b
i ) implies that κi(ri, r
b
i , r
bb
i ) = κi(r
′
i, r
b
i , r
bb
i ).
Consequently, two actions that yield the same payoff for the other player generate
the same value of κi(ri, r
b
i , r
bb
i )κj(r
b
i , r
bb
i ).
4.D Externality-freeness as a necessary condition.
Proposition 6 below states a condition under which externality-freeness and incentive-
compatibility are not only sufficient, but also necessary for social-preference robust-
ness. To prove Proposition 6 we focus on a specific model of social preferences,
namely the one by Rabin (1993), and work with the solution concept of a fairness
equilibrium that has been introduced in that paper. We require that a social choice
function is robustly implementable as a fairness equilibrium, i.e. we require that
there is a mechanism that reaches this social function on every complete informa-
tion type space, and for each possible specification of the weights y1 and y2 that
players 1 and 2 assign to kindness in their overall utility function in (4.6). We
provide necessary conditions for robust implementability as a fairness equilibrium.
Robust implementability as a fairness equilibrium is in turn a necessary condition
for social-preference-robustness.
Robust implementability as a fairness equilibrium. There are two agents
I = {1, 2}. We seek to implement a social choice function f : Θ1 ×Θ2 → X, where
X is an abstract set of economic outcomes. Thus, given a profile of preferences
parameters (θ1, θ2), the material payoff for agent 1 is denoted by pi1(θ1, f(θ1, θ2))
and the material payoff for agent 2 by pi2(θ2, f(θ1, θ2)).
In the context of Rabin’s model of social preferences, the validity of the revela-
tion principle cannot be taken for granted, see Bierbrauer and Netzer (2016). We
therefore consider the implementation of the social choice function f by means of
an arbitrary allocation mechanism that consists of a set of reports R1, with typical
entry r1, for player 1, a set of reports R2, with typical entry r2, for player 2 and an
outcome function g : R1×R2 → X that assigns an economic outcome to each profile
of reports.
The utility that individual i realizes can be written as
Ui(ri | θi, yi, rbi , rbbi ) = pii(θi, f(ri, rbi )) + yi κi(ri, rbi )κj(rbi , rbbi ) , (4.26)
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where yi is the weight that agent i assigns to kindness sensations. This notation
emphasizes that individual i chooses ri and that θi, yi, r
b
i and r
bb
i are parameters
that enter individual i’s utility function. The weights y1 and y2 take values in the
sets R0+. In the special case with y1 = y2 = 0, both individuals are selfish.
We consider complete information type spaces where both the profile of pref-
erence parameters (θ1, θ2) and the kindness weights (y1, y2) are commonly known
among the individuals. A mechanism M = [R1, R2, g] implements a social choice
function f on such a type space if there exist reports r∗1(θ1, y1) and r
∗
2(θ2, y2) such
that (i) the social choice function is reached, i.e.
g(r∗1(θ1, y1), r
∗
2(θ2, y2)) = f(θ1, θ2) (4.27)
and (ii) given correct first and second order beliefs, r∗1(θ1, y1) is the utility-maximizing
report for player 1 and r∗2(θ2, y2)) is the utility-maximizing report for player 2. More
formally, for all i and j 6= i,
r∗i (θi, yi) ∈ argmaxri∈Ri Ui(ri | θi, yi, r∗j (θj, yj)), r∗i (θi, yi)) . (4.28)
We say that f is robustly implementable as a fairness equilibrium if there exists
a mechanism M = [R1, R2, g], and a pair of functions r∗1 : Θ1 × Y1 → R1 and
r∗2 : Θ2 × Y2 → R2 so that (4.27) and (4.28) hold for all (θ1, y1) ∈ Θ1 × R0+ and all
(θ2, y2) ∈ Θ2 × R0+.
A necessary condition. Consider a specific violation of externality-freeness so
that player 1 has an influence on the payoff of player 2, and player 2 has a chance
to lower the payoff of player 1. Part B of Proposition 6 below asserts that, if
a social choice function violates externality-freeness in this specific way, then it
is not robustly implementable as a fairness equilibrium. The specific violation of
externality-freeness covers, in particular, environments with two types per player.
With a more general structure of type spaces, a social choice function f violates
externality-freeness in this way as soon as there is a type profile (θ1, θ2) so that, for
both players, truth-telling is neither entirely selfish, nor entirely selfless, i.e. as soon
as there exist (θ′1, θ
′
2) and (θ
′′
1 , θ
′′
2) such that
pi2(θ2, f(θ
′
1, θ2)) < pi2(θ2, f(θ1, θ2)) < pi2(θ2, f(θ
′′
1 , θ2))
and
pi1(θ1, f(θ1, θ
′
2)) < pi1(θ1, f(θ1, θ2)) < pi1(θ1, f(θ1, θ
′′
2)) .
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Externality-freeness, by contrast, requires that, for all i and all θj,
min
θi∈Θi
pij(θj, f(θi, θj)) = max
θi∈Θi
pij(θj, f(θi, θj)) .
Definition 2. We say that social choice function f violates externality-freeness in
a specific way if there is a complete information type space (θ1, θ2) and a pair of
alternative types (θ′1, θ
′
2) such that pi2(θ2, f(θ1, θ2)) < pi2(θ2, f(θ
′
1, θ2)) and
pi1(θ1, f(θ1, θ2)) > pi1(θ1, f(θ1, θ
′
2)).
Proposition 6.
A. If f is robustly implementable as a fairness equilibrium, then f is incentive
compatible.
B. If f violates externality-freeness in a specific way, then f is not robustly im-
plementable as a fairness equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 6. A. We first show that robust implementability of f
as a fairness equilibrium implies that f is incentive-compatible. Let yi = 0, then
implementability requires that
r∗i (θi, 0) ∈ argmaxri∈Ri pii(θi, g(ri, r∗j (θj, yj))) . (4.29)
for all θi ∈ Θi and all (θj, yj) ∈ Θj × R0+. In particular, this implies that for all θi,
all (θ′i, y
′
i) and all (θj, yj),
pii(θi, g(r
∗
i (θi, 0), r
∗
j (θj, yj))) ≥ pii(θi, g(r∗i (θ′i, y′i), r∗j (θj, yj))) .
Because of (4.27) this implies that, for all θi, all θ
′
i and all θj,
pii(θi, f(θi, θj)) ≥ pii(θi, f(θ′i, θj)) .
Thus, f is incentive compatible.
B. Let f be a social choice function that violates externality-freeness in a specific
way. We will show that this implies that there is a threshold yˆ2 so that conditions
(4.27) and (4.28) are incompatible whenever y2 ≥ yˆ2. To establish this claim we
have to go through a number of intermediate steps.
Step 1. We show that conditions (4.27) and (4.28) imply that every type of every
player behaves selfishly, i.e. that for all i, all (θi, yi) and all (θj, yj),
r∗i (θi, yi) ∈ argmaxri∈Ri pii(θi, g(ri, r∗j (θj, yj))) , (4.30)
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and that, as a consequence, equilibrium kindness is bounded from above by 0, i.e.
that
κi(r
∗
i (θi, yi), r
∗
j (θj, yj)) ≤ 0 , (4.31)
for all (θi, yi) and (θj, yj).
If (4.30) was violated for some type (θi, yi) of player i, then this type could reach
a higher material payoff by deviating from r∗i (θi, yi) to some other report. However,
by (4.27) the payoff consequence of choosing message r∗i (θi, yi) is the same as the
payoff consequence of choosing message r∗i (θi, 0). Thus, if type (θi, yi) can reach a
higher a higher material payoff by deviating from r∗i (θi, yi) then also type (θi, 0) can
reach a higher payoff by deviating from r∗i (θi, 0). But this would contradict (4.29).
Step 2. Fix a pair (y1, y2) and consider a complete information type space on
which externality freeness is violated in the sense of Definition 2. If player 1 be-
haves according to r∗1, then player 1’s equilibrium kindness is strictly negative. To
see this, note that by Step 1, player 1 behaves selfishly. Hence, he chooses the ac-
tion that minimizes player 2’s payoff from the set of Pareto-efficient action profiles
E12(r
∗
2(θ2, y2)). Hence,
pi2(θ2, f(θ1, θ2)) = pi2(θ2, g(r
∗
1(θ1, y1), r
∗
2(θ2, y2))) = min
r1∈E12(r∗2(θ2,y2))
pi2(θ2, g(r1, r
∗
2(θ2, y2))) .
By the specific violation of externality-freeness,
min
r1∈E12(r∗2(θ2,y2))
pi2(θ2, g(r1, r
∗
2(θ2, y2))) < min
r1∈E12(r∗2(θ2,y2))
pi2(θ2, g(r1, r
∗
2(θ2, y2))) ,
as player 1 could increase player 2’s payoff be choosing action r∗1(θ
′
1, y1) rather than
action r∗1(θ1, y1). Consequently κ1(r
∗
1(θ1, y1), r
∗
2(θ2, y2) < 0, for all (y1, y2).
Step 3. Consider the type profile (θ1, θ2) for which the specific violation of
externality-freeness occurs and a hypothetical fairness equilibrium in which player 1
behaves according to r∗1(θ1, y1) and player 2 behaves according to r
∗
2(θ2, y2). Given
correct first- and second-order beliefs, the best response problem for player 2 looks
as follows: Choose r2 ∈ R2, so as to maximize
pi2(θ2, g(r
∗
1(θ1, y1), r2)) + y2 κ
∗
1 pi1(θ1, g(r
∗
1(θ1, y1), r2))
where we omitted some constant terms from the objective function that do not
affect the solution of the optimization problem, and κ∗1 < 0 is a shorthand for
κ1(r
∗
1(θ1, y1), r
∗
2(θ2, y2)), i.e. the kindness of player 1 in the hypothetical equilibrium.
Now, if player 2 behaves according to r∗2(θ2, y2), then, by Step 1, this yields the
maximal value of pi2(θ2, g(r
∗
1(θ1, y1), r2)) over R2. If player 2 behaves according to
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r∗2(θ
′
2, y2), then because of (4.27), this yields a lower value of pi1(θ1, g(r
∗
1(θ1, y1), r2))
than behaving according to r∗2(θ2, y2). Moreover, if y2 is sufficiently large, overall
utility will then be larger if the action r∗2(θ
′
2, y2) is taken. But this contradicts the
best response condition in (4.28).
2
4.E Supplementary material
The locally externality-free social choice function
Example 3: An optimal robust and locally externality-free social choice
function. We illustrate Proposition 5 in the context of our numerical example.
The payoff functions, parameter values, and traded quantities are as in Example 1.
We denote the optimal mechanism that is locally externality-free by f ′′. Under f ′′,
payments to the seller are given by
pf
′′
s (θb, θs) = 3.955, p
f ′′
s (θb, θ¯s) = 1.215, p
f ′′
s (θ¯b, θs) = 6.955 and p
f ′′
s (θ¯b, θ¯s) = 2.14 .
Below is a detailed description of the normal form games that f ′′ induces on
the four different complete information type spaces and also a detailed description
of the experiment results in Treatment 3 which was based on f ′′. They can be
summarized as follows: As predicted, all low valuation buyers communicated their
types truthfully, just as in T1. For the states with high valuation buyers the locally
externality-free mechanism has less deviations from truth-telling than the mecha-
nism in Example 1. The difference is significantly different from zero for the states
with a low type seller (two-sided Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.033). It therefore also
generates higher expected seller profits (Πf
′′
= 4.90) than both the mechanism in
Example 1 (Πf = 4.82) and the globally externality-free mechanism in Example 2
(Πf
′
= 4.77). Both welfare comparisons are statistically significant (two-sided t-test,
p
T1 vs. T3
= 0.037 and p
T2 vs. T3
< 0.001).
Table 1”: The game induced by f ′′ for (θb, θs) = (θb, θs).
(pib, pis) θs θs
θb (2.68, 6.09) (2.68, 4.05)
θb (0.97, 6.09) (2.66, 4.86)
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Table 2”: The game induced by f ′′ for (θb, θs) = (θb, θs).
(pib, pis) θs θs
θb (2.68, 2.65) (2.68, 3.73)
θb (0.97,−5.79) (2.66, 3.73)
Table 3”: The game induced by f ′′ for (θb, θs) = (θb, θs).
(pib, pis) θs θs
θb (3.41, 6.09) (3.24, 4.05)
θb (3.43, 6.09) (3.43, 4.86)
Table 4”: The game induced by f ′′ for (θb, θs) = (θb, θs).
(pib, pis) θs θs
θb (3.41, 2.65) (3.24, 3.73)
θb (3.43,−5.79) (3.43, 3.73)
Choice data T3
Buyer Seller
Game induced by θb θb θs θs
T3
f ′′ for (θb, θs) 63 0 62 1
locally externality-free
f ′′ for (θb, θs) 63 0 0 63
mechanism
f ′′ for (θb, θs) 1 62 63 0
f ′′ for (θb, θs) 7 56 0 63
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Normal form games which are induced by the Mirrleesian
mechanism
The game induced by the Mirrleesian mechanism for (ω1, ω2) = (ωl, ωl).
(U1, U2) ωl ωh
ωl (3.26, 3.26) (3.26, 1.99)
ωh (1.99, 3.26) (1.99, 1.99)
The game induced by the Mirrleesian mechanism for (ω1, ω2) = (ωl, ωh).
(U1, U2) ωl ωh
ωl (3.26, 3.70) (3.26, 3.72)
ωh (1.99, 3.70) (1.99, 3.72)
The game induced by the Mirrleesian mechanism for (ω1, ω2) = (ωh, ωl).
(U1, U2) ωl ωh
ωl (3.70, 3.26) (3.70, 1.99)
ωh (3.72, 3.26) (3.72, 1.99)
The game induced by the Mirrleesian mechanism for (ω1, ω2) = (ωh, ωh).
(U1, U2) ωl ωh
ωl (3.70, 3.70) (3.70, 3.72)
ωh (3.72, 3.70) (3.72, 3.72)
Normal form games which are induced by the Piketty mech-
anism
The game induced by the Piketty mechanism for (ω1, ω2) = (ωl, ωl).
(U1, U2) ωl ωh
ωl (2.32, 2.32) (3.98, 1.04)
ωh (1.04, 3.98) (2.94, 2.94)
The game induced by the Piketty mechanism for (ω1, ω2) = (ωl, ωh).
(U1, U2) ωl ωh
ωl (2.32, 3.06) (3.98, 3.08)
ωh (1.04, 4.38) (2.94, 4.40)
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The game induced by the Piketty mechanism for (ω1, ω2) = (ωh, ωl).
(U1, U2) ωl ωh
ωl (3.06, 2.32) (4.38, 1.04)
ωh (3.08, 3.98) (4.40, 2.94)
The game induced by the Piketty mechanism for (ω1, ω2) = (ωh, ωh).
(U1, U2) ωl ωh
ωl (3.06, 3.06) (4.38, 3.08)
ωh (3.08, 4.38) (4.40, 4.40)
Choice data T4 and T5
Individual 1 Individual 2
Game induced by ω1l ω
1
h ω
2
l ω
2
h
T4
(ωl, ωl) 62 1 62 1
Mirrleesian
(ωl, ωh) 62 1 2 61
approach
(ωh, ωl) 2 61 62 1
(ωh, ωh) 2 61 2 61
T5
(ωl, ωl) 57 6 55 8
Piketty’s
(ωl, ωh) 60 3 14 49
approach
(ωh, ωl) 7 56 61 2
(ωh, ωh) 2 61 9 54
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4.F English Instructions (translated)
The following instructions are a translation of the instructions used in the experi-
ment, and are identical for all participants in all treatments.
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Instructions — General Part
Welcome to the experiment!
You can earn money in this experiment. How much you will earn, depends on your
decisions and the decisions of another anonymous participant, who is matched with
you. Independent of the decisions made during the experiment you will receive
7.00e as a lump sum payment. At the end of the experiment, positive and nega-
tive amounts earned will be added to or subtracted from these 7.00e. The resulting
total will be paid out in cash at the end of the experiment. All payments will be
treated confidentially.
All decisions made during the experiment are anonymous.
From now on, please do not communicate with other participants. If you have any
questions now or during the experiment, please raise your hand. We will then come
to you and answer your question.
Please switch off your mobile phone during the experiment. Documents (such as
books, lecture notes etc.) that do not deal with the experiment are not allowed.
In case of violation of these rules you can be excluded from the experiment and all
payments.
On the following page you will find the instructions concerning the course of the ex-
periment. After reading these, we ask you to wait at your seat until the experiment
starts.
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First Part — Presentation of decision settings, reading of payoffs
The purpose of this part of the experiment is to familiarize all participants with the
decision settings. This ensures that every participant understands the presentation
of the decision settings and can correctly infer the resulting payoffs of specific deci-
sion combinations. None of the choices in the first part are payoff-relevant.
In the course of this part, eight different decision settings will be presented to you.
In all of them two participants have to make a decision without knowing the deci-
sion made by the other participant. The combination of the decisions determines
the payoffs of both participants. [These eight decision settings refer to the four
complete information games of the respective social choice function of their specific
treatment. Each game was presented twice: First in the original form and then in a
strategically identical form where the payoffs of Participant A and B were switched.
This explanation is, of course, not part of the original instructions.]
Exemplary Decision Setting
Participant A, highlighted in green, can decide between Top or Bottom. Participant
B, highlighted in blue, can decide between Left and Right. The decision of Partici-
pant A determines whether the payment results from the upper or lower row in the
table. Accordingly, the decision of Participant B determines whether the payment
results from the left or right column. Both decisions combined unambiguously de-
termine the cell of the payoff pair.
Each cell contains a payoff pair for both participants. Which payoff is relevant for
which participant, is highlighted through their respective color. The green value,
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which can be found in the lower left corner of every cell, shows the payoff for Par-
ticipant A. The blue value, which can be found in the upper right corner of every
cell, shows the payoff for Participant B.
Please familiarize yourself with the payoff table. Put yourself in the position of both
participants and consider possible decisions each participant would make. After a
short time for consideration, you can enter a choice combination. The entry can
be modified and different constellations can be tried. After choosing two decisions,
please enter the payoffs which would result from this constellation. Your entry will
then be verified. If your entry is wrong, you will be notified and asked to correct it.
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Second Part — Decision Making
At the beginning of the second part you will be assigned to a role which remains
constant over the course of the experiment. It will be the role of either Participant
A or Participant B. Which role you are assigned to, will be clearly marked on your
screen. Please note that the assignment is random, both roles are equally likely. It
will be assured that half of the participants are assigned to the role of Participant
A and the other half to the role of Participant B.
Simultaneously to the assignment of roles, you are matched with a participant of a
different role. This matching is also random. In the course of the remaining experi-
ment you will interact with this participant.
The second part of the experiment consists of four decisions settings. Exactly one
decision setting is payoff relevant for you and the other participant matched with
you. Which decision setting that is, is determined by chance: Every decision setting
has the same chance of being chosen. Hence, please bear in mind that each of the
following decision settings can be payoff-relevant.
All decision settings are presented similarly to those of the first part. The difference
with respect to the first part is, that you can only make one decision, namely that
for your role. Thus, you do not know the decision of the participant matched with
you.
Only after you have made a decision for each of the four settings, you will learn
which decision setting is relevant for your payoff and the payoff of the participant
assigned to you. In addition, you will learn the decisions of the other participant in
all decisions settings.
After the resulting payoffs are displayed, the experiment ends. A short questionnaire
will appear on your screen while the experimenters prepare the payments. Please
fill out this questionnaire and wait at your seat until your number is called.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand.
Thank you for participating in this experiment!
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4.G German Instructions (original)
Instruktionen — Allgemeiner Teil
Herzlich Willkommen zum Experiment!
In diesem Experiment ko¨nnen Sie Geld verdienen. Wie viel Sie verdienen wer-
den, ha¨ngt von Ihren Entscheidungen und den Entscheidungen eines Ihnen zuge-
ordneten, aber Ihnen unbekannten anderen Experimentteilnehmers ab. Unabha¨ngig
von den Entscheidungen wa¨hrend des Experimentes erhalten Sie 7,00 Euro fu¨r Ihr
Erscheinen. Am Ende des Experimentes werden alle zusa¨tzlich verdienten positiven
wie negativen Betra¨ge zu diesen 7,00 Euro hinzuaddiert beziehungsweise abgezogen.
Die hieraus errechnete Endsumme wird Ihnen am Ende des Experimentes in bar
ausbezahlt. Ihre Auszahlung wird vertraulich behandelt.
Alle Entscheidungen, die Sie wa¨hrend des Experimentes treffen, sind anonym.
Bitte kommunizieren Sie ab sofort nicht mehr mit den anderen Teilnehmern. Falls
Sie jetzt oder wa¨hrend des Experimentes eine Frage haben, heben Sie bitte die Hand.
Wir werden dann zu Ihnen kommen und Ihre Frage beantworten.
Wa¨hrend des Experimentes bitten wir Sie außerdem Ihr Mobiltelefon auszuschalten.
Unterlagen (Bu¨cher, Vorlesungsskripte, etc.), die nichts mit dem Experiment zu tun
haben, du¨rfen wa¨hrend des Experimentes nicht verwendet werden. Bei Versto¨ßen
gegen diese Regeln ko¨nnen wir Sie vom Experiment und allen Auszahlungen aus-
schließen.
Auf dem na¨chsten Blatt finden Sie die Instruktionen zum Ablauf des Experiments.
Nachdem Sie diese gelesen haben, bitten wir Sie an Ihrem Platz zu warten bis das
Experiment gestartet wird.
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Erster Teil — Pra¨sentation von Entscheidungssituationen, Ablesen von
Auszahlungen
Dieser Teil des Experimentes dient ausschließlich dazu, dass sich alle Teilnehmer
mit bestimmten Entscheidungssituationen vertraut machen. Dies stellt sicher, dass
jeder Teilnehmer die Darstellung der Entscheidungssituationen versteht und die
aus Entscheidungskombinationen resultierenden Auszahlungen korrekt ablesen kann.
Entsprechend sind Ihre Entscheidungen im ersten Teil des Experimentes auch nicht
auszahlungsrelevant.
Im Folgenden werden Ihnen acht verschiedene Entscheidungssituationen pra¨sentiert.
In all diesen Situationen mu¨ssen zwei Teilnehmer eine Entscheidung in Unkenntnis
der Entscheidung des anderen Teilnehmers treffen. Die Kombinationen der Entschei-
dungen legen die Auszahlungen fu¨r beide Teilnehmer fest.
Teilnehmer A, in gru¨ner Farbe markiert, kann zwischen
”
Oben“ und
”
Unten“ wa¨hlen.
Teilnehmer B, in blauer Farbe markiert, kann zwischen
”
Links“ und
”
Rechts“ wa¨hlen.
Die Entscheidung von Teilnehmer A legt fest, ob die Auszahlungen aus einer Zelle der
oberen oder unteren Zeile der Tabelle resultieren. Entsprechend legt die Entschei-
dung von Teilnehmer B fest, ob die Auszahlungen aus einer Zelle der linken oder
rechten Spalte der Tabelle resultieren. Beide Entscheidungen zusammen legen ein-
deutig fest, aus welcher Zelle das Auszahlungspaar resultiert.
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In jeder Zelle ist ein Auszahlungspaar fu¨r beide Teilnehmer festgelegt. Welche
Auszahlung hierbei fu¨r welchen Teilnehmer gilt, ist entsprechend der Farbe der Teil-
nehmer hervorgehoben. Der gru¨ne Wert, welcher in jeder Zelle in der Ecke unten
links zu finden ist, gibt die Auszahlung fu¨r Teilnehmer A an. Der blaue Wert,
welcher in jeder Zelle in der Ecke oben rechts zu finden ist, gibt die Auszahlung fu¨r
Teilnehmer B an.
Wir bitten Sie, sich mit den Ihnen pra¨sentierten Auszahlungstabellen vertraut zu
machen. Bitte versetzen Sie sich hierfu¨r in die Position der beiden Teilnehmer und
u¨berlegen Sie sich, welcher Teilnehmer wohl welche Entscheidung treffen wu¨rde.
Nach einer kurzen Bedenkzeit ko¨nnen Sie Ihre Eingabe ta¨tigen. Diese ko¨nnen Sie
nach Wunsch vera¨ndern und so verschiedene Konstellationen ausprobieren. Nach-
dem Sie zwei Aktionen ausgewa¨hlt haben, geben Sie bitte die Auszahlungen ein,
welche aus dieser Konstellation resultieren wu¨rden. Ihre Eingabe wird hiernach
auf Richtigkeit u¨berpru¨ft. Falls Ihre Eingabe fehlerhaft sein sollte, wird Ihnen dies
angezeigt und Sie erhalten die Aufforderung Ihre Eingabe zu korrigieren.
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Zweiter Teil — Treffen von Entscheidungen
Zu Beginn des zweiten Teils bekommen Sie eine feste Rolle zugewiesen, entweder
die Rolle von Teilnehmer A oder von Teilnehmer B. Welche Rolle Sie zugewiesen
bekommen, wird auf Ihrem Bildschirm klar gekennzeichnet. Die Zuordnung von Ex-
perimentteilnehmern in bestimmte Rollen erfolgt zufa¨llig und jede Rolle ist hierbei
gleich wahrscheinlich. Es wird lediglich beru¨cksichtigt, dass die Ha¨lfte der Experi-
mentteilnehmer die Rolle A und die andere Ha¨lfte die Rolle B hat.
Gleichzeitig mit der Zuweisung von Experimentteilnehmern in Rollen wird Ihnen
ein Experimentteilnehmer mit einer von Ihnen unterschiedlichen Rolle zugewiesen.
Auch diese Zuordnung erfolgt zufa¨llig. Im Verlauf des restlichen Experimentes in-
teragieren Sie mit diesem Experimentteilnehmer.
Der zweite Teil des Experimentes besteht aus vier Entscheidungssituationen. Genau
eine der Situationen ist fu¨r Sie und fu¨r den Ihnen zugeordneten Experimentteil-
nehmer auszahlungsrelevant. Welche Entscheidung auszahlungsrelevant ist, wird
dabei vom Zufall bestimmt: Jede Entscheidungssituation hat die gleiche Wahrschein-
lichkeit ausgewa¨hlt zu werden. Beachten Sie also, dass jede der folgenden Entschei-
dungssituationen fu¨r Sie auszahlungsrelevant sein ko¨nnte.
Alle Entscheidungssituationen gleichen vom Aufbau denen des ersten Teils. Im Un-
terschied zum ersten Teil ko¨nnen Sie jedoch nur eine Entscheidung treffen, diejenige
Ihrer Rolle. Sie kennen die Entscheidung des Ihnen zugeordneten Teilnehmers nicht.
Erst nachdem Sie fu¨r alle vier Situationen eine Entscheidung festgelegt haben, er-
fahren Sie, welche der Entscheidungssituation auszahlungsrelevant war und wie sich
der Ihnen zugeordnete Experimentteilnehmer in allen Situationen entschieden hat.
Nachdem alle Entscheidungen getroffen sind, ist das Experiment zu Ende. Es folgt
ein kurzer Fragebogen auf Ihrem Bildschirm, wa¨hrend die Experimentatoren die
Auszahlungen vorbereiten. Wir bitten Sie diesen Fragebogen auszufu¨llen. Warten
Sie hiernach bitte an Ihrem Platz bis Sie zur Auszahlung aufgerufen werden.
Wenn Sie noch Fragen haben, so heben Sie bitte Ihre Hand.
Vielen Dank fu¨r Ihre Teilnahme!
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